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ABSTRACT

MEANINGS AND TYPOLOGIES OF DUBOISIAN DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS
WITHIN 20TH CENTURY UNITED STATES RACIAL DYNAMICS

June 2012

Marc E. Black, B.A. in African American Studies Oberlin College
M.A., University of Massachusetts Boston

Directed by Professor Lilia Bartolome

Americans still have more work ahead before we can come together and laugh
together as a race-conscious people. This thesis is about the sad and painful work we
need to do so we can heal and rejoice as a truly free and equal partnership of all our
various communities. To tie ourselves together through and after our healing of our
racial conflicts, we will share a special intimacy, a human connection, where our
shared culture, our partnership, (overlapping with our primary cultures) includes our
high proficiency at understanding how we appear to each other. This new cultural
understanding and partnership is explored in this thesis as the conception of,
―Multilateral double consciousness,‖ which is derived from W.E.B. DuBois‘ (1903)
conception of African American double consciousness. In the first of three sections of
iv

this thesis, the Introduction and Literature Review explain and explore some general,
historical and literary meanings of DuBoisian double consciousness as a political
position of oppression. Second, the Methodology and Findings sections offer
evidence of seven typologies of DuBoisian double consciousness within twenty six
African American works of fiction and non-fiction. These examples of double
consciousness reveal some degrees of personal harm caused by double consciousness.
They demonstrate that the prevalence of the problem deserves far more attention,
especially from academia, than it has received. Last, the third section of this thesis
includes the Discussion and Conclusion. The Discussion extends the focus to consider
how white Americans can learn to see themselves as white, and see their whiteness,
from perspectives of people of color. That would situate double consciousness as a
shared burden and a shared gift. All Americans would be equally situated to negotiate
their identities and relations on fair and transparent terms. The Conclusion shows how
race and colorblindness are hidden ideologies. It also shows how they can help reveal
the meanings and functionings of hidden ideologies more generally. The Conclusion
ties in DuBoisian double consciousness and Multilateral double consciousness to their
brother-concepts of ideology in Marxian philosophy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

A Definition of Race and its Link to Double Consciousness
To help reveal the social meanings of race and to help expose the racism of
―colorblindness,‖ the meaning of race in this thesis is based on Glenn C. Loury‘si (2002)
explanation of race in The Anatomy of Racial Inequality. Loury establishes,

In this book, I use that term [of race] to refer to a cluster of inheritable bodily
markings carried by a largely endogenous group of individuals, markings that can
be observed by others with ease, that can be changed or misrepresented only with
great difficulty, and that have come to be invested in a particular society at a
given historical moment with social meaning. (pp. 20-21)

The complexion of one‘s skin, the texture of one‘s hair and the shapes of one‘s
features are inheritable, easy to see and hard to change or disguise. These markings are
used and reproduced by people to separate themselves and others into categories that they

i

Glenn Loury is a professor of social sciences and economics at Brown (http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/
Glenn_Loury/louryhomepage/). Earlier, at Boston University, Professor Loury was the mentor and
professor of the writer of this thesis.
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contrive for their own purposes of organization, identity, control and power. Loury
emphasizes, ―Moreover, what is ‗essential‘ here is that these physical traits are taken to
signify something of import within an historical context‖ (2002, p. 21).
Race is formative of individuality and identity as it is a position within which and
by which individuality and identity is situated to develop and function. However unique
and autonomous an individual may feel, she depends on her social context for that
individuality and identity to exist. One‘s race is, or races are, part of that social context
(which also includes one‘s class, religion, nationality, cultures, in some ways gender, etc)
and part of the individuality and identity derived from that social context.
These social categories of race, Loury writes later,
are among the structures in our social environment to which meanings about the
identity, capability, and worthiness of their bearers have been imputed. I repeat:
―Race‖ is all about embodied social significance… [Bodily markings are] signs
from which cues of identities are drawn, and upon which indices of belongingness
are inscribed. As we encounter one another in social space, we perceive the
physical markings on one another‘s bodies and go on to play our respective parts,
enacting scripts written long before we were born… Here we enter the territory of
racial stigma, of dishonorable meanings socially inscribed on arbitrary bodily
markings, of ―spoiled collective identities.‖ (2002, pp. 58-59)

Insignificant biological differences are endemically imparted with social
meanings. Race means historical, institutionalized, deliberate, unintended, covert and
ongoing social ascription of inferiority and superiority based on physical markings
connoted as, in this case, ―Black,‖ and, ―White.‖ This is the meaning of race that is used
and explored in this thesis. The collective black burdens and white privileges of these

2

ascriptions or projected identities are explored through consideration of DuBoisian
double consciousness.

DuBoisian Double Consciousness
W.E.B. DuBois‘ notion of double consciousness is an important, but
controversial, concept in African American Studies. It is important because it reveals, or
actually is, the condition of African Americans being forced to try to maintain and
develop their own self-definitions while enduring hostile and negating identities that are
imposed by the outside white supremacist society through the racism of many white
Americans. These conflicting and even overlapping self-defined identities and projected
identities contribute to unique positions and experiences of African American people.
This is the general operational definition of double consciousness suggested by the
research of this thesis. However, such an operational definition is highly speculative
because the meaning, experience and condition of double consciousness is not fully
revealed by DuBois. Nor has the concept of black double consciousness been developed
and defined thoroughly and clearly since DuBois discussed the concept.
Double consciousness continues to be considered by leaders in the field of
African American Studies, including those discussed in the Literature Review section of
this thesis (Allen, 2003; Andrews, 2003; Hathaway, 2005; Krasner, 1995; Rucker, 2002;
Shaw, 2004). However, the work on the meaning, or meanings, and roles of double
consciousness do not yet comprise a comprehensive and specific debate with consensus
on what is being argued, what DuBois means and how these arguments and meanings
3

(first) could or could not pertain to or help explain racial struggles of African Americans
and (second) could lead to new views and understandings of racial struggles that reveal
under-explored interracial dynamics in the US. Given this incompleteness of double
consciousness debate, theory and exploration, I believe that further exploration of
DuBoisian double consciousness would significantly contribute to the development,
thoroughness, rigor, flexibility, clarity and depth of academic debate, self-awareness,
critical thinking, border crossing and social interaction in generalii.
Double consciousness is important to study because there seems to be evidence of
it in canonical and lesser known African American literature and non-fiction. This
evidence is seldom explicit, so it can appear not to represent double consciousness. That
can make double consciousness difficult to notice and easy to miss. However, as
someone interested in African American literature, critical thought and multicultural
education, I want to look more closely at a conception of double consciousness and
determine if and how it is represented in African American literature. By identifying and
exploring the usually implicit evidence of African American double consciousness in the
literature, I hope to contribute to a meaning and discussion of the concept that will help
all Americans, and especially teachers, to become more familiar with racial dynamics,
tensions, positions and relationships within which we participate, but that we might not
always notice and understand.

ii

Anita Hoya Patterson‘s (1997) From Emerson to King is a profound study of double consciousness in
American psychology, thought, literature and politics. It was not read or used in this thesis, though, as this
thesis is written in preparation for further study including Patterson‘s book.

4

W. E. B. DuBois (1965) provides a definition of double consciousness. In his
1903 book, Souls of Black Folk, DuBois defines double consciousness as African
Americans being forced to view themselves through the hostile and imposed perspectives
of white Americans, while also maintaining their own self-defined views of themselves.
Double consciousness refers to African Americans being able to ―see‖ themselves
through (and look from) their own individual and ―black‖ perspectives while also
―seeing‖ themselves through (and looking from) the perspectives of dominant white
culture. This kind of double consciousness results from the subjugation of African
Americans. DuBois says,

After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian,
the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight
in this American world,- a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but
only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a
particular sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always looking at
one‘s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one‘s soul by the tape of a
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,- an
American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two
warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being
torn asunder. (1965, p. 214-5)
DuBois is explaining that as oppressed people, African Americans have been
forced to develop a dual perception of who they are as human beings and as blacks who
are positioned as racially inferior in a white supremacist society. Dubois explains that as
a subordinated people, African Americans must be ever cognizant of whites‘ negative
and racist perceptions that typically involve (often rationalized and denied) contempt
towards them as ―deficient‖ and ―less than.‖ In this historical context, being an
5

―American‖ means African Americans have to be integrated, assimilated or marginalized
for subordination and invisibility instead of their being included as full citizens on their
own equally negotiated terms. Who one is personally and who one is publicly in
mainstream white society can be uniquely contradictory for African American people.
This is what Dubois laments and reveals.
DuBois sees that African Americans can be Americans without the subordination
part. By illuminating how the ―strength‖ of African Americans keeps them ―from being
torn asunder,‖ he highlights that despite the efforts of whites to completely subordinate
African Americans and impose negative and racist identities, most African Americans
find alternative schemas to these inferior definitions and strive to retain views of
themselves that are more self-defined, humane and accurate (1965, p. 215).

6

CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis will review many classic texts of African American literature to search
for implicit or explicit examples of double consciousness. The goal and purpose of this
literature review will be to discover whether or not the authors write of situations where
African Americans are forced to view themselves from the perspectives of whites while
trying to maintain their own personal perspectives. If such situations are found, then they
will serve as implicit or explicit examples of DuBoisian double consciousness.

1. Does African American writing illustrate DuBois’ concept of double
consciousness? Pursuing this question involves situating Richard Wright (through
his novels, Native Son and Black Boy) as an ideal example of implicit discussions
of double consciousness in African American writing. Then, other writings can be
considered to explore whether or not they provide other examples of double
consciousness.

7

CHAPTER 3
AFRICAN AND AMERICAN CONTEXTS OF DUBOISIAN DOUBLE
CONSCIOUSNESS

DuBois reveals that African Americans are ―gifted with second sight,‖ which
could be a positive (or perhaps ironic) ability and agility to view themselves and their
position from multiple perspectives. Maybe the gift of second sight, or the positive gift of
multiple perspectives and irony, is sabotaged because it is a position (or, ―Fulcrum‖
(James, 2007 pp. 311-12)) by which the white world imposes contempt and pity as
obstacles to ―true self consciousness‖ (1965, p. 215).
DuBois does not define self consciousness. This imprecision, along with the
indefinite meanings of double consciousness, makes DuBoisian double consciousness
difficult to explore conceptually and, likely, personally. However, looking back and
beyond the African peoples‘ experiences in the Americas, Tony Menelik Van Der Meer
(2004) shows how a part of Yoruban culture (that was brought to the Americas by
enslaved Africans) can provide a grounding or foundation for an Afro-centric meaning of
self consciousness. This foundation offers essential life-guidance for individuals to
8

develop their senses of self; and the foundation connects seamlessly with DuBoisian
double consciousness.
In Yoruban culture, Van Der Meer explains, ―Ifa,‖ is the ―system of divination
where thousands of sacred stories live that can inform a person of matters involving their
past, present and future‖ (Van Der Meer, 2004, p. 198). Within the system of Ifa are the
principles of good character, or, ―Iwa Pele.‖ However, Van Der Meer continues, in this
world where corruption and racism hides itself with false claims to democracy,
[O]ne‘s development of good character is a revolutionary act. This act requires
structural changes in our personalities; it‘s an action which improves on the
internal weakness within us while at the same time struggling with the vestiges of
colonialism that have shaped our internalized racial oppression and our
dehumanization (Van Der Meer, 2004, p. 198).
Good character as a revolutionary act is a powerful idea. As Van Der Meer
describes it, Iwa Pele seems to involve looking at and seizing or ameliorating the overt
and covert practices and damages of racism. (Interesting to explore too that this Iwa Pele
and its exposure of racist conditionings could be developed by anyone, even white
Americans who have perspectives that are unknowingly shaped by whiteness. Whiteness
and double consciousness is pursued later in this thesis.)
―Ori,‖ is another part of Ifa. Ori is the part of us that knows and leads us in the
direction of life that is the right one for ourselves according to ourselves. Van Der Meer
does not go into it extensively, but what he explains of Ori is enticing and provocative.
―Ori, or ipori, is our inner head‖ (Van Der Meer, 2004, p. 199). Perhaps this is the deep
and definite sense of what is and is not ―right for me.‖ Then, perhaps Ori would be the
sense that ―knows‖ what is right for me. The Ifa Literary Corpus explains,
9

Every man‘s Ori is regarded as his personal god who is expected to be more
interested in his personal affairs than the other gods who are regarded as belonging to
everybody… Whatever a man‘s Ori has refused to approve cannot by any other god.
(Van Der Meer, 2004, pp. 199-200)
This notion is strong. One‘s Ori seems to overrule any identity or motivation
involving one‘s personal affairs. It may be a clarity of who one is and what one is about
beyond ordinary awareness. Ori development is closely connected with Iwa Pele. Van
Der Meer explains,
[I]t is the inoculation with the principles of good character through Ifa that
enables one to internalize a healthier set of ―ideas and values… [I]t is through this
[Yoruban] cultural framework that one develops a sense of self…‖ (Van Der
Meer, 2004, pp. 201-202)
Although Ifa can instill good character and a healthy sense of self, Van Der Meer
emphasizes, the power of American pop culture and materialistic values focuses
especially on African Americans as resources to exploit for profit (Van Der Meer, 2004,
pp. 201-202). Blacks, like others each in their unique and similar ways, are trapped in a
psychological, political, cultural and economic ideology of capitalistic imperialism, neo
colonialism, or euphemistically, globalism. Recourse to obsession with money (and
recourse to the negation of the black self by the system of Western globalism) could be a
recovery or rebirth of earlier Yoruban cultural foundations of self and character. Van Der
Meer (2004) quotes Amil Cabral (a revolutionary leader of Guinea and Cape Verde (Van
Der Meer, 2004, p. 198)), as saying,
A people who free themselves from foreign domination will be free culturally
only if, without complexes and without underestimating the importance of
10

positive accretions from the oppressors and other cultures, they return to the
upward paths of their own culture, which is nourished by living reality of its
environment, and which negates both harmful influences and any kind of
subjection to foreign culture. Thus it may be seen that if imperialist domination
has the vital need to practice cultural oppression, national liberation is necessarily
an act of culture. (2004, p. 201)
A rebirth of one‘s own culture can negate harmful influences from, and
subjugation by, a foreign culture. With this strategy of rebirth and with some parts of
Yoruban culture that can be reborn, some of the difficulties of DuBoisian double
consciousness can be addressed. One problem of double consciousness, as mentioned
earlier, is that the gift of second sight, or the positive gift of multiple perspectives and
irony, may be sabotaged because it is a position (or, ―Fulcrum‖ (James, 2007 pp. 31112)) by which the white world imposes contempt and pity as obstacles to ―true self
consciousness‖ (1965, p. 215). Perhaps Ifa, especially Iwa Pele and Ori, can provide
immunity to the imposition of obstacles to self consciousness. Through Ifa, perhaps, it
would not matter to blacks‘ senses of self what white people think or do because Ifa
would be the source of the deeper sense of self and identity that would be impervious to
the racist projections of white Americans and institutions as well as the consequential
dynamics of black invisibility.
Van Der Meer directly links Ifa to the self definition side of DuBoisian double
consciousness. He says,
It is important that we are clear and come to grips with this dichotomy of either
accepting the values and beliefs of ―cultural oppression‖ or focusing on the
cultural principles that aid us in our liberation against domination. This choice is
reflective of what W.E.B. Du Bois expressed… about the dilemma of African
11

Americans confronted with ―double consciousness.‖ (Van Der Meer, 2004, p.
201)

Perhaps, then, Ifa is a source or meaning of self consciousness that could serve as
a source of self definition and an established starting point for consideration of
DuBoisian double consciousness. This would reverse the direction of the exploration. It
would lead from self consciousness to double consciousness because it would start with a
definition of self consciousness from Yoruban culture. However, DuBois neither
discusses Yoruban culture nor explains self consciousness. There is no such conceptual
grounding for his exploration. In this nebula, DuBois does identify double consciousness
as the absence of true self consciousness.
In DuBois‘ writing, self consciousness is what develops from a reconciliation of
double consciousness as a position of negation. He is seeking to determine and develop
what fills a void (self consciousness) by first identifying and defining the void (double
consciousness). DuBois is defining an actual, but yet unexplained, existence (involving
self consciousness) from a position of non-being (involving double consciousness). That
is why double consciousness is first defined negatively, as the absence of self
consciousness. Then, with that background of negativity, within that void of DuBoisian
double consciousness, the meanings of self consciousness can be seen as they fill in their
absence.
As a negative meaning, double consciousness arising from the absence of self
consciousness may involve black Americans‘ being forced to continually see themselves
through the perspective of the dominant and negating external white community and
12

broader culture. As an absence of self consciousness, double consciousness could be
one‘s being forced to always look at oneself through the eyes of others. The double
consciousness might be the duality of perspectives, a duality of senses of self, that is
imposed when one‘s own sense of self is contradicted by a negating projected identity.
DuBois‘ double consciousness connects with the double consciousness model of
his Harvard PhD professor, William James. They share an awareness of, and concern for,
the negation of the self that occurs when one‘s intrinsic sense of identity and being is not
recognized by other people and other communities. DuBois says,
It is a particular sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always looking at one‘s self
through the eyes of others, of measuring one‘s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused
contempt and pity.

Here, DuBois explains that African Americans are defined externally and treated
with contempt because of those judgments. Always having to look at themselves through
the eyes of others (i.e., white people of a white supremacist society) means that the
whites never have to look at blacks, or themselves, through the eyes of African American
people. How blacks see themselves and whites is not reflected back through and by the
broader American society and mainstream culture. Blacks then receive no recognition of
their self definitions except from themselves and their own communities.
James helps to show the severity and suffering of such a position by saying,
A man‘s Social Self is the recognition which he gets from his mates. We are not
only gregarious animals, liking to be in sight of our fellows, but we have an innate
propensity to get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, by our kind. No more
fiendish punishment could be devised, were such a thing physically possible, than
that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all
the members thereof.
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James is not suggesting a mere hypothetical situation. Knowingly or not, he is
actually describing the double consciousness position of African Americans that DuBois
knows, articulates and explicates. How one sees himself is not recognized and reflected
back by others in the community. This makes one unnoticed and invisible. DuBois, like
James, sees that people cannot live healthily this way. DuBois, however, seems to notice
how these conditions do exist for blacks where James leads in other directions (of how
people choose between selves, or identities and ways of behaving, that are available to
them for different situations).
This bifurcation is interesting. James is white so he can easily explore choices
between recognized selves, but DuBois is debarred from such pursuit. His blackness is
defined exogenously as excluded from participation in negotiation of who one is and
whom each other is at such psychological depth of the two scholars. The exogenous
definition of blackness as exclusion from negotiation of self and other, then, might be a
pillar of the DuBoisian double consciousness burden.
Double consciousness as a result of such deep and thorough exclusion from
identity negotiation may be a historical determination, a destiny, for possibly all of the
Americans who are socially ascribed as black. Through a pre-existing racial hierarchy
and through the corresponding denial of one‘s sense of self, history can both shape a
person‘s racial and national identities and concurrently set a person at odds with his/her
identities and history. In this way, double consciousness is a result and example of the
ongoing institution of American racism.
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However, helping to introduce the relationship between the individual and the
historical production of self; senses of self; and individuality, Tommy Lott says DuBois
―proposed to resolve the dilemma of double consciousness by appealing to a revisionist
analysis of the concept of race that eschews a biological essentialist account of race
identity‖ (in Pittman, 1997, p. 166). Explaining DuBois‘ meaning, Lott (in Pittman, 1997)
writes,
African-Americans must invent a conception of themselves that will contribute to
their social elevation as a group. [DuBois‘] revisionist notion of race was
therefore proposed at the outset of something African-Americas must selfconsciously adopt for political purposes. We can notice that he did not fail to
acknowledge the social construction of the concept of race when, in his citation of
the eight distinct racial groups, he qualified his reference with the phrase, ―in the
sense which history tells us the word must be used.‖ (Pittman, 1997, p. 168,
emphasis in original)

Lott explains that DuBois is proposing to revise meanings of race for collective
political power. Appropriating their negation this way would introduce African
Americans into actual negotiation over terms of a debate from which they have been
barred. Who is oneself within a community? Who decides? Why? How? How is one‘s
putative autonomy actually perniciously insidious? By emphasizing identity with the
libratory history of blackness, rather than the identity of inferiority, DuBois and Lott help
reveal, a new sense of self as agent might help overrule the effects of negation from the
outside white community.
The issue of choosing one‘s identity is explored and presented by James, but he
does not address the racial inequalities in identity choice that concern DuBois. James
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explains that people can select their preferred representation of themselves according to
the social situation they are in and the people they are with. He says,
Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who
recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind… [H]e has as many
different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion
he cares. He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different
groups… We do not show ourselves to our children as to our club-companions, to
our customers as to the laborers we employ, to our masters and employers as to
our intimate friends. From this there results what practically is a division of the
man into several selves; and this may be a discordant splitting, as where one is
afraid to let one set of his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere; or it may
be a perfectly harmonious division of labor, as where one tender to his children is
stern to the soldiers or prisoners under his command. (294)
James explains ―a division of the man into several selves; and this may be a
discordant splitting.‖ He mentions fear of letting one group know oneself as another
group knows oneself. Perhaps double consciousness includes this fear and separatism. If
black Americans are forced to keep their self definitions separate from their ascribed
identities, then each identity needs its own venue or world. Maybe the possible intrusion
of one world into the other causes fear because it might risk a confusion or conflict of
selves. This suggests that one person may have to be two different people for two
separate groups that must be kept separate. However, in DuBois‘ work, a merging of
selves can occur through Black Nationalism and Pan Africanism. In this model, black
unity supersedes the systems, structures and splits that DuBois and James explain.
For DuBois, the focus is on how African Americans can redefine themselves and
blackness to merge the ―discordant splitting‖ between their self definitions and the
negation and invisibility from the white community.
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DuBois says,
The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife—this longing to
attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer
self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not
Africanize America . . . He would not bleach his Negro soul . . . He simply wishes
to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being
cursed and spit upon by his fellow, without having the doors of Opportunity
closed roughly in his face.
This, then, is the end of his striving; to be a co-worker in the kingdom of
culture . . . (1965, p. 215)

By redefining and revising meanings of race and/in history, conflicts between
projected negations and self definitions can be removed as psychological and social
obstacles to the merging of people‘s being both black and American on their own terms
and in their own ways in their broader American culture and society. DuBoisian self
consciousness, this way, is revealed in his meaning of, ―Merging.‖ Self consciousness
develops from, and simultaneously helps develop, amelioration of the conflicts between
self defined and racially projected identities of double consciousness.
When the internalized projected identities in one‘s consciousness are negating of
that consciousness, then one might be conscious of one‘s own negation. If so, no wonder
DuBois would want to minimize the impinging impressions of racial inferiority. Through
Black Nationalism, DuBois asserts, a strong community can help people grow and live
healthily, uninhibited by the outside white world of imposed identities and obstructions.
Manning Marable explains this kind of environment in his saying,
Du Bois supported the battle to win political reforms and greater ―personal
liberty‖ for blacks, but only as ―the second great step toward a better adjustment‖
of race relations. He did not advocate ―social equality,‖ but favored ―a social
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equilibrium,‖ that would permit blacks and whites to ―develop side by side in
peace and mutual happiness. (1986, p. 37)
DuBois advocates social equilibrium, not superficial equality within an
environment of deeper nefarious impingements of inferiority. Then, self awareness could
develop with positive projections from the community to the person. Merging self and
projected definition might then lead to self consciousness instead of double
consciousness.
Within this model is a primacy of self and consciousness of self. DuBois is
focusing on the personal level of self consciousness. In a related, but different, way, two
writers in Political Sciences help reveal meanings or levels self consciousness that can
connect with DuBoisian self consciousness. John Rawlsiii and Isaiah Berliniv indicate that
a democracy must respect and protect a boundary of individuality that each person has
and is without question.
Rawls says,
Each person possesses an inviolability [security from violation, profanation,
assault or trespass; unassailable (http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary
/inviolable)] founded on justice that even the welfare of society cannot override.
For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by
the greater good shared by others. (1999, p. 3)

iii

Rawls‘ A Theory of Justice is a leading text of political theory in the field of Political Science.

iv

Berlin, like Rawls, is a leading theorist in Political Science. His notion of negative freedom is related to
positive freedom which ―is involved in the answer to the question, ‗What, or who, is the source of
control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be this rather than that?‘‖ (Berlin,
1969, pp. 121- 122)
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This inviolability relates to self consciousness and double consciousness. The self
that is inviolable has the right to freedom from negating racial stigmas impinged by the
outside world. This reasoning supports DuBois‘ concern with social equilibrium as a
condition for racial equality. Otherwise, without equilibrium, blacks could integrate
unequally into a society and culture that continues to impose negating identities and
positions. That would only provide a shallow impression of equality. Without the social
equilibrium and Black Nationalism of DuBois‘ model, double consciousness (resulting
from negating social impingements) prevents a merging of self definition and socially
projected identity into self consciousness.
Similar to this freedom from harassment, Berlin defines the concept of negative
freedom as,
involved in the answer to the question, ―What is the area within which the
subject- a person or group of persons- is or should be left to do what he is able to
do or be, without interference by other persons?‖ (1969, pp. 121- 122)
Both Rawls and Berlin emphasize the right of people to be left alone to a fair
degree. Inviolability without interference means people‘s being left alone within equal
and negotiated social norms to be who they are, do what they choose and have a sense of
self and an awareness of self that is untrammeled by others. This kind of self
consciousness might be the sense of self and awareness of self that DuBois is saying is
usurped by double consciousness. The self consciousness enabled and protected by
respect and justice through Rawls‘ and Berlin‘s models is quite different from DuBois‘
saying, ―It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking
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at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that
looks on in amused contempt and pity‖ (1965, p. 215).
This violation of negative freedom and security is a strange sensation, perhaps,
because African Americans are within two contradictory positions and perspectives at the
same time. They are native-born members of, and socialized by, their country that then
subjects them to the violations and interferences it guarantees against. Self consciousness
as a sense and awareness of who one is and as an entitlement to equal respect could be
severely impacted by such a position and perspective of double consciousnessv.
Consistent with self consciousness as inviolability and negative freedom, to
`DuBois self consciousness seems to mean merging, or ameliorating, the conflicts
imparted by white society between the black position of being American and/or African
American (or uniquely self-defined) and the position of being subjugated (or uniquely
other-defined). He says,
The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife—this longing to
attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer
self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not
Africanize America . . . He would not bleach his Negro soul . . . He simply wishes
to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being
cursed and spit upon by his fellow, without having the doors of Opportunity
closed roughly in his face.
This, then, is the end of his striving; to be a co-worker in the kingdom of
culture . . . (1965, p. 215)
v

Indeed, many groups and persons might have their own positions, perspectives and experiences of double
consciousness. This thesis is to help illuminate a conception of unique African American double
consciousness and to contribute to further and multicultural exploration of double consciousness. For
example, how does white inviolability and negative freedom depend on the conflation of individual with
white? Whites can feel no conflict, or relationship at all, between their being individuals and white. Theirs
is a privileged relationship between their race and sense of self while blacks, in terms of double
consciousness, are burdened with struggle between racial position and sense of self.
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DuBois may be arguing that blacks should be left alone to define themselves; to
define what being American means; and to define what American means to them in
equilibrium and negotiation with (not with the interference from) whites. In this sense,
self consciousness might not only be an internal sense of self. It might also be a liminal
space including an internal sense of self that is socially recognized and accepted. Then, at
such a threshold, the psychological and social realms of all Americans could be
overlapping, positive, healthy, contributing and consistent. Who we are (all of us) would
develop mutually, cooperatively and critically through mutual exploration and
negotiation of who we think we are and who we are thought to be. Exploration of double
consciousness can help expose these dynamics and possibilities by introducing a
conceptualization of how who we are is shaped by who we are to each other.
Perhaps some of these ideas could relate to the experiences, positions, identities
and perspectives of Richard Wright. He illuminates,
Being a Negro living in a white Western Christian society, I‘ve never been
allowed to blend, in a natural and healthy manner, with the culture and
civilization of the West. This contradiction of being both Western and a man color
creates a psychological distance, so to speak, between me and my environment.
I‘m self-conscious. I admit it. Yet I feel no need to apologize for it. Hence, though
Western, I‘m inevitably critical of the West. Indeed, a vital element of my
Westernness resides in this chronically skeptical, this irredeemably critical,
outlook. I‘m restless. I question not only myself, but my environment. I‘m eager,
urgent. And to be so seems natural, human and good to me. Life without these
qualities is inconceivable, less than human. In spite of myself, my imagination is
constantly leaping ahead and trying to reshape the world I see (basing itself
strictly on the materials of the world in which I live each day) toward a form in
which all men could share my creative restlessness. Such an outlook breeds
criticism. And my critical attitude and detachment are born of my position. I and
my environment are one, but that oneness has in it, at its very core, an abiding
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schism. Yet I regard my position as natural, as normal, though others, that is,
Western whites, anchored in tradition and habit, would have to make the most
strenuous effort of imagination to grasp it. (1995, p.49)

DuBoisian Double Consciousness and Unilateral Black Double Consciousness
Based on my understanding of DuBois‘ meaning of African American double
consciousness, I have developed a tightly related conception of unilateral black double
consciousness. vi My conception of black unilateral double consciousness emphasizes the
fact that DuBoisian double consciousness is a particular and unique position for African
Americans that white Americans can impose unilaterally. In other words, whites do not
have to have racial double consciousness, or, ―Whites need not understand or live in the
black world in order to thrive‖ (Gates & West, 1996, p. 86). However, blacks must
continually grapple with whites‘ racist views of them as lazy and stupid (Krasner, 1995);
ignorant (Hathaway, 2005); and untrustworthy (Andrews, 2003) while they struggle to
maintain their humanity. The development of this double consciousness only on the part
of subordinated groups highlights the asymmetrical power relations between blacks and
whites.

vi

Unilateral double consciousness is my own concept, but it is based on DuBois‘ broader observation of
double consciousness. Unilateral double consciousness is an elaboration of double consciousness
because it introduces a distinction that emphasizes the one-sidedness of the hidden inequality faced
by blacks. DuBois focuses on how blacks are forced to have double consciousness, but the concept
of unilateral double consciousness includes focusing on how and why whites are privileged not to
have to contend with racial double consciousness.
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As superordinates in a white supremacist society, whites do not have to see
themselves through black perspectives (Kincheloe, 1998; Yancy, 2004). This is why
unilateral double consciousness is a form of racial inequality. Black people are forced to
embrace contradictory identities, or a negation of self-definitions, while whites do not
have to discern how they are seen by and as others. As subordinates, African Americans
bear the burden of developing double consciousness, second guessing and enduring the
white oppressor‘s perceptions and expectations of blacks.
However, discussion of this burden and the unequal burden that is placed on
African Americans is ignored, as though the problem is not there at all. For example,
Christopher Edley Jr. (1996, pp. 108-109) criticizes how ―colorblindness‖ focuses on
intentional discrimination and therefore draws attention away from more hidden and
subtle forms and methods of discrimination. He distinguishes between testing for
discrimination as an ―intent,‖ and as an ―effect‖ (Edley, 1996, p. 109). Imposing and
maintaining the condition of unilateral double consciousness on African Americans, even
when not done intentionally by white Americans, has the effect of maintaining unequal
racial positions and burdens on African Americans because of their subordinate racial
position. Edley helps show that it is a white privilege and a form of oppression for whites
to frame their perspective and sense of justice on their own intentions as a distraction (to
whites) from the effects of how they treat, and project identities onto, African Americans.
This introduction has presented five related aspects of double consciousness that
help to illuminate the concept and its scope, causes, functions and effects. The five
aspects are:
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1. African Americans are forced to try to maintain and develop their own self
definitions while enduring hostile and negating identities that are imposed by the
outside white supremacist society through the racism of many white Americans.
This is the primary meaning that serves as a foundation for the next four aspects
of double consciousness. In overlapping but varying ways, all five aspects of
double consciousness involve conflicts and contradictions between peoples‘ being
black and human; people‘s being black and American; and people‘s being human
and American.
2. Double consciousness is a forced position of conflict between dual perceptions of
how African Americans identify themselves as being human beings and black
Americans. The assault of negating projected identities from the outside white
supremacist community challenges people‘s meanings of being both black and
American by confronting their very humanity. The positive meanings of blacks‘
being people who are American and African American, or however they choose
to define themselves, are contradicted by the negative meanings of their being
positioned as inferior and less human, or less than human, within American
society. This is about more than conflicts between social identities and positions.
It is also about conflicts between black people being recognized (by themselves
and others) as human and their being considered and treated (by themselves and
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others) as less than human. It is about differences between being organically
human and being socially less than human.vii
3. The ―gift of second sight‖ (DuBois, 1965, p. 215) is a positive gift when it
provides an ability to view oneself and others from multiple perspectives.
According to DuBois (1965, p. 215), second sight is part of self-consciousness
that comes from African Americans‘ using their multiple perspectives to define
who they are, what being American means and what America means to them.
However, this gift can be corrupted and turned into a burden on blacks when it is
corrupted by white superordinates who use the multiple perspectives of blacks to
contribute to the shattering, not synthesizing, of the senses of self and group that
the gift of second sight provides.
4. Contributing to blacks being forced to see themselves through the negating
perspectives of white outsiders, whites do not have to see themselves through
black perspectives. It is the unilateral imposition of double consciousness by
whites with no recourse for blacks that makes unilateral double consciousness a
form and practice of white supremacy.

vii

Aimee Cesaire, an anti-colonialism leader from and of Martinique in the Mid-Twentieth Century,
explains,[T]he colonizer, who in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit of seeing the other man as
an animal, accustoms himself to treating him like an animal, and tends objectively to transform himself into
an animal. It is this result, this boomerang effect of colonialism, that I wanted to point out. (1972, p. 20)
From this quote, the racism of the white colonizer can be generalized to include the racism of the American
white supremacist. In both cases, whiteness dehumanizes all people by sacrificing our sense of organic
humanity for categories of social design. Class, religion, nationality and often culture are other categories
that pervert our non-rational sense, understanding and awareness of organic humanity.
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5. Even if whites do not intend to impose or reinforce black unilateral double
consciousness, their inattention to this problem has the effect of maintaining and
perpetuating the racial struggles of blacks that can then be blamed on the victims
because the source of the problem, the projected identity itself, is not recognized
and addressed openly, honestly and deliberately.
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CHAPTER 4
DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT: RECONSTRUCTION,
POST-RECONSTRUCTION AND THE WASHINGTON/DUBOIS/GARVEY
DEBATE

In the years after the U.S. Civil War, how would white society and people adjust
or not adjust to the change from African Americans being situated as sub-human to their
being free, by law, from that position? How would these freedmen fit in, how would they
be allowed to fit in, now that they were free?
To help adjust the nation to black freedom and equality, Congress amended the
U.S. constitution. Congress passed and ratified the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865
(prohibiting slavery); the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 (granting citizenship and due
process and equal protection by law to all people born or ―naturalized‖ in the U.S.); and
the Fifteenth Amendment in 1869 (the right of all citizens, regardless of ―race, color or
previous condition of servitude,‖ to vote) (Smith, 1979, pp. 51-3, 152).
These were not only changes in laws. They were changes in meanings of
humanity and identity. The transition of property to humanity (the recognition of African
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Americans as human, free, individual and equal) might have raised confusing and
upsetting uncertainties for whites about what it means to be white, human, free,
individual and equal or, on the other hand, black. Perhaps blacks threatened to expose to
white people their own contradictions between their organic senses of people‘s humanity
and their socially contrived white beliefs about people‘s humanity. Perhaps for such a
reason African Americans were concurrently free and excluded in U.S. society and
culture. Perhaps the whole issue of the threat was avoided by whites through or by their
hate.

Franklin and Moss write,
There was no question of their status as free persons, but conflict arose over the
possible distinctions between [black] and white people… A barrier to the solution
of these pressing postwar troubles was the legacy of hate that was inherited from a
generation of bitter intersectional strife. (1988, p. 204)
African Americans‘ freedom from slavery was only part of an ongoing and
continuing struggle between freedom for all and humanity, equality and individuality for
only the whites and their accepted others. Emancipation changed only the status of
African Americans from property to not property. To many whites, blacks were still not
human, not equal and not individuals, but now they were also not property any longer as
well. The end of the war did not change the hearts and minds of those who had fought the
war. Franklin and Moss explain, ―As surely as the struggle between 1861 and 1865 was
civil war, so was the conflict from 1865-1877 [Reconstruction], with as much bitterness
and hatred, but less bloodshed‖ (1988, p. 227).
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During Reconstruction, when the nation was reorienting and rebuilding after the
Civil War, Congress superseded Presidents Lincoln and Johnson‘s moderate means of
adjusting society to black freedom, humanity, equality and individuality (Franklin &
Moss, 1988, pp. 204-7). Then,
[T]he Freedmen‘s Bureau was established. With officials in each of the Southern
states, the bureau aided white refugees and freedmen by furnishing supplies and
medical services, establishing schools, supervising contracts between freedmen
and their employers, and managing confiscated or abandoned lands, leasing or
selling some of them to freedmen. (Franklin & Moss, 1988, p. 208)
This federal bureau, however, was opposed by the Black Codes. These were local
laws that maintained control of black people by whites. Black Codes included limitations
on where African Americans could live; the imprisonment of blacks who quit their jobs;
and the prohibiting of blacks from testifying in court about whites (Franklin & Moss,
1988, pp. 205-206). Also,
Numerous fines were imposed for seditious speeches, insulting gestures or acts,
absence from work, violating curfew, and the possession of firearms. There was,
of course, no enfranchisement of blacks and no indication that in the future they
could look forward to full citizenship and participation in a democracy. (Franklin
& Moss, 1988, p. 206)
In addition to the Black Codes, blacks were refused membership in unions and
then used as scabs to break strikes. This divided labor force, and its animosity within
itself, kept the workers so preoccupied with their racial conflicts that they could not unite
and present some power to their managers (Franklin & Moss, 1988, pp. 214-215).
Even with the Black Codes and racist labor force during and around the 1870‘s,
African Americans were elected to state government offices in South Carolina,
Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia, Florida and Virginia (Franklin & Moss, 1988,
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pp. 218-220). However, white southerners were developing organizations including the
Ku Klux Klan in order
to do by extralegal or blatantly illegal means what had not been allowed by law:
to exercise absolute control over Negroes, drive them and their fellows from
power, and establish ―white supremacy.‖ Radical Reconstruction was to be ended
at all costs, and the tactics of terrorist groups were the first step of Southern white
leaders toward achieving this goal (Franklin & Moss, 1988, p. 226).
Many white Americans wanted positions, relations and dynamics to return to the
ways they were before the Civil War. Ending Reconstruction meant returning African
Americans to their earlier status of sub-human with as little interference from black
freedom as possible. In addition to terror, there were economic and political ways this resubjugation of blacks, the ending of Reconstruction and start of Post-Reconstruction, was
done.
Economically, in the 1860‘s-70‘s, African Americans could often find work only
on plantations as they had done under slavery. As freedmen, they may have had contracts
about what they would do for work and how much they would be paid, but the contracts
could be disregarded by the white employers with no recourse for the black workers.
Other African Americans worked as sharecroppers by growing crops on the land of white
people. These ―freedmen were allowed from one quarter to half of the cotton and corn;
they were also provided with a house, fuel, and in some cases with food‖ (Franklin &
Moss, 1988, p. 212). However, as with the plantation workers, the freedom of the African
Americans was often resented by the whites for whom they worked. There was a new
hostility from whites toward blacks, and toward blacks being free, that developed with
Postbellum U.S. (Franklin & Moss, 1988, pp. 212-213).
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Politically, also in the 1860‘s-70‘s, ―once the Negro was disenfranchised,
everything else for white supremacy could be done‖ (Franklin & Moss, 1988, p. 212).
Everything else included the prohibition of intermarriage; segregation of blacks and
whites in transportation, ―hotels, barer shops, restaurants and theaters… [and] schools‖
(Franklin & Moss, 1988, p. 238). This African American disenfranchisement was
accomplished by several forms of corruption. Intimidation and threat of violence was
used by whites to keep blacks from voting. Also, polling locations were changed secretly;
ballot boxes were stuffed; insurmountable bureaucracies were contrived; unaffordable
poll taxes were charged; education achievement and property ownership was required,
and voting districts were arranged to prevent black majorities (Franklin & Moss, 1988,
pp. 232, 236). Ultimately,
By 1898, the pattern for the constitutional disenfranchisement of blacks had been
completely drawn. In subsequent years other states followed the lead of
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana. By 1910, blacks had been effectively
disfranchised by constitutional provisions in North Carolina, Alabama, Virginia,
Georgia, and Oklahoma (Franklin & Moss, 1988, p. 237).
The Jim Crow laws of racial segregation were then passed and black and white
separatism in the Postbellum U.S was institutionalized. This tragic direction into unequal
segregation utterly contradicted the praise of the U.S. in sociologist Alexis De
Tocqueville‘s saying, in 1848,
It is through political associations that Americans of every station, outlook, and
age day by day acquire a general taste for association and get familiar with the
way to use the same. Through them large numbers see, speak, listen, and
stimulate each other to carry out all sorts of undertakings in common. Then they
carry these conceptions with them into the affairs of civil life and put them to
thousands of uses. (1988, p. 524)
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Political associations of shared interests and goals help empower and unite people
over the issues of democracy while also opening possibilities of associations beyond
politics in areas of civil life. This, though, is a political development (leading to civil and
cultural developments) from which African Americans were debarred by their being kept
out of unions and disenfranchised by the white supremacists of Post Reconstruction.
These associations remained only for whites even more strongly after the Civil War
ended. Being excluded from those associations is not what one thinks of as being free.
This was the racially divided historical context of humanity and sub-humanity
within which DuBois was born (in 1868) and within which he became an African
American scholar and activist. This was also the world of Booker T. Washington, who
was born into slavery about twelve years before DuBois was born. The debates between
these two leaders, and between DuBois and Marcus Garvey, help show how African
Americans faced their new struggles with being Americans, as before, but now out of
slavery and into segregation and second class status.
Booker T. Washington was born into slavery, in 1856, and dreamed of going to
school. Freed by the Emancipation Proclamation, he enrolled in school and later founded
the Tuskegee Institute in 1881 (http://www.nps.gov/archive/bowa/btwbio.html).
Washington asserted a reasoning that blacks would improve their condition most by
taking whatever position they were allowed by whites and then working so successfully
and masterfully at their industrial, agricultural and menial jobs that white people would
respect blacks. Such accommodation; hard and successful work; and white recognition
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and respect would, according to Washington, help to improve racial relations and help
lead toward more racial equality. Washington says,
Our greatest danger is that in the great leap from slavery to freedom we may
overlook the fact that the masses of us are to live by the productions of our hands,
and fail to keep in mind that we shall prosper in proportion as we learn to dignify
and glorify common labour and put brains and skill into the common occupations
of life; shall prosper in proportion as we learn to draw the line between the
superficial and the substantial, the ornamental gewgaws of life and the useful. No
race can prosper till it learns that there is as much dignity in tilling a field as in
writing a poem. It is at the bottom of life we must begin, and not at the top. (1965,
p. 147)

Washington makes some very practical points. He talks about the fact that most
African Americans were forced to accept menial industrial and agricultural work. He
seems to have considered that a reality from which to start. He continues by pointing out
that material success for blacks and improvement of racial relations would come from
how well African Americans would put their intelligence and ability into the work they
had to do. Other aspirations, including the poetic and the political, were not considered
appropriate to Washington before blacks had ―started‖ (again) at the bottom of society.
This accommodation, and the outlook or consciousness it is, is already contrary to
DuBois‘ intent to help the Talented Tenth, the black middle class, lead the masses in
struggle for equality. The depth of this difference is more than just militancy against
moderation. Each position includes a view of itself as reaching a profound level of
sophistication. The depths of the differences may reveal different consciousnesses that
might be involved with double consciousness. Washington shows his depth and
consciousness in his saying, probably as criticism of DuBois,
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The wisest among my race understand that the agitation of questions of social
equality is the extremest folly, and that progress in the enjoyment of all the
privileges that will come to us must be the result of severe and constant struggle
rather than of artificial forcing. No race that has anything to contribute to the
markets of the world is long in any degree ostracized. It is important and right that
all privileges of the law be ours, but it is vastly more important that we be
prepared for the exercises of these privileges. The opportunity to earn a dollar in a
factory just now is worth infinitely more than the opportunity to spend a dollar in
an opera-house. (1965, p. 148)

Conversely, but the same in depth, DuBois says, criticizing the limits of
vocational education that Washington accepts,
The function of the university is not simply to teach bread-winning, or to furnish
teachers for the public schools or to be a centre of polite society; it is, above all, to
be the organ of that fine adjustment between real life and the growing knowledge
of life, an adjustment which forms the secret of civilization. Such an institution
the South of to-day sorely needs. She has religion, earnest, bigoted: -- religion that
on both sides the Veil often omits the sixth, seventh, and eighth commandments,
but substitutes a dozen supplementary ones. She has, as [Washington‘s speech in]
Atlanta shows, growing thrift and love of toil; but she lacks that broad knowledge
of what the world knows and knew of human living and doing, which she may
apply to the thousand problems of real life to-day confronting her. The need of the
South is knowledge and culture, -- not in dainty limited quantity, as before the
war, but in broad busy abundance in the world of work. (1965, p. 268)

Washington and DuBois are disagreeing on a very fundamental position within
the world. Education, knowledge and developed application of the world‘s knowledge to
immediate life were part of DuBois‘ view of how African Americans could improve their
position and condition. Washington argues that blacks (and likely but only implicitly,
whites) were not ready for such a position for African Americans. Perhaps this debate is
part of the meaning of double consciousness. Perhaps Washington was proposing a
strategy blacks and whites could share that might be effective just because it expected
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little for and from each party except toleration and the giving of each a very small
chance. This implants the whites‘ imposed side of double consciousness while
suspending or disregarding self-definition on one‘s own terms. To this DuBois says no.
DuBois thoroughly distinguishes and contrasts the self-defined and imposed identities
and positions. DuBois is demonstrating the kind of inviolability and negative freedom
that Rawls and Berlin would advocate several decades later. Perhaps the debate involves
whether blacks should wait for recognition from whites when whites are ready or assert
their humanity whether or not whites are ready. DuBois explains and objects that,
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking
at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. (1965, p. 215)

This problem, though, could be very hard to confront with deeply personal and
interpersonal intensity when Washington‘s support was so great for his saying,
To those of my race who depend on bettering their condition in a foreign land or
who underestimate the importance of cultivating friendly relations with the
Southern white man, who is their next-door neighbour, I would say: "Cast down
your bucket where you are" - cast it down in making friends in every manly way
of the people of all races by whom we are surrounded. Cast it down in agriculture,
mechanics, in commerce, in domestic service, and in the professions. (1965, p.
147)

Perhaps Washington was accepting and tolerating double consciousness as a
necessary burden African Americans seemed to him to have to just bear and tolerate.
Perhaps DuBois was facing double consciousness as an obstacle and foil to one‘s feeling

35

at ease within oneself and within one‘s communities.viii If so, it could have been within
and about this conflict of consciousnesses that DuBois pursued his career as a scholaractivist. Ron Goodwinix says,
[DuBois‘1905] creation of the Niagara movement signaled that blacks would no
longer accept social and political mistreatment quietly. Within [five] years the
Niagara movement grew into the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP). ( http://modern-us-history.suite101.com/article.
cfm/the realization_of_ a_ dreamhttp://)
It was through his work as editor of The Crisis, the magazine of the NAACP, that
DuBois helped lead toward the Harlem Renaissance (the 1920‘s movement of cultural
creativity and political criticism); expose contradictions of American freedom and
racism; and critically evaluate the work of his African American and white American
opponents (Rucker, 2002, p. 37). x
In addition to his challenges from Washington and his legacy (Washington passed
in 1915), DuBois faced conflicts with a new African American leader in the 1920‘s,
Marcus Garvey, and his Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). Tony
Martinxi explains,
Convinced that black people must seek salvation first as a race, Garvey set
himself the task of doing this through the principle of nationhood.xii He believed
viii

See review of Vernon Andrews‘ article and his conception of, ―Lightness,‖ in this literature review.
Goodwin teaches history and he is a PhD student at a university in Texas.
x
Rucker‘s piece is discussed in more detail as the first article in the next section, the Literature Review.
xi
Tony Martin is one of the founders of the Africana Studies Department at Wellesley College where he
now is professor emeritus.
xii
Mary Frances Berry and John W. Blassingame explain, Black nationalism is the belief that black people
share a common culture and world view, have a common destiny, and have had a common experience:
slavery, oppression, colonialism, and exploitation. Racial solidarity is perhaps the most basic form of black
nationalism. Presuming no movement, program, or ideology, it is simply a feeling that black people,
because of their common descent, color, and condition, should act in unison. A higher and different level of
consciousness is cultural nationalism, the view that all black people share a common lifestyle, aesthetic,
and world view, often expressed in a distinctively black idiom in literature, art or music. Religious
ix

36

that black people should be brought into one active community encompassing the
whole black universe. By belonging to this Pan-African community…black
people could rely on the force of an overwhelming majority, even in areas, such
as the United States, where they were a minority. (1986, pp. 41-42)
In the early 1900‘s, many African Americans moved from the country and the
south to northern cities. There, the masses of people were increasingly interested in
separatism (Berry & Blassingame, 1982, p. 409) instead of trying to integrate or
assimilate into the white society, culture and economy. This was the spirit, activism and
immediacy that Garvey shared and helped develop into nationalism.
Garvey was born in Jamaica in 1887. Like Washington, he was interested in
education. However, economic difficulties required Garvey to leave school and learn the
printing trade when he was fourteen. When Garvey was twenty-five, in 1912, he moved
to England where he worked as a printer and learned about European colonization of
Africa (Cronon, 1987, pp. 4-15). Garvey came to the US in 1916. Garvey built with and
on the public support for separatism through his founding and leading the UNIA. The
UNIA organized and unified people in the first African mass movement (Berry &
Blassingame, 1982, p. 409).

nationalism, a specific component of cultural nationalism, is the belief in a special black religious
cosmology, including the idea that the deity is black. The highest expression and form of black nationalism
is Pan-Africanism. In its broadest sense, Pan-Africanism is the belief that African peoples share a
community of interests. Whether they are in Jamaica, Barbados, the United States, Canada, Uganda,
Sweden or Spain, blacks must unite in a common struggle for liberation. In a narrower sense, PanAfricanism refers to the unity of African nations on the continent for mutual progress. (1982, p. 388).
Berry is a professor of American Social Thought and a professor of History at the University of
Pennsylvania. She was the head of the Civil Rights Commissions of Presidents Carter, Reagan and Clinton.
Blassingame was a professor of History, African American Studies and American Studies at Yale.

37

The black nationalism of the UNIA focused on pride in, and celebration of,
people‘s being African Americans; on their developing economic self sufficiency; on
freedom of Africa; and on African Americans‘ returning to Africa. Garvey called for
black patronage of black businesses in the US and for black support of the Black Star
Steamship Line, which would bring African Americans to Africa. Garvey emphasized
that white racism was so entrenched in white American society that ―it was futile to
appeal to their sense of justice and their high-sounding democratic principles.‖ With
parades and uniforms to celebrate its work, the UNIA appealed highly to the masses of
African Americans and gained widespread support (Franklin & Moss, 1988, p. 320).
There were similarities between the works of Garvey and DuBois. Both men
supported black nationalism, but Garvey was considered in general, and by DuBois, to be
sensationalistic, dishonest and ineffective. Franklin and Moss explain, ―DuBois was
especially critical of Garvey and called the UNIA ‗bombastic and impracticable‘‖ (1988,
pp. 320-321). Garvey did, however, gain much support from the general black population
that saw the work of DuBois and the NAACP as elitist.
DuBois struggled against Washington‘s accommodation; Garvey‘s
sensationalism; and his own debates over struggle for equal integration versus his
considerations of black separatism and nationalism. This variance of perspectives and
positions could likely have influenced DuBois‘ development and experience of the
double consciousness conflicts between how DuBois saw himself and how he was seen
and positioned by the people and perspectives of the broader white (and perhaps black)
community.
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PART I
LITERATURE REVIEW

This section reviews the few papers and analyses that examine DuBois‘ concept
of double consciousness. Each review includes an overview of the article or chapter, the
author‘s definition of double consciousness, the author‘s position regarding the
usefulness of the term and discussion of double consciousness within the context of each
article.
As mentioned earlier, the classic meaning of black double consciousness was
provided by W. E. B. DuBois in The Souls of Black Folk, in 1903. In these essays,
DuBois writes to a white audience about the unequal social position of African
Americans in the US, and of the psychological, spiritual, and emotional struggles they
face within themselves and within a white racist American society. It is in this book that
DuBois introduces his conception of double consciousness (DuBois, 1965, pp. 214–215).
DuBois explains that as a subordinated people, African Americans are forced to
view themselves from, and as, the racist and negative perspectives of the outside white
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society. Historically, hegemonic representations of African Americans have been deficit
based (Delpit, 1995; Jordan, 1994) and naturalized (Ignatiev, 1995; Kincheloe, 1998, pp.
103-104; Roediger, 1999). In this history, blackness continues to be defined by white
mainstream society as naturally inferior to whiteness.
Dubois‘ claim that African Americans are ―gifted with second sight‖ suggests that
possessing their simultaneous awareness of their self defined and imposed meanings of
blackness can constitute a gift and/or a burden. The gift is a meta-awareness of American
society that reveals a critical view of democratic principles that are contradicted by
practices of discrimination and oppression (see Ellison, 1994; Jordan, 1994). However, in
addition to double consciousness or meta-awareness being a gift, DuBois indicates that it
can also be a burden because it forces people to ―always look at [themselves] through the
eyes of others, of measuring [their] soul[s] by the tape of a world that looks on in amused
contempt and pity‖ (1965, p. 215).
Since DuBois‘ discussion of the concept of double consciousness in 1903, it has
not become a subject of widespread exploration, but it is discussed by some recent
writers (Allen, 2002; Andrews, 2003; Hathaway, 2005; Krasner, 1995; Rucker, 2002;
Shaw, 2004). These authors mention and briefly discuss double consciousness before
segueing into their particular research topics.
The first article in this literature review is Walter Rucker‘s (2002), ―‗A Negro
Nation Within the Nation‘: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Creation of a Revolutionary PanAfricanist Tradition, 1903-1947.‖ This article provides the broadest overview of DuBois‘
life‘s work and how double consciousness can fit into that framework. In the next article,
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in the second article of this literature review, David Krasner (1995) considers how double
consciousness is experienced and revealed (as a clear and obvious distinction between
self definition and imposed identity) in 1900‘s black theater. A similar meaning of double
consciousness is then shown in Rosemary Hathaway‘s (2005) article about Barbara
Neely‘s circa 1992 novel, Blanche White, Undercover in Plain Sight. Then, in the fourth
article, a shift to a more subtle and nuanced treatment of double consciousness is led by
Vernon Andrews (2003). He explores how complicated double consciousness can be
because personal and social positions and identities overlap too much for there to be a
clear distinction between how one sees oneself and how one is seen by others. Article
five, "‘Two Warring Ideals‘": Double Consciousness, Dialogue, and African American
Patriotism Post-9/11,‖ by Todd C. Shaw, situates and considers double consciousness
within the context of patriotism after 9/11. This treatment implicitly includes the overlaps
between personal and cultural positions and perspectives introduced by Andrews. In the
sixth and last article, ―Double consciousness, The unsustainable argument?‖ Ernst Allen
raises challenging questions and ideas that help move the double consciousness debate
forward.
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CHAPTER 5
LITERATURE REVIEW ARTICLE ONE:
WALTER RUCKER‘S, ―‗A NEGRO NATION WITHIN THE NATION‘: W.E.B. DU
BOIS AND THE CREATION OF A REVOLUTIONARY PAN-AFRICANIST
TRADITION, 1903-1947‖

In, ―‗A Negro Nation Within the Nation‘: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Creation of a
Revolutionary Pan-Africanist Tradition, 1903-1947,‖ Walter Rucker (2002) spans mostxiii
of the history of DuBois‘ career. He begins by explaining double consciousness as a dual
frame of self-reference, or twoness, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis above.
Although Rucker does not explicitly link double consciousness within the content of his
article, the connection is implied by the focus on double consciousness in the article‘s
introduction and by DuBois‘ struggles within dualities shown in Rucker‘s writing. The

xiii

Although Rucker refers to DuBois‘ ―early career,‖ as focused on double consciousness, his article covers
the time from the publishing of Souls in 1903, through the Fifth Pan African Conference of 1947 (Rucker,
2002). That was almost all of DuBois‘ long career. In the 1950‘s, DuBois expanded his focus from concern
with colonialism of Africans and subjugation of African Americans to concern with colonialism and
subjugation of all people (Broderick, 1959, pp. 199- 226). In 1960, DuBois chose to leave the United States
and become a citizen of Ghana. DuBois lived in Ghana until he passed in 1963.
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article is a historical overview highlighting significant work, strategies, positions,
transitions and perspectives of DuBois.
Rucker begins by implicitly explaining double consciousness as a position and
then as a perspective. As a position, Rucker refers to DuBois‘ saying,
It is a peculiar sensation, […] this double-consciousness, this sense of always
looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the
tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. (Rucker, 2002, p. 37)
Explaining DuBois‘ message, Rucker writes,
Rooted in a series of historical paradoxes, black life in North America is full of
tragic irony--the enslaved in the land of freedom, the poor in the land of
prosperity, the persecuted in the land of justice and the despised in the land of
opportunity. (2002, p. 37)

Double consciousness as a position is paradoxes of African Americans being
excluded from privileges, opportunities, entitlements and advantages of their own
country. The closely related implication of double consciousness as perspective is
revealed by Rucker‘s continuing,
Yet, as Du Bois contends, it is from the very position of debasement that blacks
"born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world" have the
ability to see America in its truest form while simultaneously lacking any real
sense of self-consciousness. (2002, p. 37)

The view of the US as being different from the democratic, free and equal way it
claims to be is one part of double consciousness as perspective. The other part is blacks
having such second sight, but not having ―a sense of self consciousness‖ (Rucker, 2002,
p. 37). Second sight might be similar to today‘s term, ―Critical thinking,‖ since both
involve alternative views of mainstream views and positions. However, when that critical
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sight is not part of an inviolable sense of self and self consciousness, then the critical
view, the self defined part of double consciousness, could be contradicted by the
projected identity and position of negation. This may be DuBois‘ exploration or a way to
inquire about his exploration of double consciousness as an ongoing process throughout
his life and work. Referring directly to double consciousness, Rucker says,
At the dawn of his long career as scholar and activist, Du Bois posed the problem
of double consciousness and, in his words, sought to "make it possible for a man
to be both a Negro and an American without being cursed and spit upon by his
fellows...." He would ultimately dedicate much of his early career to resolving
this particular issue as well as addressing and combating white supremacy,
European imperialism, and the continuing degradation of Africans around the
world. (2002, p. 37)

However, in the rest of his article, Rucker does not focus specifically on how
meanings, issues and considerations of double consciousness might be part DuBois‘ work
as a scholar and activist. Evidence of double consciousness as an ongoing theme for
DuBois is implied, though, in Rucker‘s article and pursued in the following discussion of
his article.
After beginning his article with a discussion of double consciousness, Rucker
introduces a broader context of DuBois‘ debates with Booker T. Washington, Marcus
Garvey, black nationalism and socialism. Rucker then discusses the history, challenges
and successes of the Pan African Conferences. By reviewing these discussions, the
implied meanings of and connections with double consciousness can be sought.
First, Rucker explains DuBois‘ model of the, ―Talented tenth,‖ and DuBois‘
rivals, Booker T. Washington and Marcus Garvey. Rucker says,
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The Souls of Black Folk was essentially Du Bois first call to battle. In this classic
expression of black thought, Du Bois concludes that the principle problem facing
blacks in America--the ubiquitous color line--could only be properly addressed
through the rise of a "talented tenth." This group of educated elites would serve as
a vanguard, leading the black masses into social protest and ceaseless agitation
against injustice. (2002, p. 37)
The Post-Reconstruction black middle class was economically and socially
separated from the broader black community, yet also positioned to develop class and
race consciousness, as well as self consciousness, that could help lead struggles for
justice and equality (Rucker, 2002). However, the development of this self consciousness
(and race and class consciousness) was disrupted by the powerful rivalry DuBois faced in
the accommodationist, Booker T. Washington. Rucker explains,
It was in Washington's appeals for industrial education and his surrender of
demands for civil and political equity that Du Bois saw one of the greatest threats
to the rise of the talented tenth and the creation of a mass movement to fight for
civil rights and political empowerment. (2002, p. 37)
Rucker then shows that a mass movement was organized, but not by DuBois and
the middle class. Rather, it was Garvey who motivated, united and inspired the masses.
The agreement between DuBois and Garvey was in their shared goals of nationalism and
independence for Africans and African Americans. The conflict was in how they each
pursued the goals. Rucker quotes DuBois as saying, ―[Garvey‘s] dreams of Negro
industry, commerce and ultimate freedom of Africa are feasible; but his methods are
bombastic, wasteful, illogical and ineffective and almost illegal‖ (2002, p. 38).
DuBois objected to the ―methods‖ and ―tactics‖ of Garvey‘s sensationalism and
his questionable use of his finances. However, Rucker continues, DuBois later wrote, ―A
Negro Nation Within the Nation,‖ in 1935, which combined some of Washington‘s
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calling for self reliance and Garvey‘s calling for separatism and nationalism (Rucker,
2002, p. 38). Rucker says,
The contention of this essay is that by combining the views and approaches of his
two arch rivals--Booker T. Washington and Marcus Garvey--Du Bois effectively
created a model for the community-control black nationalism that Black Power
advocates of the mid to late 1960s would passionately argue for. When combined
with his earlier and later pronouncements for Pan-Africanism, Du Bois'
conceptualization of "self-segregation" became the basis for a revolutionary PanAfricanist tradition that would be espoused later by the likes of Malcolm X,
Kwame Nkrumah [the first president of Ghana in 1957], and Kwame Ture [who
changed his name from Stokely Carmichael, under which he wrote, Black Power,
with Charles Hamilton]. (2002, p. 38)
Rucker then explores some of the contradictory perspectives in which DuBois is
seen. He shows how Molefi Asantexiv considers DuBois to be Eurocentric because of his
upbringing in New England and his academic background at Harvard and in Germany.
However, Rucker points out that DuBois was greatly influenced by his studies and
participation in Southern black culture at Fisk University in 1885, a historically black
university in Nashville that was founded in 1866. Also, at Harvard (where he was the first
African American to earn a PhD in 1895), DuBois considered Black Nationalism and
rejected the belief that blacks should acquiesce to, or accommodate, the social, economic
and political terms of white people (Rucker, 2002, p. 39). Perhaps Rucker is implying
that nationalism can correspond to self definition while accommodation can apply to

xiv

Asante is a founder and professor of African American Studies at Temple University. He also founded
and edits, The Journal of Black Studies. Asante developed the concept of, ―Afrocentricity.‖ He explains,
―Afrocentricity… assert[s] the central role of the African subject within the context of African history,
thereby removing Europe from the center of the African reality. In this way, Afrocentricity becomes a
revolutionary idea because it studies ideas, concepts, events, personalities, and political and economic
processes from a standpoint of black people as subjects and not as objects, basing all knowledge on the
authentic interrogation of location.‖ (http://asante.net/articles/1/afrocentricity/)
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projected identity. If so, perhaps Rucker is showing that the debate over assimilation,
integration and separatism is a debate of double consciousness. Perhaps the
nationalism/assimilation duality corresponds to the self-definition/ascription duality as
two forms of double consciousness.
It may have been within, around and between these positions and perspectives of
double consciousness that DuBois became a leader of the six Pan-African conferences
from 1900- 1947. Introducing this movement, Rucker quotes and then explains,
In 1900… DuBois notes, "Let the nations of the world respect the integrity and
independence of the free Negro states of Abyssinia [Ethiopia], Liberia, Haiti, and
the rest, and let the inhabitants of these states, the independent tribes of Africa,
the Negroes of the West Indies and America, and the black subjects of all nations
take courage, strive ceaselessly, and fight bravely, that they may prove to the
world their incontestable right to be counted among the great brotherhood of
mankind." This announcement was an unmistakable call for drastic social change
and an end to European exploitation in Africa and the Diaspora. (2002, p. 40)
At the Pan African Conferencexv, Rucker explains, DuBois had to reject African
American self segregation because it was too similar to Washington‘s accommodation.
Both strategies of self segregation and accommodation reinforced disenfranchisement,
legal subjugation and sub-standard education of black Americans. Instead, a broader and
international movement (in the scope of Garvey‘s UNIA) seemed necessary for DuBois
to envision a truly empowered widespread movement. Then, there could be cooperating
power between blacks within and outside the US to pressure the US and European
colonizers of Africa to end their oppression and domination (Rucker, 2002, p. 40).
xv

In 1900, the earliest Pan African Conference was held in London. In 1919, the next conference, called,
―The First Pan African Conference,‖ was held in Paris. That was actually the second conference. Finally,
the last conference was the called, ―The Fifth Pan African Conference,‖ but there were a total of six
conferences.
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The next conference, named, ―The First Pan African Conference,‖ was held after
World War I, in 1919. Then, DuBois was more concerned with the relationships between
racial oppression in the US and colonialism in Africa. President Wilson had emphasized
the need for nations‘ autonomy, but he excluded colonized peoples from such recognition
and denied them such freedom. The conference accepted this rule by the colonizers, but
called for more fair and equal treatment by the occupying forces. The later conferences,
starting with the Second Pan African Conference of 1921, would more aggressively insist
on independent African nations and equality of participation in government and all
economic and social opportunities (Rucker, 2002, p. 42).
After the First Pan African Conference, there was shift from a more
accommodationist position, or consciousness, of to a call for self-sustaining self-reliance
in the Second Pan African Conference. Perhaps this shift is a struggle with double
consciousness on a global scale. Perhaps DuBois rejects toleration of subjugation and
perhaps he rejects hope that peace first will lead to justice later. Perhaps these two issues
of rejection and toleration of subjugation (and of rejecting imposed identity and accepting
positions of negation) are two recurring themes in meanings of African American, or
DuBoisian, double consciousness in the US and in the broader world.
The Third Pan African Conference, in 1923, is not mentioned in Rucker‘s article.
The third conference faced many difficulties and had little success. It came after the shift
to more assertive calls for African independence. Little actual progress had been realized
from the second conference. The NAACP had denied financial support for the third
conference. When the third conference was held, representatives of only thirteen
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countries attended. In the previous conference, thirty countries had been represented
(Broderick, 1959, pp. 131-132).
Rucker does look into DuBois‘ efforts with Socialism after his visit to the Soviet
Union in 1926. DuBois became increasingly disappointed with assimilation of the black
middle class (the Talented Tenth that he had hoped would lead and help liberate the
general population) and their alienation from the majority of blacks. He also, or perhaps
therefore, focused more on economic improvement of African Americans without the
talented tenth. For these reasons, DuBois was interested in the Socialist Party, but he was
reluctant because he felt the Socialists were not thorough enough about racism in the US.
DuBois‘ grass-roots orientation became a common strategy he shared with aspects of
both Washington‘s accommodation and Garvey‘s nationalism (Rucker, 2002, p. 40-41).
However, Rucker explains, DuBois became distanced from the NAACP when he
became interested in focusing more on black economic development. Rucker says,
In a series of Crisis editorials in 1934, Du Bois made plain his notion of selfsegregation. In the April 1934 edition, he wrote that blacks should "Organize our
strength as consumers; learn to cooperate and use power as producers; train
ourselves in methods of democratic control....Run and support our own
institutions." (Rucker, 2002, p. 41)
This turn from integration to nationalism led to DuBois‘ leaving the NAACP. It
was at this time, in 1935, that DuBois published, ―A Negro Nation Within the Nation.‖ A
main point of this writing is that land redistribution after the Civil War had been required
for African Americans to thrive in America through independence from the mainstream
white community. DuBois also argues that Washington‘s accommodation depends too
much on tightly rationed white inclusion of blacks and mobility of blacks in mainstream
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businesses. Instead, DuBois calls for mutually supporting black businesses and black
communities. Rucker notes that similar nationalism would be espoused and developed
later by Ture, Nkrumah and Huey P. Newton (a leader of The Black Panther Party)
(Rucker, 2002, pp. 41-42).
DuBois‘ socialism and Black Nationalism might connect to double consciousness
as an effort to end struggle between the two positions of blacks‘ striving to thrive in their
country and white resistance to black attempts to integrate and/or assimilate. Nationalism,
self segregation and self sufficiency might lead to cohesive self definition, true self
consciousness and self determination in psychological, economic and political terms.
Near the beginning of DuBois‘ socialism and Black Nationalism strategies, the
Fourth Pan African Conference was held in 1927 (one year after DuBois visited the
Soviet Union). This conference did not yet suggest revolution, but ―the demands of each
successive Congress became less conciliatory to European imperialism and more insistent
on self-determination and autonomy for Africans‖ (Rucker, 2002, p. 44). The demands
included black representation in government; black rights to their countries‘ lands; better
education; African development according to the interests of Africans, not the colonizers;
an economic system to benefit the general population rather than the rich; equal treatment
between people regardless of race; removal of US troops from Haiti and autonomy there;
and prevention of whites from taking all the land of South African native people (Rucker,
2002, p. 44).
The demands and orientation of this fourth conference are similar to, and likely
shaped by, DuBois‘ direction toward Black Nationalism, separation from white
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domination, self determination and self definition. Perhaps this direction leads from the
political struggle to the personal struggle. By taking the land, rule and economic
development, perhaps DuBois was suggesting African Americans and Africans could
have the space, time and conditions to pursue their strivings to act, feel, think, be and live
with inviolable self consciousness that would be free from hindrance by US and
European whites.
The Fifth Pan African Conference, in 1945, reached the revolutionary level to
which the earlier conferences had led. World War II had ravaged European countries and
greatly weakened their abilities to maintain their empires. DuBois and several African
leaders, including Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta (who would become the first prime
minister of Kenya in 1963), had become strong enough to wrest increasing autonomy
from the colonial occupiers (Rucker, 2002, p. 45). Rucker quotes DuBois as saying,
Africans themselves began to demand more voice in colonial government and the
Second World War had made their cooperation so necessary to Europe that at the
end actual and unexpected freedom for African colonies was in sight. (Rucker,
2002, p. 45)
Rucker explains that Pan Africanism had succeeded. In 1960, DuBois attended
the inauguration of Nkrumah as the first prime minister of Ghana and the inauguration of
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as the first prime minister of Nigeria. He then became a citizen
of Ghana where he lived until he passed in 1963 (Rucker, 2002, p. 45).
Through a combined struggle of African and African American leaders,
widespread people of the African Diaspora had all helped unite Africa for Africans.
Then, extending beyond Africa, Pan Africanism and Black Nationalism was strengthened
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back in the US during the Black Power movement of the 1960‘s-70‘s (Rucker, 2002, p.
45). This determination for explicit political and economic autonomy may be implicitly
coupled with determination for inviolable self consciousness on the personal level. This
connection is not made by Rucker, but he quotes Nkrumah as asserting at the Fifth Pan
African Conference,
We affirm the right of all colonial peoples to control their own destiny. All
colonies must be free from all foreign imperialist control whether political or
economic.... We say to the peoples of the colonies that they must fight for these
ends by all the means at their disposal.... (2002, p. 44)
Similarly, at the conference DuBois says,
Yet if the Western world is still determined to rule mankind by force, then
Africans, as a last resort, may have to appeal to force in the effort to achieve
freedom, even if force destroys them and the world. We are determined to be
free....We demand for Black Africa autonomy and independence.... We will fight
in every way we can for freedom, democracy and social betterment. (Rucker,
2002, p. 44)
People‘s fighting by all means for the human right to control their own destiny
can likely include their fighting ―to attain self-conscious manhood [and personhood], to
merge a double self into a better and truer self‖ (DuBois, 1965, p. 215). Perhaps Black
Nationalism and Pan Africanism was a way DuBois fought and led against the wide
world systems and very personal positions of blacks‘ having their own senses of self
while enduring the negations and replacements of those senses of self. DuBois says,
In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not
Africanize America . . . He would not bleach his Negro soul . . . He simply wishes
to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being
cursed and spit upon by his fellow, without having the doors of Opportunity
closed roughly in his face.
This, then, is the end of his striving; to be a co-worker in the kingdom of
culture . . . (1965, p. 215).
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After beginning with double consciousness as the introduction to his article,
Rucker presents a history of DuBois‘ concept of the talented tenth; his relationships with
the activisms of Washington and Garvey; and his leading the Pan African Conferences.
Although Rucker does not discuss double consciousness after his introduction, implicit
evidence of double consciousness can be found in his writing.
First, when Rucker (2002, p. 37) discusses double consciousness explicitly in the
introduction, he shows the possibility of African Americans having second sight (or
perhaps a critical view of putative democracy in the US) while not having a true self
consciousness (or perhaps an inviolable sense of self). Second, this duality is implied
later when Rucker (2002, p. 39) discusses DuBois‘ interest in Black Nationalism at Fisk
and Harvard. Third, double consciousness may be suggested on a global scale through
Rucker‘s (2002, p. 42) writing about DuBois‘ call for increasing African and African
American independence as the Pan African Conferences proceeded. Fourth, Rucker
(2002, pp. 41-42, 44) implies that the Fifth Pan African Conference helped to link the
political and economic independence of Africans and African Americans with
increasingly strongly self defined identities that link struggles with double consciousness
as a political position with double consciousness as a personal struggle.
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CHAPTER 6
LITERATURE REVIEW ARTICLE TWO:
DAVID KRASNER‘S ―PARODY AND DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE
LANGUAGE OF EARLY BLACK MUSICAL THEATRE‖

David Krasner‘sxvi (1995), ―Parody and Double Consciousness in the Language of
Early Black Musical Theatre,‖ is a literature review of African American stage theater
about twenty years before the Harlem Renaissancexvii of the 1920s. Through the early
1900‘s, African Americans collectively and consciously developed a self definition of the
New Negro. Central to this concept was African Americans‘ rejection of negative and
misrepresentative images of themselves and assertion of their own messages on their own
terms and in their own ways (Krasner, 1992, p.317).

xvi
xvii

Krasner is a professor of performing arts at Emerson College.
The Harlem Renaissance was a period of African American literary and artistic creativity in the 1920‘s.
It was a result of increasing black migration to northern cities, post-war prosperity and critical
evaluation of continuing racial inequality that led to a new self-definition of African Americans on
their own terms and rejection of earlier imposed positions and definitions (Franklin & Moss, 1988,
pp. 324-27). The Harlem Renaissance was an organic, artistic and intellectual cultural movement
of critical social evaluation and exploration of black and white integration as equals (Locke,
1925).
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Krasner begins his article by introducing a general meaning of New Negro. He then
focuses on the musical, ―Coontown,‖ as an example of parody and double consciousness.
First, Krasner explains the historical background and meaning of the concept of
double consciousness as a subject of DuBois‘ writing in relation to pre-Harlem
Renaissance theatre. Quoting DuBois, Krasner shows that double consciousness is how
―the black actor or actress had to effect a public self through what DuBois called a
tertium quid, often performing as a ‗clownish, simple creature, at times even lovable
within its limitations, but straitly foreordained to walk within the Veil‘‖ (1995, p. 317). In
other words, to perform for a white audience, the actor had to adhere to roles that
maintained the imposed identity and negation of African Americans.
Krasner discusses how African Americans exposed, parodied and challenged this
position ―by employing what Henry Louis Gates Jr. calls ‗signifyin(g).‘ For Gates,
signifyin(g) defines a ―uniquely black rhetorical concept‖ that uses a word in a way that
draws attention to the word and reveals new meanings or a new significance of the word
(1995, p. 319)xviii.
The term that is signified is, ―Coon,‖ xix in the Bob Cole production, ―A Trip to
Coontown.‖ Signifyin(g), ―Coon,‖ means repeating the term often and with a sense of

xviii

This spelling of signifyin(g), with the, ―G,‖ in parentheses is not explained by Krasner. It might be
spelled this way to emphasize a black vernacular pronunciation and the particular meaning the word has as
a form of social criticism.
xix
Coon is a derogatory term for an African American person. ―A coon is a black actor or actress, who
takes roles that stereotypically portrays black people. They think they have made it but they are slaves to
the same images. It comes from the term baracoons (a cage), where they used to place Africans, who were
waiting to be sent to America to be slaves. They had no idea of this, so some of them were even eager
waiting in the baracoons.‖ (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=coon)
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irony that illuminates a double meaning to people (other African Americans) who
appreciate the parody. The double meaning of the repeated ironic use exposes the
absurdity, insult and projected identity of the racist term. Perhaps this signifyin(g) is a
message of self definition; rejection of imposed negation; and a part of the meaning of
the New Negro.
In the play, ―a dead swell gentleman of color‖ saves his earnings and takes his
lady out for a fancy date. He then undergoes a transition into futility and despair because
all the nice places maintain, ―No coons allowed‖ He and his date cannot get in anywhere.
So frustrated, he raises his voice and is thrown to the ground, humiliated in front of his
lady. From his high hopes for a swell date, the term, ―Coon,‖ brings the gentleman to
disappointment and embarrassment.
That could be the man‘s double consciousness of looking forward to his date (as
self definition) and his experience (or ascription) of rejection and humiliation by the
white world. The term, ―Coon,‖ is what initiates and executes the man‘s torment.
Focusing on that term helps illuminate that the term is not descriptive of a type of person,
but rather is a verbal weapon of mainstream society. Put differently, the word and its
meaning is not the person, but it is used to impose an identity and position that is contrary
to the person. Catching that word in action through signifin(g) exposes a severe assault of
white America on black America.
Krasner says,
This element of parody could be powerful. It was, for instance, used to great
effect in Bob Cole‘s production of A Trip to Coontown (`-1901)… ―No Coons
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Allowed!,‖ … dramatizes the duality of black life in America, and creates a
parody of racism:
No coons allowed No coons allowed This place is meant for white folks
that‘s all We don‘t want no kinky-head kind So move on darky down the line No
coons allow‘d in here at all. (1995, p. 318)
―Coon,‖ is given a double meaning through Cole‘s signifyin(g) the term. It is
encountered so much as the man descends into anguish that its racist role is emphasized.
No longer are black people portrayed as, ―Coons.‖ Rather, those who project the
derogatory meaning are portrayed negatively. The actors are showing the audience that
they see their own negation and they even mock it in acting it out in front of the audience.
Krasner helps show that the African Americans‘ displaying double consciousness
are quite able to redefine and renegotiate and outright reject racist identities imposed on
whites by blacks. The display of double consciousness in theater was evident before and
through the Harlem Renaissance and involved some degree of individual meta-levelcritical evaluation of both African American self defined and white imposed racist black
identities. In this way, African American signifyin(g) was a strategy for maintaining
their humanity, indirectly opposing racist representations of blacks, while participating in
theater in ways that whites approved. Such signification necessarily involves double
consciousness on the part of the black actor or trickster because the irony requires
interplay between the projected identity and one‘s own self-definition. When the negative
meanings of words such as ―coon‖ or ‗tar baby‖ and general subordinated social positions
of African Americans are revealed and parodied, the harmful meanings can become
increasingly ridiculous and questionable to African Americans. This play with inferior
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black positions; unequal racial power relationships; and words and meanings is a form of
black exposure, opposition and reversal of those positions and dynamics.
Krasner‘s discussion of double consciousness focuses on the resistance and
oppositional strategies that African Americans have developed over time and across
contexts (in this case, the theater context) to oppose whites‘ inaccurate and racist
representations of them. The resistant and oppositional behavior is displayed in implicit
and ―hidden‖ ways so as not to incur the wrath of dominant culture whites. Krasner
shows that by thinking critically about their position, African Americans have developed
forms of opposition within the dynamics of oppression they face. Dubois highlights the
burden and gift of double consciousness as a type of African American meta-awareness
of white racist views of blacks. Krasner demonstrates one way this awareness was used to
subvert and resist oppression.
Krasner demonstrates that this type of ―resistant‖ signifyin(g) occurs in early1900s theater, but he does not develop the theory of double consciousness into a broader
model of racial dynamics beyond the scope of early-twentieth-century theater and the
following Harlem Renaissance. Some questions are evoked, but not pursued, by Krasner.
How do the dynamics between black theatre and white audiences reveal the limitations
and opportunities for interracial dialogue about self definition, imposed identity and
mutually negotiated identity during and after the Harlem Renaissance? Was the Harlem
Renaissance the apex or the end of such pursuits? No, it was not. This literature review
and the whole thesis will show that after the Harlem Renaissance, there continue to be
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many African American writers who explore and struggle with conflicts between self
definitions and imposed identities.

59

CHAPTER 7
LITERTURE REVIEW ARTICLE THREE:
ROSEMARY HATHAWAY‘S, ―THE SIGNIFYIN(G) DETECTIVE: BARBARA
NEELY‘S BLANCHE WHITE, UNDERCOVER IN PLAIN SIGHT‖

For example, Rosemary Hathawayxx shows how signifyin(g) and double
consciousness are related in, ―The Signifyin(g) Detective: Barbara Neely‘sxxi Blanche
White, Undercover in Plain Sight‖ in Critique (2005, pp. 320–332).xxii In this book
review, as Krasner does in his piece on early-twentieth-century theater, Hathaway refers
to Gates to define, ―Signifyin(g).‖

xx

Hathaway is a professor of English at West Virginia University.

xxi

―Neely is a novelist, short story writer and… a host of Commonwealth Journal, a radio interview
program‖ from UMass Boston. (http://www.blanchewhite.com/biography.html)
xxii

Hathaway explains how, in 1992, Neely‘s Blanche White, a young black woman, is wrongfully
convicted by a North Carolina court of writing bad checks. She escapes and takes a job as a domestic for a
wealthy white family so she can use that role and stereotype to hide from the judicial system. In so doing,
Hathaway explains, Blanche employs ―triple- or even quadruple- consciousness‖ as a black, female and
working class navigator between her own identity and the stereotypes she is burdened with, but also
exploits as weapons and defenses of her own. (Hathaway, 2005, p. 321) In this way, double consciousness
is related to signifyin(g) when the self defined identity reflects on, exposes and parodies the imposed
identity.
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Hathaway says,
To Gates, Signification is ―black double-voicedness,‖… Blanche enacts this trope
through the free play she engages in with her white employers‘ stereotypes about
her and her awareness of the power and protection afforded by the gap between
[Blanche‘s identity and how she is seen, defined and treated by others]. (2005, p.
323)
As Krasner (1995, p. 3) explains, ―For Gates, signifyin(g) defines a ‗uniquely
black rhetorical concept… by which a second statement or figure repeats, or tropes, or
reverses the first,‘‖ so too does Hathaway refer to Gates to explain how Neely‘s Blanche
uses her self-definition to reverse, or expose and contradict, the identities imposed from
the outside white society. By playing with the term, ―Coon,‖ as Krasner explains, and by
playing with white employers‘ stereotypes, as Hathaway explains, African Americans at
the beginning and end of the twentieth century are shown to use double consciousness as
a source of empowerment that is employed by signifyin(g).
Part of this relationship between double consciousness and signifyin(g) involves
the concept of, ―Passing.‖ xxiii Blanche‘s double consciousness and her signifyin(g) enable
her to pass in an unconventional way. Blanche has dark skin, so she passes not for a
white, but for an obsequious and submissive maid. This ―passing in reverse- as the
stereotypical black woman domestic‖ (Hathaway, 2005, p. 324) is not about Blanche
making her blackness invisible in the traditional sense of passing. Rather, given her dark
complexion and subordinate status as a servant, whites do not perceive her as intelligent

xxiii

―Passing‖ traditionally refers to light-skinned blacks‘ crossing the color line because they appear white
to whites (or at least, they are more visually pleasing to whites because they resemble whites) (O‘Toole,
2002).
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so Blanche is ―invisible‖ to the whites because she is ascribed with the white stereotype
of insignificant blackness. Blanche is not noticed as a full human being and she uses this
invisibility to her own advantage since her intention is to ―use her marginality as a
disguise‖ (Hathaway, 2005, p. 324).
The signifyin(g) is Blanche‘s using her self-definition as the contradiction to the
imposed identity from the white society. In this way, signifying can be a way double
consciousness is used as a form of opposition. Hathaway says,
Neely‘s Blanche […] appears to ―stay in her class‖ by doing her employers‘
bidding, while carrying out her own subversive agenda below the surface.
Because no one Blanche is ―investigating‖ knows that she is being transgressive,
or even thinks her capable of such complexity, what she can gain by doing so is
increased exponentially. (2005, p. 325)
Blanche uses her hidden status, her reverse-passing, to gain access—as an
intimate, but also as an invisible support person of the familyxxiv—to problems and
vulnerabilities of the white family, which the family members do not think Blanche has
the capacity to understand. The link to double consciousness lies in the fact that reversepassing and signifyin(g) require that Blanche know how she is seen from white
perspectives, while also knowing how she sees herself. Blanche knows that the whites
view her as below them, but she also sees that her position affords her opportunities to
learn secrets of the white family that the family thinks are beyond her understanding.
With both of these identities and positions under her own control—and unknown to the
whites who project their own ignorant and dehumanizing views of African Americans to

xxiv

―…Grace [the employer of Blanche] appears in the kitchen, flashing what Blanche describes as her
‗Mammy save me‘ eyes, wanting sympathy for her marital troubles…‖ (Hathaway, 2005, p.325)
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her—Blanche‘s possession of double consciousness allows her to create her own agency
out of a position of subjugation. In this way, double consciousness is not solely a burden;
this awareness can also be used to resist oppression and also to strategically maneuver
around and manipulate whites in power with whom blacks must contend. Hathaway
explains,
Blanche is both the detective figure [learning about the white family] and a
potential suspect [as] she is also the only one aware of her own ―passing.‖ This
powerful awareness makes her able to exploit her employers‘ perceptions of her
and maximize her power as a detective. (2005, p. 326)
In this sense, then, Blanche is an undetected detective. She can explore the white
family from the inside because the family does not think she has the abilities to
understand them. By underestimating the intelligence and humanity of Blanche, the white
family situates Blanche in two positions which lead to two perspectives that comprise
double consciousness and that Blanche can use to secretly exploit those who are
exploiting her.
Hathaway (2005, p. 321) says,
Bonnie Plummerxxv argues that the Blanche novels enact a sort of DuBoisean
―double-consciousness,‖ as the term has been applied specifically to African
American detective fiction by Stephen Soitosxxvi in his study The Blues Detective.
Hathaway (2005, p. 332), again quoting Plummer, continues in her endnote to this
passage,

xxv

Plummer is a professor of English and theater at Eastern Kentucky University.
No biographical information at all was found in extensive and seemingly exhaustive Internet searches
for Stephen F. Soitos. Perhaps Soitos defies his being investigated.
xxvi
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Soitos claims that blues detectives are those who ―are double-consciously aware
of their blackness in relation to white society. By using the trickster qualities of
masking, they make their detection work‖ (35-36).
The issue of double consciousness and how this position or condition can be used
by black Americans is, in itself, a negotiation or even a covert negotiation of who is
whom, who is designated or ascribed as whom and how such designations and ascriptions
can be subverted and used to the advantage of those who are intended to be silenced,
dehumanized and negated by their position of having contradictory consciousnesses or
identities. In a way of appropriating and manipulating a negative projected identity,
ascription of inferiority can actually be made liberating when the invisibility created by
the negative identity is not internalized as a submission to inferiority, but is employed as
a position from which African Americans can be self defined in social relations with
people who do not notice, recognize or accept such self definition. This is how
invisibility can be turned around from a form of silencing to a form of empowerment.
Hathaway explains,
Combined with the double irony of her name, the child Blanche nearly withered
under insults about her color until a wise aunt told her that the taunts stemmed
from the other children‘s jealousy: ―Some people got night in ‘em, some got
morning, others, like me and your mama, got dusk. But it‘s only them that‘s got
night can become invisible. People what got night in ‘em can step into the dark
and poof—disappear! Go any old where they want. Do anything.‖ (2005, p. 320)
Projected identity leading to double consciousness is sublimated from a form of
negation to a form of agency because the agency disguises itself behind the putative
negation and therefore creates an empowering role for mistaken identity. This dynamic is
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between people very intimately. We can be mindful of this intimacy together and with
Blanche White too.
There is a limitation, however, to the critique and agency of sublimation of
negation to power through signifyin(g). The limitation is that there is a particular
advantage and disadvantage to signifyin(g)‘s so clearly distinguishing between self
definition and projected identity. The advantage and disadvantage is that signifyin(g)
situates self definition as pure, autonomous and impervious to projected identity.
In so situating itself, self definition empowers because it puts itself as the resource
that disguises agency behind projected identity, as shown by Blanche‘s sense of self that
uses her being negated as power to go unnoticed and free among others. This
resourcefulness of self definition is its agency and empowerment through its
distinguishing itself from projected identity.
However, something is missed, or mistaken actually, with the advantages of the
agency brought with the distinction between self definition and projected identity. The
distinction is not really accurate. The self defined and the projected identity cannot truly
be distinguished as signifyin(g) asserts. That is the disadvantage of signifyin(g) as
agency. The empowerment it enables prevents awareness of how the self defined and
projected identities are so entwined that they cannot be realistically distinguished.
Awareness of that entanglement is indeed a level of agency far more critical and
empowering than signifyin(g), but that awareness and agency is actually prevented by
signifyin(g)‘s sense of empowerment that defines itself as critical and therefore forestalls
pursuit and apprehension of the empowerment gained from recognizing and exploring
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how the self defined and projected identity are too entwined to be critically distinguished.
The agency of signifyin(g) becomes a form of liberation that is still a trap because of the
form of liberation it provides.
For example, Plummer says, ―The awareness of her ‗otherness‘ gives the black
detective a different perspective on events in the case and may allow this black detective
to recognize clues or evidence that a white would not‖ (1999, p. 82). From where does
the awareness of her otherness derive? Who is it whom is aware of her otherness? That
identity (and everyone‘s inner most sense of identity), however it seems to be self
defined, develops in and from the social environment just as the projected identity
develops in and from the social environment. Both the self defined and projected
identities are products of socialization, conditioning, culture and other external
influences. There is really no self that is autonomous. Realizing that may rightly seem
disempowering from a perspective that depends on signifyin(g) as a sense of agency.
However, realizing that there is no self that is autonomous is much more empowering in a
different and more critical and reflective way.
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CHAPTER 8
LITERATURE REVIEW ARTICLE FOUR:
VERNON ANDREWS‘, ―SELF-REFLECTION AND THE REFLECTED SELF:
AFRICAN AMERICAN DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SOCIAL
(PSYCHOLOGICAL) MIRROR.‖

When self defined identity and projected identity are both seen as culturally
derived, new forms of agency can be identified and acquired through new questions and
explorations of meanings of double consciousness. Vernon Andrews (2003) helps show
how the limited or mistaken agency of signifyin(g) can be conceptualized and
surmounted through exposure and exploration in his article, ―Self-Reflection and the
Reflected Self: African American Double Consciousness and the Social (Psychological)
Mirror.‖ This is an article of seven narratives through which Andrews shows how he
navigates, negotiates and wrestles with how he sees himself, how he is seen and how he
can identify, share and discuss these views in liberating and empowering ways. In his
narratives, Andrews reflects on some of his earlier experiences and situations and notices
or remembers conflicts between perspectives.
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The underlying theme of the article is captured in Andrews‘ saying,
the distinctions between the personal and the cultural often become blurred
beyond recognition as authors narrate action, dialogue, emotion and selfconsciousness revealed through action, feeling, thought and language (2003, p.
60).
Andrews is helping to show how the personal or self defined identity and the
projected or cultural identity cannot be so realistically separated as they appear to be with
signifyin(g). Before considering Andrews‘ insightful exploration of the blurring of the
cultural and personal, a caveat at this point is needed to provide an operational definition
of culture for this thesis. Although Andrews does not define culture in this article, E.B.
Tylor (a British Knight and anthropologist writing in 1871) explains,
Culture or civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. (Tylor 1871, in
McGee & Warms 2000, p. 27)
John McGee and Richard Warms paraphrase Clifford Geertz, (all of whom are
anthropologists) by saying,
[Culture is] a shared code of meanings that is acted out publicly...culture is not a
mental model, but exists between people, created by their social actions. (McGee
& Warms, 2000, p. 503)
These definitions emphasize culture as a public code of meanings (or public
understandings of social expectations and consequences for behaviors or actions) and
culture as a sense of whole (perhaps a sense of being at-home to some degree) acquired
from a society. Missing is discussion of these codes and wholes between societies.
Cultures are not only social systems of their own people, but are also defined by and in
relation to other cultures through their ―contact,‖ ―differences‖ and mutual ―challenges‖
68

(Fuentes, 1988, p. 93). Lilia Bartolome shows how these defining inter-cultural
interactions and relations occur and how they are political. She says,
In reality, values placed on [cultural forms of] language and literacy practices
reflect the greater society‘s socioeconomic and political hierarchy. That is, the
language and literacy practices of dominant cultural groups are usually deemed
more valuable and desirable than those of groups that are socially, economically
and politically less powerful. (Bartolome, 1998, p. 19)
This hierarchy, and therefore politics, of cultures can be developed and
reproduced in ways that are subtle to the point of invisibility. When that happens, cultural
domination and subjugation can function without even seeming to be political at all.
Donaldo Macedo explainsxxvii, ―It is through the manipulation of language that the
ideological doctrinal system is able to falsify and distort reality, making it possible for
individuals to accommodate to life within a lie‖ (1994, p. 39).
An explanation of how language is manipulated and how that leads to life within a
lie, in this case a lie of cultural domination and subjugation that is not recognized as such,
is provided by Lisa Delpit. She says,
There are codes or rules for participating in power; that is, there is a ―culture of
power.‖ The codes or rules I‘m speaking of relate to linguistic forms,
communicative strategies, and presentation of self; that is, ways of talking, ways
of writing, ways of dressing, and ways of interacting…The rules of the culture of
power are a reflection of the rules of the culture of those who have power… If
you are not already a participant in the culture of power, being told explicitly the
rules of that culture makes acquiring power easier… Those with power are
frequently least aware of- or least willing to acknowledge- its existence. Those
with less power are often most aware of its existence. (1995, pp. 25-26)

xxvii

Macedo references Vaclav Havel (1988), whose piece, ―The Power of the Powerless,‖ stimulates
insight not just into, but also of, ways political and ideological systems (including Western ―democracy‖
and capitalism) trap people mentally and/or physically.
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When those of the culture of power (those teachers and others who are of white
middle class mainstream [and academic] discourse) are not aware of their position of
rationing; denying access; or denying explanation of the codes and rules of dominant
culture, then they can perpetuate the sense, the lie, of the mainstream culture‘s superiority
and the lie of minorities cultures‘ inferiorities. In that way, culture is highly, but invisibly,
political.
Delpit provides a perspective, approach or strategy of how people, especially
those of superordinate cultural positions, can intervene in our own conditionings. She
says,
We all interpret behaviors, information, and situations through our own cultural
lenses; these lenses operate involuntarily, below the level of conscious awareness,
making it seem that our own view is simply ―the way it is.‖ Learning to interpret
across cultures demands reflecting on our own experiences, analyzing our own
culture, examining and comparing varying perspectives. We must consciously and
voluntarily make our cultural lenses apparent. Engaging in the hard work of
seeing the world as others see it must be a fundamental goal for any move to
reform the education of teachers and their assessment. (1995, p. 151)

This identifying of our own cultural lenses through seeing the world as others see
it is also a meaning of exposing hidden ideology (or exposing a system of thought that we
do not realize we are held within). The exposure of hidden ideology and the illumination
or invisibility of culture as political hierarchy is both personal and social. No one is so
pure as to be free from the politics of culture. Bartolome shows how the personal and
political/cultural are so deeply and subtly entwined that they cannot be separated even
though we may like to believe that we are critical of, and above, that.
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She says,
If the sociocultural and political reality is one in which teacher and learner are
antagonistic toward each other- if the teacher unconsciously or consciously resists
mentoring students perceived as deficient and if students, in turn, reject the
devaluation of their existing language and literacy skills and the imposition of the
dominant culture‘s language and literacy practices- very little teaching and
learning will take place… [I]t is also necessary to acknowledge the impact of
political and ideological realities on culture formation and maintenance; any
discussion of linguistic-minority students‘ language and literacy practices must
take into account the larger sociopolitical context in which these practices have
developed and in which teacher and student negotiate the maintenance of primary
discourses and the acquisition of the dominant culture‘s secondary discourses.
(1998, p. 21) (Emphasis added)
There is a social realm broader than, but including, the personal from which the
personal derives and within which people interact with each other under shared or
conflicting systems of norms, histories, politics, beliefs, values and traditions. The
individual is not legitimately separable from the cultural and political environment even
if that environment lies by leading us to think we are autonomous. Living such a lie
means having a sense of distinction between the personal and cultural/political when the
truth is that we are far more conditioned than we are conditioned to notice. We are
conditioned to think of ourselves as individuals and to not notice that we are impartible
from the cultural/political/collective.
Returning now to Andrews, his article helps to further illuminate how the
personal and the cultural/political cannot be distinguished even though people can be
unaware of how who they are as people (and as putative individuals) is shaped, or
determined, by their cultures and by dynamics and positions between cultures. The
article‘s underlying theme is captured in Andrews‘ saying, ―[T]he distinctions between
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the personal and the cultural often become blurred beyond recognition as authors narrate
action, dialogue, emotion and self-consciousness revealed through action, feeling,
thought and language‖ (2003, p. 60).
When Andrews says, ―[A]uthors narrate action, dialogue, emotion and selfconsciousness,‖ then he is already showing the blurriness of the personal and the cultural.
The narration is of a mixture of personal and cultural that cannot be sorted out.
Distinctions cannot be made between personal and cultural aspects or elements of
actions, dialogues, emotions or self-consciousness. Narrating those events is narrating
events that are themselves blurrings of personal and cultural. The narration is ―revealed
through action, feeling, thought and language‖ because the blurred personal and cultural
is what reveals, becomes or informs the narration that is claimed as personal.
This blurring of the personal and cultural ties back into the caveat about culture.
The dynamics between the personal and cultural are between one‘s own culture(s) and
other cultures, including the political hierarchy, rules of inclusion or exclusion and
positions of superiority and inferiority of people within those cultures and politics. All
that is part of the narration that is itself cultural and political even if it seems to be just
personal. That is how the personal, cultural and multicultural are blurred beyond
distinction.
Andrews shows how, and in what ways, his personal views, and those of others,
are actually reflections of positions, attitudes, values, beliefs, relations and dynamics that
were and are imparted to him, as they are to everyone, through systems or meanings he
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learned from his culture. These personal views deriving from their cultural systems or
meanings is what blurs the distinction between the personal and the cultural.
As an introduction to all seven narratives and the first one in particular, Vernon
Andrews is an African American man who, when writing this article in 2003, is an
assistant professor of American Studies at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand.
In the early 1990‘s, he was studying for his PhD in Sociology at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison. There, once a semester, Andrews and other social psychologists
from Sociology met over lunch with social psychologists from Psychology to present,
share and discuss their research (Andrews, 2003).

Narrative One: “White Like Me”
In the first narrative, ―White Like Me,‖ Andrews is at the lunch. Hearing one
presentation, he wonders about how or if the study could be generalized to the broad
public or only to specific racial and class populations. He asks the presenter, ―Could you
give me the racial breakdown of the subjects you surveyed?‖ Then Andrews writes, ―My
question was nervously misinterpreted as, ‗Why didn‘t you include African Americans
and other racial groups in your survey?‘‖ Andrews is not concerned whether there should
be more black people in the survey. Rather, he is saying that if the subjects are white,
mostly middle class, UW-Madison students, then should the results be generalized to that
demographic rather than generalized without such qualification? Andrew says, ―Whites,
by implication, were non-racial. By further implication, white students were ―the norm‖
and thus broadly generalizable beyond the scope of the data‖ (2003, p. 61). This insight is
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an example, but also a criticism, of Plummer‘s saying, ―The awareness of [his]
‗otherness‘ gives the black detective a different perspective on events in the case and may
allow this black detective to recognize clues or evidence that a white would not‖ (1999,
p. 82).
As an example of Plummer‘s detective, Andrews‘ awareness of his otherness is a
perspective that illuminates clues or evidence of negation and misrepresentation (through
generalizing and norming beyond the scope of data) that whites miss because their sense
of their racelessness (their sense that they are just individuals, not ―white‖ or part of a
―white‖ collective) comes from, and makes invisible, the over generalized identity they
project onto themselves. In this way, Andrews has the double consciousness that
signifyin(g) provides because he uses self definition to expose, manipulate and reject the
projected identity of whites onto themselves and others as the norm. He uses self
definition to reject black exclusion from having their say about their place in the
erroneously and unexamined universalized scope of data.
In this way, by identifying the implication of racelessness as whiteness, Andrews
is exposing blackness as excluded from racelessness. When whites are raceless and ―just
individuals‖ because they are white, their being individuals depends on their
socialization, which is a blurring of the personal and cultural position for them that is
revealed by the black detective, like Andrews. Blacks too have a blurring of the personal
and cultural position because their being individuals is contradicted by their not being
raceless, which they would have to be white to be.
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The personal self definition, not just of blacks but of whites and everyone too, is
not pure, autonomous and impervious to culture, but is imparted from the culture that
differentially and therefore corruptly ascribes positions of individuality through
racelessness to some by ascribing positions of mass anonymity through racialness to
others. Blacks have a blurring of the personal and cultural, or socialization, because their
being individuals is contradicted by their not being raceless, which they would have to be
white to be. (Whites too have a blurring of the personal and cultural in their own way
because their individuality derives from their racelessness, which they get from their
history and social position that gives them a fallacious sense of autonomy and
independence from that history and social position.) The personal and the cultural that are
so clearly distinguished with signifyin(g) become entwined and impossible to realistically
separate when there is exposure of the ways the cultural (including ascribed individuality,
ascribed anonymity and projected identities) shapes, informs and determines the sense of
the personal and the self definition. This elusive entwining creates blurriness of the
cultural and personal for and between everyone.
At the level of critique of signifyin(g), double consciousness clearly distinguishes
the personal from the cultural. At the deeper level of Andrews‘ inquiry, double
consciousness explores how neither consciousness, and no consciousness at all, can be
truly claimed as personal, pure and autonomous from the cultural conditionings,
including racelessness and racialness, that shape and determine the sense of individuality
with which people feel distinguished from or entrapped in the cultural. There are entirely
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different relationships between the personal and the cultural for blacks and whites. There
are entirely different reflections of the cultural on, or as, the personal. Andrews says,
My experiences discussed herein account for only a miniscule amount of the
many errors in judgment many black folk make when we carry the double burden
of trying to assess white social signs through an ―American‖ lens while also
trying to assess (possible) white racist signifiers through a ―black‖ social lens.
(2003, p. 61)
Andrews‘ saying, ―[A]ssessing white racial signs through an ‗American lens
while also trying to assess (possible) white racist signifiers through a ‗black‘ social lens,‖
seems to mean that double consciousness involves blacks‘ have to acquire and use the
norm (or signs or a set of meanings) that is defined by and for whiteness to mean
individual while blacks also have to maintain their own perspective from which to expose
and confront parts of those meanings (or signifiers) that are identifiably racist.

Narrative Two: “Social Lenses and Mirrors”
In his first narrative, Andrews reveals the blurring of the personal and cultural. In
his second narrative, ―Social Lenses and Mirrors,‖ he provides an approach to using the
impartibility of personal and cultural perspectives to identify and explore that blurriness
itself. The blurriness is actually positive because it means we have to figure out together
how we see ourselves, each other, and how we see each other seeing us.
Andrews says,
[S]ocial psychologists can add to scientific knowledge by including ―the racial
other‖ in future theorizing in the field. Past theory is fraught with gaps in analysis
and could benefit by scholars revisiting our most sacred texts. (2003, p. 63)
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Andrews is suggesting a return to sacred (perhaps canonical) texts with the
inclusion of the racial other in the theorizing. The theory is incomplete because it requires
more inclusion of the racial other to show how individuals, or senses of individuality, are
constructed through group positions, dynamics and interactions.xxviii With awareness that
we are being created by others according to their reactions and responses to our
presentations of ourselves to them, and with this awareness as a meaning of socially
situated conduct, the way Andrews seeks to include the racial other in revisiting
canonical texts can be considered. Andrews says,
[T]he following discussion is an initial visitation of works in social psychology
highlighting situated social conduct [or focusing on how we are being created in
the minds of each other] and how these discussions might shift and grow in light
of African American situated identity, double-consciousness and the reflected
social selfxxix. (2003, p. 63)
Socially situated conduct, the reflected social self and double consciousness are
conceptions of the overlaps, blurrings and impartibility of the personal and cultural
identities, positions and dynamics between people. Andrews is saying he will return to
texts that focus on these overlaps and consider how their dynamics might be developed
and illuminated through exploration of African American situated identity, doublexxviii

In order to explore how Andrews goes on to explain the inclusion, it is necessary to first define the key
Social Psychology concept he uses of, ―Socially situated conduct,‖ or, ―Situated social conduct‖ (2003,
p.64). Andrews uses both terms seemingly interchangeably. Jack Katz, a professor of sociology at UCLA,
is not discussed explicitly by Andrews, but Katz can help explain that socially situated conduct involves
―tak[ing] account of how one's actions are likely to shape how the other will see oneself… So long as a
person knows he or she is being known by another, it will be impossible not to be involved in shaping the
other's image of who one is and what one is doing‖ (Katz, 1996, p.574). As we interact with each other, we
are creating ourselves in each others‘ minds. We can have awareness of our creating who we are to others.
xxix

Similar to socially situated conduct, the reflected social self conceptualizes the blurring of the personal
and cultural. Sharon K. O'Dair, a UC Berkeley professor, explains, ―According to the interactionists, the
self is constructed socially… the individual is creature and creator of society.‖ (O‘Dair & Danson, 1985)
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consciousness and the reflected social self. In this way, Andrews is using the impartibility
of personal and cultural perspectives to identify and explore their own overlapping
blurriness. The framework of blurriness as background is a perspective from which to
return to the texts.
To begin this inquiry, Andrews discusses Charles Cooley‘sxxx, ―The Looking
Glass Self,‖ published in 1902 (the year before DuBois‘ Souls was published). Andrews
says, ―Cooley, in the citation below, summarizes the interaction between the individual
mind, the social ‗Other,‘ and socially situated conduct:‖
So in imagination we perceive in another‘s mind some thought of our appearance,
manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on, and are variously affected by
it. . . . The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical
reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this
reflection upon another‘s mind. . . . We always imagine, and in imaging share, the
judgments of the other mind. (2003, p. 64)
The other‘s view of us, or our surmise of that view, both of which are mutually
socially conditioned or informed, affect how we choose to behave, how we expect others
to behave and, therefore, those conditioned views become part of who we are and who
we think we and others are even if we mistakenly claim our identities as self defined.
Identity, even one‘s own identity, is not (or not predominantly) self defined. The self that
defines itself as self defined comes from the cultural background. The ways we see
ourselves are shaped by ways others, including ―racial others,‖ see us and by the ways we
see each other. Realizing that is acquiring the framework or orientation with which to

xxx

Cooley was a professor of sociology at the University of Michigan who taught the school‘s first
sociology course in 1899. (http://www.asanet.org/page.ww?name=Charles+H.+Cooley&section)
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return to canonical texts with the inclusion of ―the racial other‖ in the theorizing.
Andrews explains,
If we accept Cooley‘s picture of imaginative social interaction, then we believe
that people constantly interact with the real or imagined images of ourselves
reflected back to us; thus, how we correspondingly act is tempered by how the
social ―other‖ might view our social actions. (2003, p. 64)
Within this framework, Andrews introduces how racial identities and positions,
even when they are not noticed, function as a part of socially situated conduct, the
reflected self and double consciousness. He says,
As many members of racial and ethnic groups in America can attest, the ―other‖
in the social institution is often white and often in a power position. While this
institutional dynamic does not problematize Cooley‘s construction, at the least,
race and power problematizes how people in the “out” racial group situate
themselves and “reflect” on how to behave in social settings. This phenomenon
of shifting cultural lenses on a daily, hourly or moment-by-moment basis by black
people was first noted by W.E.B. Dubois at the turn of the 20th century and is
often referred to as ―double consciousness.‖ (2003, p. 64) (Emphasis added)
Double consciousness involves ―how people in the ‗out‘ racial group situate
themselves and ‗reflect‘ on how to behave in social settings‖ (Andrews, 2003, p. 64). For
example, Andrews explains that historically African Americans have often been at risk if
they made eye contract with white Americans. Blacks‘ avoiding eye contact with whites
for that reason, though, has been misconstrued by whites as blacks being suspicious
(2003, p. 65). This is a dynamic of blacks having to take the risk of making eye contact
with whites or appearing suspicious to whites for not making eye contact. It requires
blacks‘ conjecturing how they appear to whites and behaving accordingly in order to
shape that image and protect themselves from how the whites might create their image of
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the blacks in their minds. That is double consciousness, socially situated conduct and
reflected social self. Another example is Andrews‘ saying,
A black athlete in professional or collegiate sport must at many points in social
time choose the racial audience that she ―imagines.‖ Whose behavior does she
reflect? Whom does she try to please when her audience is predominantly white
in the stadium and, in her imagination via the television camera, black at home in
her family? African Americans constantly confront this dilemma of audience
choice from multiple perceived audiences. (2003, p. 65)
Black athletes have to juggle perspectives right during the game and then choose
how to behave and respond. Of course, everyone does this in all sorts of venues when we
monitor and regulate our self presentation and when we negotiate who we are to others
and who they are to us, as is done in socially situated conduct. The focus here is on racial
dynamics within what Andrews calls, ―Cognitive dissonance,‖ of African Americans. He
explains,
The cognitive dissonance about ―Americaness‖ suffered by many African
Americans has its roots in how we perceive ourselves versus how our [white]
American brethren perceive us. While African Americans may no longer be ―torn
asunder‖ by our continued ―twoness‖ in contemporary society, as Dubois might
say a century ago, we are always at one and the same time trying to imagine we fit
―Americaness‖ in the face of constant reminders by real (and imagined) others
that we don‘t quite fit in. (2003, p. 65)
Inferring from Andrews‘ use of the term, cognitive dissonance seems to refer to
the mental conflict between African Americans‘ self-perceptions and how they are
perceived by white Americans. In this way, cognitive dissonance can be considered a part
or synonym of double consciousness. DuBois seems to have alluded to the term and
concept, but at his time the discipline of social psychology had not yet coined the term. In
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linking the concepts of cognitive dissonance with double consciousness, Andrews is
helping to advance consideration of the concept of double consciousness.
With this introduction of cognitive dissonance helping to conceptualize twentyfirst century black double consciousness, Andrews ends his second narrative and prepares
for his third narrative. To recapitulate and repeat, Andrews‘ first narrative is about how
whiteness is an individuality-affirming personal identity within and from the cultural
background. For African Americans, and perhaps all people of color, though, the culture
they share with whites is an exclusive and negating white norm through which they must
construe and define individuality while also being prepared to identify and face the
meanings or signifiers of the culture that are more blatantly racist. This is a form of
double consciousness for blacks when they are defining themselves personally within a
shared interracial culture that negates them. The generalizing of whiteness, and
specifically white racelessness, as the norm that enables or debars individuality, or that
racially rations individuality, is the interracial context of double consciousness that
Andrews reaches by exploring how self definitions and projected identities are too
entwined to be separated instead of his staying at the mistaken distinctions of the more
rudimentary level of signifyin(g).
Then, in his second narrative, Andrews contextualizes the racial rationing of
individuality within the Social Psychology concept of socially situated conduct. To
reiterate and repeat for the second narrative, the other‘s view of us, or our surmise of that
view, both of which are mutually socially conditioned or informed, affect how we choose
to behave, how we expect others to behave and, therefore, those conditioned views
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become part of who we are and who we think we and others are even if we mistakenly
claim our identities and each others‘ identities as self defined. Identity, even one‘s own
identity, is not (or not predominantly) self defined. The self that defines itself as self
defined comes from the cultural background. The ways we see ourselves are shaped by
the ways others, including racial others, see us and by the ways we see each other. For
whites this relationship between self and other, or blurring of the personal and cultural,
can be unrecognized because the cultural position of white racelessness makes whites feel
that their individualities are self defined instead of their being, or being from, cultural
positions. For blacks, though, who are not raceless because they are not white, being an
individual is contradicted by their collective anonymity to whites within their shared
culture with whites. That leads to cognitive dissonance and double consciousness.

Narrative Three: “Scotland, Kilts, and the Camera Man: Black to the USA”
In his third narrative, ―Scotland, Kilts, and the Camera Man: Black to the USA,‖
Andrews explores cognitive dissonance and double consciousness within some
interpersonal interactions between himself and white people.
Andrews explains and assesses one whole situation (in a necessarily extensive
quote) by saying,
As part of research I am conducting on the British roots of sportsmanlike conduct,
I visited England, Wales, and Scotland for six weeks in 1999 to cover the Rugby
World Cup and to collect data from various sources… One afternoon, I decided to
visit Windsor Castle… On my way back to my hotel I…asked a passing
gentleman if he‘d mind taking my photo with the Castle in the background. He
replied, ―As long as you take my photo with my camera also.‖ ―Sure,‖ I said,
noting his American accent…
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After the photo, the tourist returned with my camera and I set it down next
to my research bag on the bridge‘s bench. As he gave me his camera, he had
apparently noted my American accent also, which does tend to stick out in the
British countryside. He stared me right in the eye and, with serious concern
tempered by a sly grin, said, ―Now you aren‘t going to run away with my camera,
are you?‖ I was so shocked at the question and implication of my latent
criminality that later I was surprised I was able to gather together a coherent
response. I looked him back in the eyes and said, ―Sir, I don‘t think my university
would take kindly to its professors stealing cameras.‖ He gave me the camera
along with a sheepish grin, backed for his photo, and returned to say, ―I was just
kidding.‖ Sure he was.
More likely, I had activated a stereotypical schema about black men. As
many rap artists like KRS-One, L.L. Cool J., Ice Cube, and Chuck D. note, black
men are always considered suspects. Others have noted that black men are
stereotyped as dangerous…
[However,] Gaertner and Dovidioxxxi note that whites are consciously
concerned with maintaining an egalitarian and non-prejudiced self-concept even if
they hold negative sentiments toward African Americans. (2003, p. 66)
The image the white tourist creates of himself in the mind of Andrews contradicts
the image the white tourist wants to create. What happens then? The white tourist claims
to be joking. He makes the whole thing unreal to himself and expects affirmation through
Andrews‘ socially situated conduct, whatever the hurt and burden to Andrews.
Similar responses from other whites comprise a consistent pattern of experiences
for Andrews. He says,
And for white associates I have related this story to, the advice is, understandably,
that I should ―shake it off—he was just being a jerk.‖ Another white person
commented, ―Everybody needs to be concerned about theft when traveling
abroad,‖ the point being that caution should always be one‘s guide when dealing
with the unknown. I understood the general reasoning in both white responses
above, but reasoned that they failed to see, feel or understand my hurt as a
(relatively) young black American male cast forever and always as the criminal
suspect.
xxxi

Samuel Gaertner is Director of Social Psychology at the University of Delaware. John Dovidio is a
professor of psychology at Yale.
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Gaertner and Dovidio note that discrimination is most likely to occur
when nonracial justifications for discriminatory behavior are available. It would
appear that, for better or for worse, other whites also look to find nonracial
justifications for the actions of other whites so as to diffuse racial angst of blacks
and possibly to further cement their own status as egalitarian and non-prejudicial.
(2003, pp. 66-67)
Andrews and Gaertner and Dovidio may be inquiring whether sometimes white
people may try to be equal-minded and may want situations to be racially equal when
they are not. In other words, perhaps white people want to have a fair and equal outlook
and perspective as the one that defines and explains situations including, for example, the
one between Andrews and the cameraman. Perhaps they can think they are contributing
to peaceful conditions and relations by sharing their fair and equal outlook and
perspective. All that can become an image, though, or a form of socially situated conduct,
that they share and by sheer force of quantity make the norm that everyone else has to
tolerate even though it is not actually the way things are (or are seen by blacks) between
black and white Americans. An even more dubious possibility is that whites might be less
concerned about being fair and equal and more concerned with negating or denying white
supremacy (and its white privileges of racelessness and individuality as well as its black
burdens of mass anonymity and double consciousness) while it continues, and for it to
continue, to function in actuality, but outside public discourse. If so, this might add
tremendously to the cognitive dissonance and double consciousness that Andrews is
discussing.
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Narrative Four: “Black Pacifica: New Zealand and African American Bodies”
Andrews‘ fourth narrative, ―Black Pacifica: New Zealand and African American
Bodies,‖ is about another interaction with a white person. This one is earlier in 1999 than
the interaction over cameras with the white American in England. It happens in
Wellington, the capital of New Zealand, with a kind and respectful fifty year old New
Zealand man who is a house painter. They meet when Andrews is in Wellington for a
conference and is trying to find his way walking to Te Papa Museum. He sees the painter
preparing to leave his work site and asks for directions to the museum. The directions,
though, are complicated and Andrews starts to walk off without a very clear
understanding of the way. Andrews wonders whether this white man is trying to help or
make him more lost. Then, the man offers Andrews a ride which he accepts. They talk
about rugby on the way into town. Andrews explains his thoughts and feelings by saying,
On the ride I had the amazing experience of lightness. I was experiencing trust by
another individual who had white skin but did not know me. Call me deprived,
but I had never experienced this level of trust and confidence from a white
stranger in America. No doubt there are many who might have trusted me. But the
amazement was that I reflected in the moment how I had constructed myself as a
criminal. I actually said to myself, ―Why does this man trust me?‖ (2003, p. 69)
(Emphasis added)
In terms of double consciousness, Andrews sees himself as being defined as a
criminal in the minds of others and then he ―internaliz[es]‖ that definition even though
Andrews knows he is honest and law-abiding (Andrews, 2003, p. 69). He seems to be
saying that an imposed identity becomes one self definition that contradicts who he feels
he really is as a person. Then, Andrews is in the social realm of how people create
themselves and are created in the minds of others, meaning he is in socially situated
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conduct, with the struggle of two identities. Andrews seems to be explaining this by
saying,
When I am in the social milieu of whiteness, my imaginings of the white other‘s
interpretations of my black body and its threat cause me to attempt to reflect a
docile persona in order to achieve some desired result…Gradually, over a period
of years, I have been able to bring to the fore a calm in social interactions that
does not bear the weight of American racism. I have always wondered what the
unbearable lightness of whiteness was—to walk outside and wave at neighbors, to
ride elevators without having others cringe, to walk through a store with a
backpack and not worry about being checked, and to test drive a car without
leaving identification behind. (2003, p. 70)
Andrews carries the weight, the burden and double consciousness, of projected
and internalized identity, while enabling himself to ―bring to the fore a calm in social
interactions.‖ He still is debarred, though, from ―the lightness of whiteness.‖ This is a lot
of work without much relief, or lightness, for African Americans. Aware of this, though,
Andrews explains,
Many African Americans have stopped trying to please the imagined white other
in media situations, preferring instead to send a ―shout out‖ to the brothas and
sistas backstage… [M]any youth simply don‘t care to have their cultural norms
take a ―back seat‖ on the bus of public presentation any longer. The imagined
authoritative white public other is for many African Americans in the hip-hop
generation losing its fear factor. (2003, p. 71)
As blacks assert their own norms, reject the authority of white norms and
disregard their seeming threatening to whites, there are complicated positions, dynamics
and interactions between black and white Americans even though, and because, they are
not discussed between blacks and whites, or between whites, perhaps at all. This further
complicates double consciousness within socially situated conduct because everyone is
participating in the conduct, but it is not discussed. In his fifth narrative, providing
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something to discuss, Andrews gives a glimpse of his experience of some positions,
dynamics and interactions between himself and a white waiter who provides good service
to Andrews at a restaurant.

Narrative Five: “Fat Bob”
In this narrative, ―Fat Bob,‖ Andrews is driving from Wisconsin to California in
1994. In Nebraska, at a stop for coffee, he enters the restaurant and orders a cup.
Andrews is waiting a long time and wonders why. He thinks of stories of waiters
―sabotaging customers‖ and becomes concerned about the quality of his coffee. Andrews
decides he will accidentally knock over the cup when it comes to then get a refill. Then,
though, as Fat Bob, the waiter, comes with the coffee, he says goodbye to Jimmy and
Tiny, two black customers who seem to be old and close acquaintances or friends of Fat
Bob. Serving Andrews‘ coffee, he explains that the reason for the delay was his brewing
a fresh pot. Because of Fat Bob‘s closeness to Jimmy and Tiny and the fresh coffee,
Andrews understands that African American customers are not assaulted by this white
waiter (2003, p. 72).
To consider this situation, Andrews introduces the, ―Social mirror,‖ saying,
[I]n many a cross-racial scenario, the social mirror is beyond foggy. The social
mirror is not solely our own construction; we reflect at any given moment our
personal collective experiences, in addition to the experiences of others of our
group as told through stories. In addition, we reflect what we have heard other
whites say and feel about us, in addition to what has been done to us over many
years. (2003, p. 72)
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We reflect, perhaps presenting and demonstrating, our experiences and those we
share with our groups. That seems applicable to anyone. Also, Andrews seems to be
saying that African Americans present and demonstrate what whites have said about and
done to them and the legacy of that history. He says, ―This is all put into the mix of how
we think about our situation or our lives or our skin color at any given moment in any
given space‖ (2003, p. 72). This could be a form of double consciousness with the
reflections of one‘s own experiences and those of one‘s group as one perspective while
the reflecting of what others have said and done is another perspective.
Stereotypes can be held by both blacks and whites about each other, but the
sources of the stereotypes, including the cultural positions, from which they derive, are
much different. Andrews says,
African Americans are also prone to stereotype, though admittedly more out of
crosscultural fear than out-group disdain. Given the many horrific acts by white
supremacist groups, the police, and the U.S. government over the years toward
African Americans, it should never come as a surprise when black folk overreact
to what they perceive as a racial slight in a public setting. (2003, p. 72)
Interactions can be sensitive between whites and blacks. Whites can be sensitive
to being considered racist while blacks can be sensitive to be treated in racist ways.
Andrews‘ discussion of the cameraman and the findings of Gaertner and Dovidio shows a
sensitivity of whites in their seeking non-racial rationales for racially-based beliefs,
positions, behaviors and treatments while feeling strongly, or perhaps to feel strongly,
that they are being fair, equal and individual. In fact, white racelessness as a state of mind
is a non-racial rationale for the racial base of white individuality within which a sense of
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fairness and equality functions and is held with such insidious conviction. A form of
sensitivity of African Americans is explained by Andrews‘ saying,
I want here to highlight that there is a cumulative effect of stress on the individual
from having to decipher and react to one‘s race in the social milieu. Black males,
I believe, carry a significant amount of stress once in adulthood from reactions to
their perceived ―threat‖ in interracial settings to the social order and from having
to sort out, as above [at the coffee stop], any number of social scenarios where
race plays a factor. (2003, p. 73)
Within and between these sensitivities, there are unequal adaptations and
accommodations due to unequal power distributions. Because they are a subjugated
minority, blacks have to adjust to and accommodate white sensitivities far more than the
other way around. Whites can actually use their sensitivity to their own hurt feelings to
coerce blacks into silently tolerating the suspicion and non-racial rationalizations from
whites who become upset as a defense when these and other forms of racism are exposed
and addressed (see Williams, 1991, p. 64; Gates, 1992, p. 38; Loury, 2002, pp. 68-69).
That defense from exposing and addressing racism can become a norm, a sort of
collective denial and taboo, while whites becoming upset can be how they enforce their
norm and make it non-negotiable. And they might not even consciously or admittedly
realize that.

Narrative Six: “Whose Norms are Watching You?”
One way the inequality of adaptation can happen below a surface of apparent
equality is shown by Andrews in his sixth narrative, ―Whose Norms are Watching You?‖
In the sixth and seventh narratives, Andrews does not focus on specific situations as
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much as he considers general dynamics of interracial interactions including those that he
has discussed in his earlier five narratives. A most crucial observation in the sixth
narrative is that whites can often or mostly be within their own cultural norms. Even
when they participate in events and communities of African Americans or people of color
in general, the broader outside culture is white in the US. Conversely, as Andrews
explains,
In a mixed setting how do we [African Americans] continually shift and decide
which group is the true social mirror? The choice of audience to reflect is a daily
situational contestation with professional and non-professional African Americans
who are always and constantly in cross-cultural settings and interactions. Whose
norms do you choose? Who is watching? Whose imagination do you reflect?
(2003, p. 73)
This continual deciding and shifting between social mirrors is black double
consciousness as accommodation and enabling of the broader norm of white racelessness.
It is a particular dialectic or even a symbiosis of white privilege and black burden.xxxii
The personal and social identities and positions we hold and are held by are so entwined
within and between races (as historical positions and social conditionings) that
individuality, blackness and whiteness; and how we see ourselves and each other; and
how we expect to be treated and how we expect others to let us treat them can only be
explored all together in holistic and mutually defining ways.
Helping to show part of this broad perspective, Andrews explains how there is an,
―Acceptable situational conformity,‖ (2003, p. 74) that is a way African Americans have
xxxii

Andrews notes that all people do the ―cultural dance‖ of adjusting to and participating in the norms of
other cultures when necessary or desired. (Andrews, 2003, p. 73-4) However, it is the specific uniqueness
of black and white interactions that helps illuminate black double consciousness and white racelessness too.
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developed as individuals and a group to interact with the outside white mainstream. This
seems like double consciousness as it negotiates self definition, identity as part of African
American culture on the one hand and on the other hand the images and expectations
projected from the outside white mainstream. Andrews says,
While there is a general norm of black resistance and racialized intragroup
pressure in social settings not to conform to white norms, there is also a general
level of acceptable conformity in mixed social settings. This acceptable
situational conformity varies by individual actor, assessor, and social setting. In
general, the posture, diction and level of real or feigned subservience are allowed
to shift toward the white norm in order to get the job done and pay the bills, so to
speak. Most African Americans calculate that there is no escaping some level of
assimilation in order to advance economically… African Americans over the
years have by necessity had to be far more conscious of the imaginations of
whites than the other way around. And thus, through the act of reflection on how
we as blacks ―should‖ behave, we have become increasingly, if not defiantly,
socially conscious of white ―others.‖ (2003, p. 74)
This difference between black and white consciousness of each other is profound.
Blacks have to navigate a historically hostile mainstream that has denied their
individuality while providing a sense of autonomous individuality to whites who have not
had to notice how that sense of racelessness comes from the same historical and social
source as black negation and double consciousness. This distinction between black
double consciousness and white racelessness emerging from the same shared social and
political history of race leads to different choices of behaviors and different influences on
those choices. In other words, there are connections between choices of how to behave
and social influences on those choices.
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Narrative Seven: “Situations and Contexts”
Andrews explains some connections between choices of how to behave and social
influences on those choices in his seventh, and last, narrative, ―Situations and Contexts,‖
Conduct becomes situated activity when it is anchored outside the self and
constrained by presumed ―monitoring‖ by others…We choose specific behaviors
in every sociocultural situation and in so doing imply to others our situated
identity or our persona in the given social context. (2003, p. 75)
Presumed monitoring, our surmise of how others are interpreting and
understanding our conduct, is an influence on how we choose to behave. That could be
how ―conduct… is anchored outside the self.‖ For examples, Andrews refers to such
situations as seeing an ex-lover in a café; breaking norms with family members and with
people at work; and whether female Olympic athletes who choose to primp for, and
retake, their photos. How people choose to behave can be influenced by the responses
they can anticipate to receive from others.
The influences and expected responses should be equal for everyone. However,
Andrews has already shown how this is not the case. Andrews says in his sixth narrative,
―African Americans over the years have by necessity had to be far more conscious of the
imaginations of whites than the other way around‖ (2003, p. 74). Presumed monitoring
between blacks and whites is different and unequal because blacks have to be more
conscious of how whites see them than the other way around. Whites do not have to have
presumed monitoring about their whiteness, but blacks have to have presumed
monitoring about their blackness. In this way, Andrews‘ sixth and seventh narratives
combine. The sixth narrative reveals the inequality that blacks have to attend to the
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negative images ascribed from the white mainstream while whites have racelessness
ascribed onto themselves by their own mainstream. Then, Andrew‘s seventh narrative
introduces presumed monitoring as a social practice of considering how others will
interpret our behavior. That presumed monitoring is unequal because it requires African
Americans to get double consciousness from their ascriptions while white ascriptions
function as privileges of raceless individuality that are kept invisible (and that keep
whiteness-as-individuality invisible) because they are not discussed.

Discussion and Conclusion
In this section, Andrews leads his inquiry in a new and profound direction. He
explains that he will not focus on racial differences, but will talk within the context of
how ―[t]he similarities among diverse people along various social axes in society
outweigh our differences‖ (2003, p. 77). This does not mean that the similarities negate
the racial differences, as colorblind proponents mistakenly assert. Rather, Andrews
reveals how common abilities shared between (at least) black and white Americans can
help illuminate racial differences so they can be better understood as social formations
and institutions that shape who we are.
Specifically, Andrews focuses on the common ability of whites to develop and
share a view of themselves, and develop and share a view of themselves as whites, from
the perspectives of their African American brethren. Andrews brilliantly explains,
I want to emphasize, then, that it is fine to say what you think in social settings
with African Americans. But also think about what you say, and if called upon to
self-reflect, be willing to step outside the norm of whiteness, white rules, white
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manners and white hegemony to be able to take the imagined position of the
social/racial/cultural/gendered other. Part and parcel of the ability of African
Americans to redefine interracial social spaces as appropriate venues for the
enactment of blackness might be the dual ability for whites to exhibit double
consciousness about multiple meanings of the social acts of non-whites. (2003, p.
77)
Andrews calls on white Americans to ―take the imagined position of the [socially
situated] other‖ (2003, p. 77). Although he does not emphasize the significance of this
white recognition of their own ability to have a sense of otherness, the change in white
people and in social dynamics would be profound. White double consciousness would
give white Americans a new way to view how they, blacks and other people of color are
positioned in relation to each other as members of socially positioned groups. The next
article in this literature review, "‘Two Warring Ideals‘": Double Consciousness,
Dialogue, and African American Patriotism Post-9/11,‖ by Todd C. Shaw,xxxiii helps
show what views are possible and observable when whites too see themselves, and see
themselves as whites, from the perspectives of African Americans and all people of color.

xxxiii

―Todd C. Shaw is an assistant professor of Political Science and African American Studies at the
University of South Carolina, Columbia.‖ (Shaw, 2004, p. 20)
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CHAPTER 9
LITERATURE REVIEW ARTICLE FIVE:
"‘TWO WARRING IDEALS‘": DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS, DIALOGUE, AND
AFRICAN AMERICAN PATRIOTISM POST-9/11,‖ BY TODD SHAW

Shaw‘s study of intraracial and interracial dialogue shows different meanings of
patriotism; how these forms of patriotism are expressed in racially mixed and non-mixed
dialogues; and how perspectives across racial lines can be unknown and misunderstood
(Shaw, 2004). These views explicitly reveal black double consciousness. They implicitly
help reveal how whites can have their own double consciousness when studying
dialogue. Then, the possibility opens for a true dialogue (one that is equal) about who we
are and who we are not to ourselves and each other. This multilateral double
consciousness would change the discussions Shaw observes and it would change some of
the interactions between Andrews and white people. Dialogues, interactions and
dynamics would become more transparent and comprehensible with multilateral double
consciousness as a meta-view of ourselves, each other and who else we each might also
be. With ―the dual ability for whites to exhibit double consciousness about multiple
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meanings of the social acts of non-whites‖ (Andrews, 2003, p. 77), the black burden of
accommodating the conflicts between, and blurrings of, self defined and imposed
identities and positions would shift through multilateral double consciousness to equal
negotiations and explorations of who we and each other are and why.

Invested and Iconoclastic Patriotism as Double Consciousness
Shaw begins his article by explaining DuBois‘ conception of double
consciousness and relating double consciousness to two meanings of American patriotism
within the context of discussions about America‘s first experience as the recipient of
terrorism on September 11, 2001.
American racism imposed an identity dilemma upon African Americans and
affected their expressions of patriotism. On the one hand, moments of crisis and
racial opportunity have led leaders such as Frederick Douglass during the Civil
War, Du Bois before World War I, and Al Sharpton after 9/11 to embrace a faith
that the Black gifts of labor, loyalty, and culture might one day be rewarded with
full racial equality (Levine, 1997; Lewis, 1993; Sharpton, 2003). This is called
invested patriotism. On the other hand, moments of racial retrenchment have led
leaders such as Paul Robeson and Du Bois during the 1950s and Martin Luther
King, Jr. during the Vietnam War to believe that Blacks must reject traditional
forms of patriotism and instead display devotion by fundamentally challenging
American racism (Marable, 1990). This is called iconoclastic patriotism. These
two poles mirror the "American" vs. "Black" duality of double consciousness,
though both depart from the assumptions of traditional symbolic patriotism.
(Shaw, 2004, p. 20) (Emphasis in original)
Double consciousness is seen as the dual identities of invested and iconoclastic
patriotism. Invested patriotism is faith that mainstream America will recognize and
reward the contributions of African American people, culture and work. Iconoclastic
patriotism is the challenging of the whole of America together to actualize its principles
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and values of freedom and equality. Shaw situates iconoclastic patriotism as a black
identity and he situates invested patriotism as an American identity for African American
people.
Shaw focuses on whether and how African Americans feel more invested
patriotism or more iconoclastic patriotism in discussions of patriotism after 9/11. He
inquires into which forms of patriotism are held by African Americans through their
conversations with all black groups, black and white groups and with multiracial groups.
Shaw says,
Therefore, this article explores how the Black expression of the above forms of
patriotism depends not only upon the larger racial climate of the times, but more
specifically, upon whether the conversational context for their expression is AllBlack, Biracial, or Multiracial. As detailed later in this article, America after 9/11
represented a unique opportunity for American solidarity across racial and
cultural lines. The de jure barriers of racial segregation DuBois lamented at the
turn of century no longer existed and the terrorist attacks prompted Americans to
symbolically unite. While African Americans seemed as eager as other Americans
to display traditional signs of loyalty and patriotic attachment, the next section of
this article will discuss why considering the racial dynamics of dialogue is
necessary to any exploration of how African Americans express concepts as
controversial as patriotism. (2004, p. 21)
Legalized segregation, the Jim Crow era during which DuBois wrote Souls, has
ended and 9/11 was an opportunity and motivation for Americans of all races and
cultures to unite. Patriotism, though, is not the same for everyone. Nor is it the same
when expressed around different people. Shaw illuminates some of the controversies and
complications of patriotism and race in America. He explains that many African
Americans had been highly critical of George W. Bush as president. ―However,‖ Shaw
says, ―On the surface, September 11th appeared to have changed everything‖ (2004, p.
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21). On the surface, 9/11 led many Americans to express their feelings and patriotism by
flag waving and by increased support for Bush as president. There have also been
feelings that ―the attacks caused [black Americans] to look beyond [their] normal
ambivalence toward America and instead see [themselves] as ‗full-fledged American[s]‘‖
(Shaw, 2004, p. 21). Shaw asks,
So what has become of W.E.B. Du Bois's metaphor of double consciousness in
which the "the veil" of race and racism persistently divides Black America from
White America? To put it in DuBoisian terms, did these attacks induce such a
level of political trauma that African Americans decided, at least for a while, to
fully identify as Americans and thus trump the salient group identity of Black?
(2004, pp. 21-22)
So race would not matter anymore because blacks would identify so strongly with
America? Would that identification instantly overrule the whole history and legacy of
white exclusion of blacks from full first class citizenship? What one meaning of,
―American,‖ would be so inclusive, unanimous and strong to eradicate all divisions,
conflicts and hierarchies within the rubric of, ―American?‖ Could 9/11 be such a
comprehensive positive cure for race in America? To help consider such questions, Shaw
explains,
This article will first theorize the relevance of the perennial double consciousness
debate, the differing forms of patriotism emanating out of this debate, and then
the construction of contemporary Black conversational contexts, especially within
this post-segregationist era. (2004, p. 22)

Theoretical Framework
Shaw will discuss how the double consciousness debate is currently relevant; the
invested and iconoclastic patriotisms that emerge from the debate; and the current
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contexts of black discussions that develop from or with double consciousness and
patriotism. First, Shaw explains DuBois‘ perspective that African Americans have always
been vital to the productivity, development and success of American society. Also, the
African American struggle for freedom is truly American in its values, determination and
contributions. These positive meanings of, ―African American,‖ however, have not been
appreciated because negative ascriptions of blackness have relegated African Americans
to second class status. This duality of service to America without recognition from
mainstream America is part of double consciousness and the way double consciousness
connects with patriotism. Invested patriotism, Shaw explains, ―Is rooted in the Black
experience and leans toward the American pole of the double consciousness dilemma.‖
Iconoclastic patriotism is ―the assertion that Blacks display devotion to America by
fundamentally challenging and transforming its traditional interpretations, identities, and
practices; otherwise America will remain irredeemably flawed by racism.‖ Did 9/11 end
this conflict between African American contributions to America and the necessity of
African Americans to ―challenge and transform [America‘s] traditional interpretations,
identities, and practices?‖ (Shaw, 2004, p. 23).
Shaw helps to show how these conflicts have not been so simply eradicated. He
mentions, ―Bonilla-Silvaxxxiv argues that a ‗new racism‘ and accompanying ‗racial
structure‘ has emerged‖ (2004, p. 25). Although Shaw does not elaborate on this new
racism and racial structure, he could likely be referring to Bonilla-Silva‘s saying,

xxxiv

Eduardo Bonilla-Silva is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Texas A&M.
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[W]hites do not see or interpret their own racial segregation and isolation as a
racial issue at all. This blindness is central for understanding their views on a host
of racial matters. Recognizing whites‘ lack of realization that race matters in their
lives, combined with their limited interracial socialization, helps decipher the
apparent contradiction between their stated preference for a colorblind approach
to life (which corresponds to their stated preference of their perception of how
they live their own lives) and the white reality of their lives. (Bonilla-Silva, 2003,
p. 116)
Bonilla-Silva, Andrews and Shaw together help reveal that double consciousness
is not only a blurring of the personal and cultural, but it includes a constant racial
negotiation between us all, including whites, even though we might not notice. Who
people are, including for example the form of patriotism they express, depends on who
they are talking to and how they are interacting. In this framework, double consciousness
is interactive between people. Shaw contributes another dimension to double
consciousness and the blurring of the personal and cultural. His study explores how the
racial composition of discussion groups combines with cultural, in this case racial,
influences people may not notice to inform whether African Americans express more
invested or iconoclastic patriotism. Shaw says,
One way we can understand how people politically interpret the world and those
in it is to listen as they talk about politics. Sociologists, linguists, and other social
scientists have long suspected that given the ways in which each of us is shaped
by communities of norms, customs, and beliefs—not to mention language patterns
and dialects—there are discernible routines to and outcomes of conversation.
(2004, p. 26)
There could be patterns of how conversations proceed and where they lead. Such
patterns could be social conditionings developed from the ways people are shaped by
their communities. Shaw pursues how evaluating conversations can reveal these patterns
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of conditionings. These patterns of conditionings occur within and through conversations
that include the often unnoticed racial negotiations of who people are. Shaw explains,
Talking with others can reinforce, challenge, or hold in abeyance preexisting
expectations, interpretations, and memories. It can help to create community
where none existed or further alienate persons already occupying divergent social
locations. So how do the dynamics of a political dialogue about the War on
Terrorism and American patriotism change based upon whether a group is AllBlack, Biracial, or Multiracial? (2004, p. 26)
To introduce how views, and therefore who people are, are shaped through
conditionings and dialogue, Shaw begins by explaining findings of research about
conversations between African Americans. He then writes of research about
conversations between African Americans and whites; and briefly mentions that there are
complicated dynamics within multiracial conversations as well.

African American Dialogical Interactions
Between African American speakers, Shaw says, ―[Melissa] Harris-Lacewellxxxv
concludes dialogic interaction serves to hash out the particular ideological conclusions
participants will reach… [T]he dialogic process is fundamental to African American
political interpretation‖ (2004, p. 26). The term, ―Dialogic interaction,‖ suggests an
exchange through and with language including verbal, gestures, body language, eye
contact and touch or physical proximity. All of these forms of communication are related
to and interactive with language in dialogical interaction.

xxxv

Harris-Lacewell is an Associate Professor of African American Studies and Politics and Princeton.
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It is dialogical interaction that, ―[S]erves to hash out the particular ideological
conclusions participants will reach.‖ The term, ―Ideological conclusion,‖ indicates a
system or pattern of thought (including one that is not noticed by its user) that leads back
to itself in a tautology of thinking within terms that perpetuate their own reproduction and
monopoly at the expense of awareness of other perspectives and at the expense of
awareness of the tautology itself. That is how a conclusion can be ideological (Shaw,
2004, p. 26).
Returning to the assertion that, ―[D]ialogic interaction serves to hash out the
particular ideological conclusions participants will reach,‖ the point is that the ideological
systems and patterns of thought and their conclusions are influenced by the various forms
of language and communication of dialogical interaction. Ideology, then, is affected and
influenced by its interactions with different, similar and the same ideologies. If so, a
broader generalization to all people could develop from Shaw and Harris-Lacewell‘s
explaining that, ―[T]he dialogic process is fundamental to African American political
interpretation.‖
If this is the case, then ideology may not be entirely impenetrable and
imperviousxxxvi (Shaw, 2004, p. 26).

xxxvi

Norman Fairclough says, ―[I]deologies are generated and transformed in actual discursive events…
[D]iscursive restructurings arise from contradictions in social practice which generate dilemmas for people,
which they try to resolve through mixing available discourse conventions in new ways the mixtures being
realized in heterogeneities of form and meaning in texts.‖ (1995, p. 25)
Karl Mannheim says, ―It seems inherent in the historical process itself that the narrowness and the
limitations which restrict one point of view tend to be corrected by clashing with the opposite points of
view. The task of a study of ideology, which tries to be free from value-judgments, is to understand the
narrowness of each individual point of viewand the interplay between these distinctive attitudes in the total
social process‖ (1936, p.81).
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Although this exploration of ideology can be broader than African American
dialogical interaction, and although that is important to the exposure of ideology, Shaw
investigates how uniquely African American dialogic processes inform African American
people‘s political interpretations or ideological conclusions. Shaw emphasizes,
To be sure, notions of group collectivity have been defined in widely divergent
ways. Discursive historical gatherings, ranging from the 19th-century Negro
Conventions or Reconstruction Constitutional Conventions to Black political
assemblies in the late 20th century, provide evidence that collectivity or solidarity
have been valued if contested concepts for many who have claimed a "Black"
racial self-identity. (2004, p. 26)
Shaw seems to be saying that these negotiations and developments of collectivity
and solidarity have been part of the meanings African Americans have chosen and
inherited about what it means to be African Americans. If so, black views, like invested
and iconoclastic patriotism and other forms of double consciousness, are socially
constructed within black dialogical interaction as well as in interracial interactions. The
ways these interactions occur and result are unique, as Shaw shows above, between
African Americans, but the conceptual model (of views being socially constructed

Similarly, but in concrete context, Lilia Bartolome says, ―The juxtaposing of ideologies should help
teachers to better understand if, when, and how their belief systems uncritically reflect those of the
dominant society and thus maintain unequal and what should be unacceptable conditions that so many
students experience on a daily basis.‖ (2004, p. 98)
A crucial aspect of ideological dynamics and ideological conclusions is that they can often function
unnoticed by people who are within, and therefore trapped by unawareness in, ideology. That is what
defines, ―Hidden ideology,‖ and what distinguishes hidden ideology from the much more simple and
common understanding of ideology as a known system of thought or position. Awareness or exposure of
hidden ideology reveals and apprehends our conditionings enabling us to no longer identify those
conditionings and contents of consciousness as who we are. Rather, with awareness and exposure of hidden
ideology, we can identify as the awareness. That is actually no identity, no ego, no self, no psychological
state, no individuality, at all. Beyond double consciousness and race itself, that is pure consciousness.

103

through dialogical interaction) can be generalized. Shaw shows how the model can be
generalized in his discussion of interactions between black and white Americans.

African American and White American Dialogical Interactions
Shaw begins by discussing the research of Anne Rawlsxxxvii that suggests that
blacks tend to be more forthcoming with their views than whites in informal conversation
(2004, p. 27). Then, referring back to Bonilla-Silva,xxxviii Shaw says,
If [his] assertions about the race-neutral and covert terminology of "new racism"
are valid, then White apprehension about not being considered as racist may
strongly inhibit their revealing candid sentiments during political discussions with
Blacks. Such conversations are then likely to be polarized or very subdued. (2004,
p. 27)
Put together, there would be a dynamic of discourse interaction where blacks
would be more open and whites would be more reserved. Perhaps Andrews gives an
example of this discourse interaction in his saying,
By the hyper-critique of past actions and white behaviors in interracial
environments, it might be easy for white students, professors and others to adapt a
―say nothing, do nothing‖ approach in ambivalent interaction scenarios. (2003, p.
77)
If so, then white double consciousness, as Andrewsxxxix suggests, would be a way
for whites to change how they reach their ideological conclusions. That might change the
xxxvii

Anne Rawls is Associate Professor of Sociology at Bentley.

xxxviii

Bonilla-Silva says, [W]hites do not see or interpret their own racial segregation and isolation as a
racial issue at all. This blindness is central for understanding their views on a host of racial
matters. Recognizing whites‘ lack of realization that race matters in their lives, combined with
their limited interracial socialization, helps decipher the apparent contradiction between their
stated preference for a colorblind approach to life (which corresponds to their stated preference of
their perception of how they live their own lives) and the white reality of their lives. (BonillaSilva, 2003, p. 116)
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interaction from one with white withdrawal to one of mutual open exchange of how we
see ourselves and each other; and how we evaluate our own and each others‘ views; and,
in terms of the generalized conceptual model, awareness of how our views are being
socially constructed through dialogical interaction.

Multi-Racial Dialogical Interaction
Shaw briefly addresses interracial dialogical interaction in broad and general
terms. He points out that to DuBois, ―the ‗veil‘ of race is a fluid curtain that engenders
many forms of unequal double-ness‖ within and between different socially defined and
politically positioned racial groups (Shaw, 2004, p. 27). Shaw suggests that the diversity
of racial and ethnic groups and interactions can ―lessen the stresses upon the Black-White
polarity‖ (2004, p. 27).

Conclusion and Hypothesis of Theoretical Framework
Shaw‘s study and assessment of the literature leads him to anticipate that all-black
groups discussing post-9/11 patriotism would have ―the most varied and nuanced
expressions of double consciousness and invested versus iconoclastic patriotism.‖ He
conjectures that biracial groups would have more distinct expressions of either invested

xxxix

Andrews suggests that whites ―think about what you say, and if called upon to self-reflect, be willing to
step outside the norm of whiteness, white rules, white manners and white hegemony to be able to take the
imagined position of the social/racial/cultural/ gendered other. Part and parcel of the ability of African
Americans to redefine interracial social spaces as appropriate venues for the enactment of blackness might
be the dual ability for whites to exhibit double consciousness about multiple meanings of the social acts of
non-whites.‖ (Andrews, 2003, p. 77)
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or iconoclastic patriotism. In multiracial groups, Shaw expects a variety of expressions of
invested and iconoclastic patriotism (Shaw, 2004, p. 27).
Research Sample
Shaw advertises his study, "War on Terrorism Student Dialogue Study,‖ to
students at a large Midwestern public university. Sophomores and Juniors identifying
themselves as ―Black, White, Arab, Asian, or Latino/a black, white are chosen to
participate. Their compensation is $20.00 for their 90 minute participation. Most of the
―87 participants—42 men, 45 women; 46 Black/African American, 26 White, nine South
Asian/Pacific Islander, five Latinos, and one Arab/Middle Eastern student--― are 20 year
old Political Science majors in their Junior year‖ (Shaw, 2004, pp. 27-28).
Shaw continues,
Seventy percent of the 46 Black participants reported attending high schools and
growing up in communities that were predominantly Black or predominantly
minority, only a third went to mostly White schools and only about 22% said they
grew up in mostly White communities. Yet, even despite these tepid signs of
formal integration, the continuing social divisions of race are evident in that 61%
of Black participants and 64% of White participants said their four closest friends
were of their same race (2004, pp. 27-28).
Findings and Discussion
―The format for each group was that the research team:‖ Shaw explains,
(1) administered a pre-test survey; (2) asked focus group members to read two
articles about the War on Terrorism—one pro-war article presumably written by a
White male moderate named Jonathan who lived in Scarsdale, New York, and the
other was an anti-war article presumably written by a Black female liberal named
Shelia who lived in Washington, DC (both articles were actually authored by the
lead researcher); (3) asked each group to have an unfacilitated, open-ended group
discussion for 30 minutes ("suggested questions" were provided) in which only a
student monitor was present to video record; and then (4) administered a post-test
survey. (2004, p. 28)
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All-Black Discussion Group.
In the all-black discussion group, the ―members agree upon iconoclastic
reinterpretations of what ought to constitute American patriotism and compassion for
others‖ (Shaw, 2004, p. 30). This sharing of iconoclastic patriotism seems to differ from
the earlier thought that ―one might expect All-Black focus groups to display the most
varied and nuanced expressions of double consciousness and invested versus iconoclastic
patriotism‖ (Shaw, 2004, p. 27). For example, Shaw explains that the first speaker
compared current racial profiling to the internment of Japanese American people during
World War II. Both practices are considered forms of overt institutionalized racism that
iconoclastic patriotic proponents of American democracy can fight for the good of the
people and the country. Shaw says, ―The introductory comment concerning the Japanese
internment camps was a seamless, uncontested contribution in the dialogue‖ (Shaw,
2004, p. 31). Shaw uses, ―BM,‖ to refer to, ―Black man,‖ ―WM,‖ to refer to, ―White
man,‖ ―BF,‖ to refer to, ―Black woman,‖ etc. An excerpt of the discussion is,
Akintunde (BM): The first [author] was comparing it [September llth] to
World War II and like the Japanese bias in this country. He was saying that it
was not as bad as that—the numbers don't match up, as though discrimination
against Muslims is okay because of the numbers. I didn't see what he was trying
to do in this paragraph.
Janette (BF): I hate this slogan, "God Bless America." Why can't we bless
everybody, all nations? Why does it just have to be Americans or America? It's
such a cliché.
Akintunde (BM): You see flags everywhere. Cars, windows, my mom had one on
there.
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Janette (BF): They didn't have one up there before that, you know?
Harold (BM): The first one [article] you can take from the standpoint of the
majority of White people, because he's never been discriminated against. He
doesn't see the problem, while the second you can take as the perspective of Black
people. So she's been discriminated against; she knows how it feels. So she can
relate... He has no reason to have any hatred, I mean, bias toward the country,
because it's been good to him. (2004, p. 31)
There is consensus even to the point of shared understanding of Harold‘s
comment about how many white people cannot notice or understand discrimination
because they have never experienced discrimination. There is also agreement with Janette
about all the flag waving and how the slogan of, ―God Bless America,‖ blindly leaves out
a lot of people who should also be blessed. These views comprise a shared iconoclastic
patriotism that challenges America to reach its higher potential.

Biracial (black and white) group.
The biracial, black and white, discussion went significantly differently. This group too
discussed racial profiling and Japanese American internment. Shaw reports that ―there
was an incremental struggle for even basic agreement on the comment about the Japanese
internment camps‖ (2004, p. 31). At first, though, there is consensus in opposition to
racial profiling; discrimination and violence against Moslems in the US; and criticism of
the veracity of how the American media covers violence against Moslems. Even when
Cindy, a white student, claims progress of American justice since Japanese internment
camps of World War II, Ben, a white student, remarks that racial profiling is still
occurring and Cindy agrees with that. At this point, all participants, black and white,
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present iconoclastic patriotism. Then, though, as Derrick and Tonya, both black students,
provide more thorough explanations of their positions, Ben changes from opposing to
supporting racial profiling.
Shaw reports,
Derrick (BM): To me internment camps were more to make the Americans on the
West Coast feel safer because there was a general paranoia in that area about
Japanese Americans. The government felt it was necessary then. If they felt it was
necessary now, they would have done it. It just wasn't necessary.
Tonya (BF): And you know, I don't think there's exactly what we would call today
internment camps in relation to what happened before because in the second
article it pointed out that a lot of Arab Americans have been kind of confiscated
and put aside. They've been arrested and held and detained with no charges
against them and that may be the new internment.
Ben (WM): [To Tonya] Well, those are the people "suspected" of something,
right? You're talking people having to wear ID's? Those may just be people who
have dissent. I don't know. (2004, pp. 31-32)
For Ben, there is no longer a need for his opposing the policies and practices of
America as a form of patriotism. He returns to the mainstream and claims later ―he
noticed a ‗racial stance‘ or divide between the Black and White participants‖ (Shaw,
2004, pp. 32-33). How does Ben‘s change illustrate a way dialogical interaction can
shape or change ideological conclusions and connect to double consciousness? Shaw
suggests that race ultimately divides people initially in agreement about ―agreement
about the emptiness of symbolic or "blind" patriotism‖ (Shaw, 2004, p. 32), but the
connections between the data and the concepts of patriotism, dialogical interaction,
ideological conclusions and double consciousness not explored in the article.
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Nor does the article thoroughly explore exactly how these demonstrations of
black iconoclastic patriotism is and demonstrates double consciousness. It can be
inferred, perhaps, that the discussions illustrate that both all-black and biracial discussion
groups reveal black propensities toward the iconoclastic side and away from the invested
patriotic side of double consciousness (when double consciousness is defined as
challenging America or having faith in America to become equal and just for everyone).

Multi-racial discussion group.
There is very little information about the multi-racial group in the article. What is
written is a summary that is clearest as a direct quote.
Shaw explains,
Although not seamless, the Multiracial (Black, White, Latino, and Asian
participants) dialogue more subtly grapples over basic agreement. Throughout
their conversation, the participants voice implicit and explicit feelings of double
consciousness—Black and American, South Asian and American, Jewish (or
identifying with Israel) and American. Overall, the group deliberated about
symbolic, invested, and iconoclastic forms of patriotism and reasons for the 9/11
attacks. Conceivably this is why participants reported on their post-test surveys
that they thoroughly enjoyed hearing the different perspectives of their group
members even though were clear ideological differences. (2004, pp. 34-35)

Conclusion.
The brief summary of the multi-racial discussion group is how the article ends.
The article and the rather abrupt ending opens many questions about how double
consciousness can be defined, expressed and studied. Shaw does point out, ―Yet, the
ultimate goal was to build theory, as opposed to test theory, by considering how
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conversational settings construct shared meanings‖ (2004, p. 28). Indeed, there is more to
wonder about double consciousness as it is further explored.
For example, how can the data from Shaw‘s study define more clearly how
iconoclastic and invested patriotism are forms of double consciousness? How can the
data and meanings of patriotism apply to Shaw‘s conceptual models of ideological
conclusions and dialogical interactions? There is a language, and even a discourse,
developing from Shaw‘s writing that might combine with Andrews‘ ideas of, and
experiences with, socially situated conduct; the blurrings of the personal and the cultural;
and white double consciousness. These could be significant advancements of
understandings of meanings and functions of double consciousness.
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CHAPTER 10
RECAPITULATION OF THE INTRODUCTION, THE LITERATURE REVIEW AND
THE CONCEPT OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

So far, the introduction, the historical context and the first five articles of the
literature review can help outline a general meaning of double consciousness. The
introduction, history and the first literature review article (―‗A Negro Nation Within the
Nation‘: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Creation of a Revolutionary Pan-Africanist Tradition,
1903-1947,‖ by Walter Rucker (2002), suggest a meaning of double consciousness that
develops from DuBois‘ observations of the positions and perspectives of self defined and
imposed identities of African Americans; DuBois‘ struggles with his observations and
goals; with his debates with Washington and Garvey; and the implicit theme of double
consciousness that can be seen in Rucker‘s writing about DuBois‘ Pan Africanism.
The introduction of this thesis defines DuBoisian double consciousness as a dual
and antagonistic frame of African Americans‘ self-reference that develops within the
negation and racism blacks experience in mainstream American society. The introduction
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also indicates that double consciousness can be an assault on the positive meanings of
peoples‘ being African Americans.
Then, the historical context section shows how this conception of double
consciousness (as dual frame of reference and assault) can be seen in DuBois‘ debates
with Washington and Garvey. With Washington, the conflict may have been over
whether ascribed identities and positions should be tolerated and accepted as means to
better ends. Washington may have believed that patience with whites would lead to
improved race relations while DuBois argued for self-assertion whether or not others
were, or are, ready.
DuBois and Garvey may have had similarities if they can both be seen as
addressing double consciousness. Both leaders were concerned with helping their
followers develop proud and healthy black identities and reject the negative projected
identities from the outside white society. Garvey, however, reached out directly to the
masses while DuBois focused early on the talented tenth and later on nationalism as PanAfricanism, both of which could have been, and can be, considered elitist.
In these ways, double consciousness might be more of an empirical observation
rather than a theoretical position of DuBois. Perhaps double consciousness is more of a
condition than an idea. Indeed, the articles following Rucker help show how double
consciousness can be found as a condition that other African American people
experience.
In the second article of this literature review, ―Parody and Double Consciousness
in the Language of Early Black Musical Theatre,‖ David Krasner (1995) shows evidence
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and meaning of double consciousness in early Twentieth Century African American
theater. This period was around the time of Washington‘s passing; the increasing
popularity of Garvey; and just before the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920‘s. In Krasner‘s
depiction, signifying on double consciousness is a verbal debate over whose definitions
of African Americans will prevail. People use their own self definition, as Krasner (1995)
shows in, ―A Trip to Coontown,‖ and signifyin(g) to withstand and rebuff the ascribed
identities.
A different use of signifyin(g) is shown in the third article, Rosemary Hathaway‘s
(2005), ―The Signifyin(g) Detective: Barbara Neely‘s Blanche White, Undercover in
Plain Sight.‖ There, instead of signifyin(g) verbally parodying ascribed identities on
stage, Blanche White keeps her intelligence and awareness of her invisibility quiet so she
can watch, think and learn about the white people without their knowing they are being
observed. This kind of invisibility empowers Blanche White to work as a domestic (who
is also an undercover, because she is invisible, detective) and expose the truth about the
family‘s crime.
In Krasner and Hathaway‘s articles, there is conscious conflict between self
defined and projected identities. Perhaps the conscious parts of double consciousness are
just the tip of an iceberg? The next two articles pursue more oblique depths where there
are overlaps between self defined and imposed identities. Then, the distinction between
identities is less clear and what to parody by signifyin(g) is less clear.
In, ―Self-Reflection and the Reflected Self: African American Double
Consciousness and the Social (Psychological) Mirror,‖ Andrews (2003) talks about seven
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of his own situations through which a theme is the blurring between his own identity and
projected identity. Andrews says,
the distinctions between the personal and the cultural often become blurred
beyond recognition as authors narrate action, dialogue, emotion and selfconsciousness revealed through action, feeling, thought and language (2003, p.
60).
The blurring could occur because even a self defined identity is socially
constructed, just as an imposed identity is socially constructed. All of Andrews‘
narratives share how blurry is the distinction between self definition and ascription
involved in his ―carrying the double burden of trying to assess white social signs through
an ‗American‘ lens while also trying to assess (possible) white racist signifiers through a
‗black‘ social lens‖ (2003, p. 61).
Andrews then situates his inquiry within the concept of socially situated conduct.
That reveals how all people imagine how they are seen and defined by others and how
they act according to those anticipated perceptions. Andrews says,
[R]ace and power problematizes how people in the “out” racial group situate
themselves and “reflect” on how to behave in social settings. This phenomenon
of shifting cultural lenses on a daily, hourly or moment-by-moment basis by black
people was first noted by W.E.B. Dubois at the turn of the 20th century and is
often referred to as ―double consciousness.‖ (2003, p.64) (Emphasis added)
At this point in Andrews‘ writing, a connection can be made between Andrew and
Shaw‘s writings. Perhaps one way African Americans may socially situate themselves (as
Andrews explains) involves their choosing (as Shaw explains) invested or iconoclastic
patriotism. Shaw also shows that African Americans‘ situating themselves in either (or
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perhaps a combination of) invested or iconoclastic patriotism can depend on the racial
composition of their immediate conversants.
Andrews and Shaw are opening and revealing (not resolving and concluding) the
blurriness between self definition and ascription in terms of DuBoisian double
consciousness. In fact, although there is a connection between their observations of
double consciousness, both writers reveal that more work is needed to explore and clarify
experiences and meanings of double consciousness.
For example, Andrews conceptualizes double consciousness as ―shifting cultural
lenses on a daily, hourly or moment-by-moment basis by black people‖ (2003, p. 64),
while Shaw says, ―These two poles [of invested and iconoclastic patriotism] mirror the
‗American‘ vs. ‗Black‘ duality of double consciousness‖ (2004, p. 20). Perhaps double
consciousness is difficult to apprehend because it can be conceptualized in so many ways
and everyone is unique in terms of identity and individuality. Perhaps double
consciousness is also difficult to apprehend because peoples‘ own broader social
contexts, situations, dynamics and interactions influence how they all, not just African
American people, experience and think about their personal, shared, chosen and ascribed
identities as well as their ―socially situated conduct‖ (Andrews, 2003).
Double consciousness might seem like an untenable concept at a level of such
individuality and personal specificity. However, there is a different direction of inquiry
that can illuminate double consciousness more clearly in a different and more generalized
way. In this other direction, there is a connection between the American conditions of
black double consciousness and white supremacy. None of the articles address this
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connection directly, but a student at Northwestern University, Kortney Ziegler, has
already made connections between double consciousness and white supremacy.
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CHAPTER 11
WHITE SUPREMACY AND BLACK DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS:
FROM KERNER TO BAKKE

In her blog, Ziegler writes, beginning by quoting DuBois,
―the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight
in this American world,–a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but
only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar
sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one‘s self
through the eyes of others, of measuring one‘s soul by the tape of a world that
looks on in amused contempt and pity.‖
-–W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folks (1903)
Then, she explains her own experience and view of double consciousness by
saying,
even though du bois wrote those words over a hundred years ago, i still see blacks
as living in this false consciousness. there is always an influence to identify as an
―american,‖ while constantly being reminded we are not ―american.‖ and most
importantly, we are not african, and we were never allowed to be. our fragmented
identity is in a sense, in limbo–where denying a connection to blackness provides
some sort social economic and political mobility, while embracing blackness, still
does not allow us to control how others see us. in both cases, we are left as
disembodied souls–a paradox of race.
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With this introduction, she connects double consciousness and white supremacy.
for me, and ostensibly other blacks, it is impossible to ignore the negative
constructions of blacks as subhuman, less than, not enough and never will be. the
racial attitudes of white superiority, imply by default, that blacks are not able to
feel any pain. we are `‖strong‖ black women, or we are ―strong‖ black men, and
so forth. so, when i for example, discuss my experiences of pain, people question
it because since i know ―how the system works,‖ how could it possibly affect
me…
White supremacy is dehumanization by negating African Americans‘ ability to
feel pain because they should know how the ―the system,‖ white supremacy, ―works.‖
Blacks are expected by mainstream white people and society to accept their
dehumanization. This raises the question of where that ability to feel pain is supposed to
go and where it does go. She explains,
i also do not want people to think that black people, or other folks of color do not
have loving healthy relationships with one another–that is not the case. but it is
safe to argue that we share an internal rage and anger towards the structures of
white dominance, and this rage is played out in many ways–specifically for me, in
the ways that i mentioned in my last posting. but most importantly, in ways that
harm ourselves and others that look like us. (Ziegler, 2006)
Is playing out rage on other blacks a part of a negative internalized ascription of
inferiority? Is that part of double consciousness? If so, where exactly does that ascription
come from? If it comes from white supremacy, how does that happen?
A. Leon Higginbotham Jr. (1996)xl provides a meaning of white supremacy by
first situating it at, and also as, a part of the origin of the US. He explains,

xl

Higginbotham was an African American Ivy League law professor, a Chief Judge of the US Court of
Appeals and a recipient of several prestigious awards for his book, In the Matter of Color (Higginbotham,
1996, back flap).

119

When this nation was being born, one important circumstance… was its
theoretical commitment to the principles of human freedom and equality. But
another equally significant circumstance- as evidenced by the genocide of Native
Americans and the enslavement of African Americans- was the dedication to the
doctrine of white supremacy…
[O]ur nation was founded explicitly, prospered implicitly, and still often
lives uneasily on the precept of black inferiority and white superiority. Indeed,
that precept helped to legitimize slavery in America and served to justify the
segregation of African Americans in this nation long after slavery had been
abolished. To this day, the premise of black inferiority and white superiority
remains an essential element of the ―American identity,‖ mesmerized as we still
are by race and color. (1996, p. 8)
Higginbotham continues by explaining how the manumission of slaves freed them
from their status of property, but the mainstream belief that ―African Americans were not
quite altogether human,‖ could not be just wiped away as slavery laws could be changed.
Instead, ―‘inferiority‘ spoke to the state of the mind and the logic of the heart.‖ Nor did
the 1960‘s civil rights laws to end Jim Crow segregation eradicate the cultural and
personal views that whites were superior and blacks were inferior (Higginbotham, 1996,
p. 9).
Other than law and the meanings and conditions it can create and change, there
are stolid personal views (Kovel, 1988) and cultural traditions (Loury, 2002) by which
Americans are conditioned (or unknowingly condition themselves) by race. These views,
traditions and conditionings can be difficult to change. They can actually be difficult to
acknowledge even in the abstract because one of those views, traditions and
conditionings is that Americans have rational thought and can be critical of their own
thinking. It is in this nebulous realm of unnoticed conditionings shaping belief in rational
thought and views considered to be based on rational thought that ―‗inferiority‘ [speaks]
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to the state of the mind and the logic of the heart.‖ White supremacy (and later double
consciousness) is a precise, but grotesque, case of hidden ideology.
Beyond the surface of law and what it can do, white supremacy and black
inferiority are deeply ensconced in, and actually formative of, American identities,
relations, views, thoughts and behaviors. Just how deep and subtle is white supremacy
(and then how does white supremacy connect to black double consciousness)? The
meanings and complexities of white supremacy beyond the range of legal remedies to
unjust laws can be explored through one example from the late civil rights era (in 1968)
and through another example from the post civil rights era (in 1978). In this context,
evidence of Higginbotham‘s assertion of the symbiosis of US culture and white
supremacy can be pursued through a search for covert or unnoticed white supremacy
within society and within people. A connection of white supremacy and double
consciousness can then be sought.
First, Howard Manly (2008), a reporter for The Bay State Banner (an African
American newspaper from Boston), wrote, ―An Unfilled Prescription for Racial
Equality.‖ This article discusses the Kerner Report of Lyndon B. Johnson‘s presidency in
1968. The Kerner Report was written by the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders. This commission was a group of leaders (including senators, mayors and
activists) who were appointed by President Johnson to study and answer three questions
about the racial riots of the 1960‘s. What were the problems leading to the riots? Why
were the riots happening? What could be done to correct the problems causing the riots?
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Manly adds, ―Illinois Gov. Otto Kerner Jr., the commission‘s chairman, went a
step further, asking his colleagues to ‗probe into the soul of America‘‖ (2008). Kerner‘s
meaning might be similar to Higginbotham‘s meaning of the mind and heart. This
suggests a more psychological, sociological, philosophical and spiritual problem and
treatment of white supremacy than just that of legal legislation. The report does not
explicitly explore all these areas, but it looks back at the white community to see that
cultural and historical conditionings of the mainstream and from the mainstream were
implicated in the riots.
Explaining the findings of the report, Manly quotes Massachusetts Senator
Edward W. Brooke. He was one of the 1968 commission members and the author of,
Bridging the Divide, a book that was published in 2008, just before Manly‘s article
(Manly, 2008). Quoting Brooke, Manly writes,
―We pointed out that Negro frustration grew out of under-representation in the
political system, the police, the media and all aspects of American life,‖ Brooke
wrote. ―We concluded that ‗White racism is essentially responsible‟ for the
explosive violence that engulfed many cities and declared that „race prejudice has
shaped our history decisively; it now threatens to affect our future.‘‖ (2008)
(Emphasis added)
In more detail, the Kerner Report says,
We have visited the riot cities; we have heard many witnesses; we have
sought the counsel of experts across the country. This is our basic conclusion: Our
nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white--separate and
unequal.
Reaction to last summer's disorders has quickened the movement and
deepened the division. Discrimination and segregation have long permeated much
of American life; they now threaten the future of every American.
This deepening racial division is not inevitable. The movement apart can
be reversed. Choice is still possible. Our principal task is to define that choice
and to press for a national resolution.
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To pursue our present course will involve the continuing polarization of
the American community and, ultimately, the destruction of basic democratic
values. The alternative is not blind repression or capitulation to lawlessness. It is
the realization of common opportunities for all within a single society.
This alternative will require a commitment to national action-compassionate, massive and sustained, backed by the resources of the most
powerful and the richest nation on this earth. From every American it will require
new attitudes, new understanding, and, above all, new will…
What white Americans have never fully understood but what the Negro
can never forget--is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White
institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones
it…
It is time to make good the promises of American democracy to all
citizens-urban and rural, white and black, Spanish-surname, American Indian, and
every minority group.
Our recommendations embrace three basic principles:
* To mount programs on a scale equal to the dimension of the problems:
* To aim these programs for high impact in the immediate future in order to close
the gap between promise and performance;
* To undertake new initiatives and experiments that can change the system of
failure and frustration that now dominates the ghetto and weakens our society.
These programs will require unprecedented levels of funding and
performance, but they neither probe deeper nor demand more than the problems
which called them forth. There can be no higher priority for national action and
no higher claim on the nation's conscience.
(http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf) (Emphasis added)

A large part of defining the choice and resolution of national and racial division or
unity involves Americans‘ developing ―new attitudes, new understanding, and, above all,
new will.‖ This requires white Americans‘ understanding what has been obvious to
African Americans, ―that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White
institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.‖ The
programs, initiatives and experiments to ―change the system of failure and frustration that
now dominates the ghetto and weakens our society‖ would work only with the new
attitudes, understandings and wills of white Americans who learn that and how white
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society, institutions and people create and maintain the second class status of African
American people. New laws and new programs as well as new attitudes, understandings
and wills would be needed. One change would involve new and more interactions
between whites and people of color. Specifically, in, ―Chapter 17, Recommendations for
National Action,‖ the report states,
We support integration as the priority education strategy; it is essential to the
future of American society. In this last summer's disorders we have seen the
consequences of racial isolation at all levels, and of attitudes toward race, on both
sides, produced by three centuries of myth, ignorance and bias. It is indispensable
that opportunities for interaction between the races be expanded.
(http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf;
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6546)
What kinds of new attitudes, understandings and wills would be required to make
expanded opportunities for interactions between Americans in schools more healthy,
democratic and edifying of how whiteness is implicated in racial disadvantage? In other
words, how could schools help bring all students, and all people, together to explore,
understand and eliminate white supremacy within self and society cooperatively?
Tragically, and with severe perpetuation of racial disadvantage and division, such
questions raised by The Kerner Report were never explored, developed, pursued, tested
and answered. A holistic and frank exploration and treatment of white supremacy on
personal, social and institutional levels, as framed by The Kerner Report, was forsaken.
Quoted by Manly, Brooke explains,
In retrospect, I can see that our report was too strong for [President Johnson] to
take. It suggested that all his great achievements — his civil rights legislation, his
antipoverty programs, Head Start, housing legislation, and all the rest of it — had
been only a beginning. It asked him, in an election year, to endorse the idea that
white America bore much of the responsibility for black rioting and rebellion.
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However true that might be, the message was politically too hot to handle. So the
Kerner Commission Report gathered dust while America‘s racial problem grew
worse. (Manly, 2008)
Here, though, after the beginning, is where interracial inquiries into racial
inequality could, and still can, seek the new attitudes, understandings and wills that are
needed for Americans to interact constructively and equally across color lines. A cultural
meaning of white supremacy is attitudes, minds, hearts and wills of many white
Americans. Senses of superiority and projections of inferiority from enough white people
situate such white supremacy as a core element of mainstream America and beyond the
reach of law. When that racial hierarchy is so naturalized, even well- meaning and fairminded people can participate unknowingly in the maintenance and perpetuation of white
supremacy as a cultural tradition and a ―state of the mind and the logic of the heart‖
(Higginbotham, 1996, p. 9). That covert white supremacy, beyond the range of law, is a
source of the projected identities of African Americans that lead to double consciousness.
In other words, the content of white supremacy and the projections of negating
ascriptions of blackness can be in and among us even though the existence, concept and
awareness of (seeing or really looking at) white supremacy is abhorrent to us. Seeing that
could be an important step toward the kinds of changes in understandings and wills
recommended by the Kerner Report. Charles Silberman explains that it is necessary for
Americans to look critically at, and act critically on, their own views, perceptions, images
and conditionings. He says,
The American Negro has been subject to a system designed to destroy ambition,
prevent independence, and erode intelligence for the past three and a half
centuries. Hence, nothing could be more foolish or more damaging to the Negro
125

cause, than to refuse to face the harsh reality of what three hundred fifty years of
white oppression have done to Negro personality and behavior. Uncomfortable as
we all may find the truth, the truth is that the ―niggerxli‖ with which Baldwin is
obsessed, the ―Samboxlii‖ of Southern folklore, was a reality and to a considerable
extent still is. Not for all Negroes, certainly, and not in all places- but for enough
Negroes, in enough places, over a long enough time, that the Negro cannot move
into the main stream of American life unless he is able to destroy the image of his
own mind and in the mind of the white. That image stems directly from slavery. A
hundred years after its abolition, Negroes are still bound by its effects on their
minds and spirits.
So are white Americans- even those whose fathers or grandfathers arrived
long after slavery had ended. European immigrants acquired the racist attitudes of
the native-born even before they acquired citizenship. Slavery was ―the congenital
defect‖ with which this nation was born; the depth and persistence of racist
attitudes among white Americans go back to slavery, whose shadow is still very
much with us. (1964, p. 77)
How is the shadow of slavery still with us? How does the exclusion and
consequential double consciousness described by Silberman, Baldwin and DuBois persist
even after laws have been passed to prohibit overt discrimination? Writing in 1970, Joel

xli

Baldwin (1981) explains his meaning of, ―Nigger,‖ in his story of John Grimes (an African American
boy growing up in 1950‘s Harlem) and his father in, Go Tell It on the Mountain. Baldwin writes,
[John‘s father] said that white people were not to be trusted, and that they told nothing but lies, and that not
one of them had ever loved a nigger. He, John, was a nigger, and he would find out, as soon as he got a
little older, how evil white people could be…
This [white or mainstream] world was not for him. If he refused to believe, and wanted to break his neck
trying, then he could try until the sun refused to shine; they would never let him enter. In John‘s mind, the
[white] people and the [downtown New York City] avenue underwent a change, and he feared them and
knew that one day he could hate them if God did not change his heart. (1981, pp. 36-7)
Similarly, remembering his own first experience of double consciousness, DuBois (1965) writes,
In a wee wooden schoolhouse [in Great Barrington, Massachusetts], something put it into the boy‘s and
girl‘s heads to buy gorgeous visiting cards- ten cents a package- and exchange. The exchange was merry,
till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my card, refused it peremptorily, with a glance. Then it dawned on
me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and
longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil. (1965, p. 214)
xlii
―The image that is usually associated with the ‗Sambo‘ is that of a happy-go-lucky, clueless, headscratching black man. The voice is usually high and the syntax elementary.‖
(http://www.answers.com/topic/sambo-racial-term)
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Kovelxliii explains that ―aversive racism… is revealed in a pronounced willingness to
undertake social reform via remote, impersonal means, and by a corresponding reluctance
to engage in any kind of intimacy with black people‖ (1988, p. 55) (Emphasis added).
This is still one way, as Higginbotham explains in 1996, ―To this day, the premise of
black inferiority and white superiority remains an essential element of the ‗American
identity,‘ mesmerized as we still are by race and color‖ (p. 8).‖ Specifically, writes Glenn
Loury,xliv
―[D]iscrimination in contact‖ refers to the unequal treatment of persons on the
basis of race in the associations and relationships that are formed among
individuals in social life, including the choice of social intimates, neighbors,
friends, heroes, and villains. It involves discrimination in the informal, private
spheres of life (2002, pp. 95-96). (Emphasis added)
Aversive racism and discrimination in contact are covert forms of racism and
white supremacy as identity and private spheres of life that continue to project identities
of inferiority onto African Americans. These ascriptions continue to force blacks to
struggle between their own self definitions and the negations they experience from the
broader, mainstream white community. In this way of aversive racism and discrimination
in contact, the shadow of slavery and white supremacy as an attitude (as a state of mind
and logic of heart), continues to perpetuate black double consciousness. For white people
to see that problem, even though overt discrimination is illegal, would require a change in
understanding and will for which the Kerner Report called, but for which America is still
waiting.

xliii

Kovel is a ―Professor of social studies at Bard College.‖ (http://www.joelkovel.org/joelkovel.html)
Loury is a professor of Social Sciences and Economics at Brown.
(http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Glenn_Loury/louryhomepage/cvandbio/GL%20BIO%2006.pdf)
xliv
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Helping to indicate the depth of white supremacy and double consciousness, both
Kovel and Loury state problems of intimacy between black and white Americans.
Perhaps they are echoing the message of Langston Hughes in, ―Impasse.‖
I could tell you,
If I wanted to,
What makes me
What I am.
But I don‘t
Really want to—
And you don‘t
Give a damn. (1989, p. 85)
Hughes seems to be showing a distance and antagonistic indifference between
African Americans and white Americans. There sounds like a hostile intimacy in the
distance and indifference Hughes describes.
Another kind of disconnected intimacy is shown by, ―The Vet,‖ of Ralph
Ellison‘s, Invisible Man, saying,
―You see,‖ he said turning to Mr. Norton, ―he has eyes and ears and a good
distended African nose, but he fails to understand the simple facts of life.
Understand. Understand? It‘s worse than that. He registers with his sense but
short-circuits his brain. Nothing has meaning. He takes it in but he doesn‘t digest
it. Already he is—well, bless my soul! Behold! A walking zombie! Already he‘s
learned to repress not only his emotions but his humanity. He‘s invisible, a
waking personification of the Negative, the most perfect achievement of your
dreams, sir! The mechanical man! . . . Poor stumblers, neither of you can see the
other. To you he is a mark on the scorecard of your achievement, a thing and not
a man; a child or even less—a black amorphous thing. And you, for all your
power, are not even a man to him, but a God, a force.‖ (1989, pp. 94-95)
(Emphasis added)
Unlike the mutual invisibility the Vet reveals, Richard Wright sounds unilaterally
intimate with the white girls of, Black Boy, in ways that the girls cannot fathom because
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of their known or hidden blindness to their privilege of ignorance (which is unavoidably
present to Richard). Richard says,
I wished that Negroes, too, could live as thoughtlessly, as serenely, as they . . .
They knew nothing of hate and fear, and strove to avoid all passion . . . They lived
on the surface of their days . . . For these poor, ignorant white girls to have
understood my life would have meant nothing short of a vast revolution in theirs.
And I was convinced that what they needed to make them complete and grown-up
in their living was the inclusion in their personalities of a knowledge of lives such
as I lived and suffered containedly. (Wright, 1993, pp. 319-320) (Emphasis
added)
What could be this revolution in their lives? What are white people missing about
black people and themselves?
Perhaps these and other kinds of intimate disconnection are what Hughes is
addressing in, ―Down Where I Am:‖
Too many years
Beatin‘ at the door—
I done beat my
Both fists sore.
Too many years
Tryin‘ to get up there—
Done broke my ankles down,
Got nowhere.
Too many years
Climbin‘ that hill,
‘Bout out of breath.
I got my fill.
I‘m gonna plant my feet
On solid ground.
If you want to see me,
Come down. (1989, p. 50)
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What does Hughes mean by, ―Come down?‖ In response to a college paper
written about that question, Calvin Herntonxlv wrote on the paper, ―Maybe to ‗come
down‘ means to ‗get down,‘ to be truly human, which is the greatest risk anyone can
take‖ (Personal communication, 1989). This could be risky if it means being open to
other people as equals and both different from and the same as oneself regardless of how
they seem at first or from a distance.
―Coming down‖ could also be risky if it means looking at kinds of intimacy that
are uncomfortable to see and habitually ignored, as illuminated by Kovel, Loury, Hughes,
Ellison and Wright. What would happen, what would be possible, if there was looking at
and discussing these kinds of intimacies together across racial lines? Learning about and
understanding each others‘ perspectives would include learning about and understanding
how each person sees the other as a racial other across the color line. By seeing how they
see and are seen, people can learn more about who they and others are.
This view would likely be more recognizable to many African Americans than
whites if African Americans are already familiar with white views that are parts of double
consciousness. The view of oneself as racial, as white, and as racial other would be new
for white Americans who were not accustomed to seeing themselves as they are seen by
others. Coming down to that view of oneself would truly be being human and it would be
the risk, the greatest risk, of exposing vulnerabilities and aversions to social dynamics

xlv

Professor Hernton was a highly esteemed Professor of African American Literature at Oberlin College in
the 1980‘s.
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and interactions that might be very personal, sensitive and guarded while also being
covert aspects of white supremacy.
However, introducing whites to their own double consciousness or ―multilateral
double consciousness‖ (MDCxlvi) and an interracial discussion at that level of inquiry
might be a form of equal integration where, as James Farmerxlvii states, ―Two proud
parties meet, each having something to contribute‖ (reference needed). Then, dialogue
could be or become equal because MDC involves all parties recognizing and negotiating
how they see each other and who they are to each other and themselves. MDC could
equalize dialogue by sharing, politicizing and negotiating collectively double
consciousness in some and absence of double consciousness in others. Otherwise, black
double consciousness and white privilege of ignorance is maintained and reproduced as a
unilateral black burden of covert (or denied) white supremacy

Perhaps this is why Andrews says,
I want to emphasize, then, that it is fine to say what you think in social settings
with African Americans. But also think about what you say, and if called upon to
self-reflect, be willing to step outside the norm of whiteness, white rules, white
manners and white hegemony to be able to take the imagined position of the
social/racial/cultural/gendered other. Part and parcel of the ability of African
Americans to redefine interracial social spaces as appropriate venues for the
enactment of blackness might be the dual ability for whites to exhibit double
consciousness about multiple meanings of the social acts of non-whites.
(Andrews, 2003, p. 77)

xlvi

MDC is a concept I developed by connecting DuBoisian double consciousness with my reading African
American literature and non-fiction and considering how I might be seen as white from those perspectives.
xlvii
Farmer was a leader of The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in the 1960‘s.
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Whites could expose and surmount their unrecognized racially shaped
perspectives by viewing themselves race consciously as white and by viewing their
whiteness from the perspectives of African Americans and many other people of color.
This MDC would be a race conscious shift from ―colorblindness.‖xlviii

xlviii

Critical meanings of ―colorblindness‖ can be explored as Leslie Carr discusses Supreme Court Justice
Harlan‘s dissent in the 1896 Supreme Court ruling of Plessey v. Ferguson, which upheld ―separate but
equal‖ segregation of blacks and whites (1997, 114). He reveals how Harlan‘s argument for integration and
―colorblindness‖ is intended to maintain, not stop, racism and white supremacy. Carr says,
The best way [according to Harlan] to maintain the domination of the White nation is to follow the colorblind constitution in all matters of law. Harlan, a former slave owner, felt that the ―separate but equal‖
argument was a subterfuge that permitted the public degradation of an inferior people… To him, it was a
gratuitous degradation but, more important, it was one that weakened the whole society by degrading the
state, the bourgeois state. (1997, p.116) (Emphasis added)
White supremacy, even in Harlan‘s strategy over a hundred years ago, is best protected by keeping it out of
view and behind a façade of just colorblind constitutional law. Separate but equal treatment is gratuitous
degradation in this view because it calls attention to the oppression Harlan wants to maintain less
conspicuously and less consciously. The white nation, the unofficial aggregate that benefits from and
maintains black oppression, needs to hide behind an insidiously legitimized just state so it can operate
undetected. The putative just state, according to the actual role of ―colorblindness‖, exists not to protect
blacks, but to protect the privacy and efficacy of intentional and unintentional white supremacists. Stokely
Carmichael and Charles Hamilton explain,
Racism is both over and covert. It takes two, closely related forms: Individual whites acting against
individual blacks, and acts by the total white community against the black community. We call these
individual racism and institutional racism. The first consists of overt acts by individuals, which cause death,
injury or the violent destruction of property. This type can be recorded by television cameras; it can
frequently be observed in the process of commission. The second type is less overt, far more subtle, less
identifiable in terms of specific individuals committing the acts. But it is no less destructive of human life.
The second type originates in the operation of established and respected forces in the society, and thus
receives far less public condemnation than the first type. (1967, p. 4)
Does this mean white colorblind people can be intentionally racist and innocent too because they have
figured out a clever way to oppress by naturalizing white privilege so it is invisible or at least not discussed
in too much depth or across color lines? Perhaps one‘s own ―colorblindness‖ is not so deliberately
oppressive, or perhaps it is a white privilege to not look too far outside one‘s racial perspective or to look
too closely at race, including one‘s own, and what that really means. For example, by not looking outside
and at their own deliberate thoughts about what race means or does not mean to them, colorblind people
open wide the opportunities in a purported just society for what Bonilla-Silva calls, ―New racism.‖ He says,
―‘[N]ew racism‘ practices… are subtle, institutional, and apparently nonracial… Whether in banks,
restaurants, school admissions, or housing transactions, the maintenance of white privilege is done in a way
that defies facile racial readings. Hence, the contours of color-blind racism fit America‘s ‗new racism‘‖
(Bonilla-Silva 2003, p. 3). This covert racism might be more prominent since civil rights legislation ended
deliberate Jim Crow, but rather than being new it seems quite similar to methods of subtle oppression
explained by Carmichael and Hamilton over forty years ago.
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Paraphrasing and elaborating on Eduardo Bonilla-Silvaxlix, Shaw says,
If Bonilla-Silva's (1999) assertions about the race-neutral and covert terminology
of "new racism" are valid, then White apprehension about not being considered as
racist may strongly inhibit their revealing candid sentiments during political
discussions with Blacks. Such conversations are then likely to be polarized or
very subdued. (2004, p. 27)
White fear of being racist and consequential evasion through ―colorblindness‖ can
be a form of and maintenance of white supremacy. There are profound differences
between on one hand, ―think[ing] about what you say, and if called upon to self-reflect,
be willing to step outside the norm of whiteness, white rules, white manners and white
hegemony to be able to take the imagined position of the social/racial/cultural/gendered
other,‖ and on another hand, ―White apprehension about not being considered as racist
may strongly inhibit their revealing candid sentiments during political discussions with
Blacks.‖ Perhaps it is not even what white people say, don‘t say or think that can be
racist. Perhaps the white supremacy (historical, covert and deeply embedded in socially
situated behavior) leading to black double consciousness is the very position of whites‘
not having to step outside of their whiteness and see it and themselves as others do. This
kind of self awareness could lead to conscious and deliberate choices of socially situated
behavior and attention to how such behavior is shaped by conditionings people had not
critically evaluated or even noticed as conditionings that contradict their sense of rational
thought, critical thought, free will, choice, equality, open mindedness, agency and justice.
How can people think critically about covert white supremacy and their continued
perpetuation of it through ―colorblindness‖ even after the advances and repeals of civil
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rights legislation? MDC, and the views it accesses and illuminates, can be a penetrating
approach to dialogue about such a question and a transition from colorblind racism.l
Supreme Court Justice Harold Blackmun says, dissenting in the 1978, US Supreme Court
case, ―Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,‖ where Affirmative Action
advances of the 1960‘s were repealed and white privilege was reinforced,
I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-action program in a
racially neutral way and have it successful. To ask that this be so is to demand the
impossible. In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.
There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat
them differently. We cannot -- we dare not -- let the Equal Protection Clause
perpetuate racial supremacy. (Powell et. al., 1978)
Referring to Blackmun‘s dissent, Cornel West said, in a public speech, ―We must
go through race, not beyond race‖ (Cambridge Forum, early 1990‘s, personal
communication). Blackmun and West are concerned that racial differences are real social
dynamics that have developed through American history. Although they understand that
race has no biological essence, they disagree with colorblind advocates who think that
race and racial differences should be ignored in order to pursue equality between people.
Equality does not mean, ―Sameness,‖ especially within a history, sociology, politics,
economics and psychology of covert white supremacy. Blackmun is saying that people
must be treated according to their racial differences in order for them to be treated
equally. West is saying that those differences must be accepted, explored and understood
in order for people to be treated equally. This going through race means entering a social,

l

As exactly and concretely as currently possible, the development and experience of such dialogue and
transition is explored in the Discussion section of this thesis.
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historical and philosophical intimacy with which Kovel and Loury may be concerned.
Seeing the differences between racial positions means seeing oneself and others within
those positions. This view is both personal and social/historical. This potential of MDC
seems propitious, but the concept of double consciousness is still controversial. To
explore one such controversy, an operational definition of double consciousness, based
on the previous discussion, will be this thesis‘ meaning of double consciousness
throughout the inquiry.
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CHAPTER 12
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

In this thesis, DuBoisian double consciousness refers to African Americans‘
struggles between their own self definitions and the negative and ascribed identities
projected knowingly or unknowingly onto them by the US white supremacist society and
people of that society. This is the interpretation of double consciousness that is used in
the next and last discussion of this literature review.
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CHAPTER 13
LITERATURE REVIEW ARTICLE SIX:
ERNEST ALLEN JR.‘S, ―DU BOISIAN DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS: THE
UNSUSTAINABLE ARGUMENT‖

Ernest Allen Jr.‘s, li ―Du Boisian Double Consciousness: The Unsustainable
Argument,‖ is an inquiry into the validity and study of DuBoisian double consciousness.
Allen introduces an overview that he will discuss the meaning of DuBoisian double
consciousness; discuss why the concept was not developed; and ―argue in this essay, that
Du Bois‘ formulation of double consciousness was little more than double sleight of
hand‖ (2003, p. 25). However, there is no operational definition of double consciousness
at the beginning of, or developing through, the article. This, in and of itself, creates an
amorphous status of the concept of double consciousness. Concurrently, Allen focuses
more on what double consciousness is not and how it has been misunderstoodlii, rather

li

Allen is a Professor of Afro-American Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
(http://www.umass.edu/afroam/)
lii
In endnote #2, Allen says, ―From the 1960s onward, virtually every academic writer who has interpreted
the notion of ‗two souls‘ as a broad-based cultural dilemma has failed to cite specific passages in Du Bois
that support such an interpretation. The fact that segments of his work can be read as such does not mean
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than on what it could be. He seems to be intending to disparage the whole notion of
double consciousness. However, through the discussion, Allen does mention, support and
add to the components of the operational definition of double consciousness in this thesis.
He says,
Confronted with a sinister engineering of signs and mores designed to fix the
social and political inferiority of Afro-Americans in perpetuity, black self-respect
was severely put to the test, with seeds of despair and self-doubt finding
extremely fertile ground. (Allen, 2003, p. 34)
A few pages earlier, Allen says,
[D]eep down at the roots, of course, this [double consciousness] was not so much
a conflict over ideals as a conflicted deliberation concerning the actual ability of
black people to hold ideals—that is, a question ultimately turning upon the
recognition of black folk as human beings. (2003, p. 32)
Both of these statements share a common meaning with double consciousness as
African Americans‘ struggles between their own self definitions and the negative and
ascribed identities projected knowingly or unknowingly onto them by the US white
supremacist society and people of that society (the operational definition of double
consciousness in this thesis). This conflict, though, does not seem to be what Allen
considers DuBois‘ meaning of double, or divided, consciousness. He says,
If black physicians were beset by existential agony in the late Nineteenth Century,
perhaps its source might more readily be found in the respect or esteem denied
them by the dominant population as well as by their own people (the latter
manifestation constituting a form of internalized white supremacy) rather than a
divided consciousness on their own part. (Allen, 2003, p. 34) (Emphasis added)

that Du Bois himself conceived them that way.‖ (2003, p. 40). It is likely that some writers would have cited
chapter 7, especially the first paragraph, of Dusk of Dawn and it is unclear why Allen would maintain that
the paragraph and chapter can not situate double consciousness as ―a broad-based cultural dilemma.‖
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Could not this be double consciousness if, ―Rather than,‖ were changed to,
―With,‖ or, ―As part of,‖ so the sentence read,
If black physicians were beset by existential agony in the late Nineteenth Century,
perhaps its source might more readily be found in the respect or esteem denied
them by the dominant population as well as by their own people (the latter
manifestation constituting a form of internalized white supremacy) [with or as
part of] a divided consciousness on their own part. (Allen, 2003, p. 34)
Then, the denial of respect and esteem from whites and blacks as aspects and
effects of white supremacy could be part of double, or ―divided,‖ consciousness as
argued in this thesis. Allen also explains,
From the formation of the Niagara Movement in 1905 onward, of course, Du
Bois‘ own protest activities were set in motion for the long term. Another
revelation for Du Bois and other middle-class Black Americans in general, was
that in after being forced into segregated communities during the last quarter of
the Nineteenth Century, they discovered recognition in and of themselves: a
renewed sense of mutual self-respect, collective self-esteem, and black-on-black
solidarity cutting across class lines. Although neither outward protest nor the rise
of inner group-based mutual esteem were able to change the dominant character
of Nineteenth Century social relations or material conditions, they contributed
nonetheless in many ways to the overall mental health of the race. Most
importantly, in the process of mutual recognition so necessary to identity
formation, African Americans were not unilaterally dependent on whites for their
individual as well as collective sense of self. (2003, p. 35)
Clearly Allen is in agreement with the idea that African Americans have faced
conflicting and harmful messages about who they are and whether they are equal to other
people within and outside their own communities. This and the other quoted passages
suggest that Allen could be in favor of the concept of double consciousness although he
writes that he is opposed. Allen does not present these passages together in his article so
he does not appear to contradict himself, but he does seem to acknowledge the reality,
although not the name, of double consciousness. This raises a question of whether Allen
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is arguing against the whole concept of double consciousness or against the way it has
been studied and understood.

Misreadings of Double Consciousness
In this first section of his article, Allen is concerned with shortcomings and
vagaries of studies of double consciousness. Although Allen states that he rejects the
concept, the issue of how double consciousness has been studied leads to another way
evidence used against double consciousness can also support double consciousness. Allen
says,
Although it is possible to conceive of an African American double consciousness
in a broad anthropological sense—many have done so over the past several
decades, and, stripped of its historical context, Du Bois‘ work can certainly be
read in such a manner today—that is emphatically not how Du Bois himself
viewed the matter. Rather, his concerns appear far narrower, focusing instead on
what he considered as conflicts engendered by (unspecified) double thoughts,
(equally unspecified) double strivings, (vaguely defined) double aims, and
(comparatively well articulated) double ideals, a subject to which we shall return.
In late 19th Century America, however, there existed no concept to express the
kind of cultural conflict that many of today‟s academics have tried to impose upon
Du Bois‟ earlier views of the world. (2003, pp. 25-26) (Emphasis added)
Here, Allen asserts that many scholars have misinterpreted DuBoisian double
consciousness by contextualizing it in broad cultural terms that do not fit the vague (but
narrower) thoughts, strivings and aims to which DuBois was referring. Similarly, just as
later anthropological and cultural impositions ―strip [DuBois‘ meaning of double
consciousness] of it historical context,‖ so too is it a mistake to associate DuBoisian
double consciousness too closely with any of its antecedent or contemporary conceptions
of double consciousness.
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Allen explains,
Widely differing concepts of double consciousness, antagonistic ideals, and
psychic despair were all, so to speak, ―in the air‖ at the turn of the Nineteenth
Century, thereby providing a number of overlapping and sometimes mutually
incompatible paradigms for Du Bois to draw upon while executing his own
unique take on them. Not only Goethe, but Emerson, James, Henry David
Thoreau, Robert Louis Stevenson, George Eliot, and scores of other Nineteenth
Century literary figures engaged the drama of the divided self through literature or
psychological discourse. Apart from Goethe‘s Faust, one also finds in Du Boisian
two-ness, for example, echoes of the internally competing psychic states in the
medical model of double consciousness elaborated by James and others, where
one‘s social selves became separated from one another. But we also should
emphasize that in no ways might Du Boisian double consciousness be reduced to
the content of any of its predecessors. (2003, p. 28) (Emphasis added)
DuBoisian double consciousness is unique and different from any earlier or later
forms or meanings of double consciousness. Indeed, DuBois does seem to be concerned
with a uniquely African American subjugation to American white supremacy.
Complicating this specificity is the difficulty that there was no mainstream language or
discourse available or developing with which double consciousness could be illuminated.
There could have, however, been conditions and dynamics of black conflicts with white
supremacist projections without concepts and explanations to identify, name and
critically evaluate those conditions and dynamics. Just because something is not named,
that does not mean it is not there. The absence of language and discourse to expose and
address double consciousness does not necessarily argue against the possibility of double
consciousness. Rather, this absence might mean that DuBois was pursuing dynamics and
conditions of white supremacy that were, and still are, beyond the mainstream language
of the time and inaccessible to or through the dominant discourse or dominant ideology.
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Does this mean DuBoisian double consciousness is synchronically isolated
between a past and future, neither of which can really embrace and claim the concept?
Maybe not. A vastly different situation might be revealed by the problem posed by
Allen‘s writing. Perhaps the problem is not with the concept of double consciousness at
all. The problem might be with our ability to see, comprehend, identify, assess and
discuss double consciousness and the white supremacy from which it derives. Then that
would mean that we, mainstream Americans, are missing a political, social and
psychological dynamic that is there while we claim it is not there only because we cannot
or will not see that it is there. That would be covert white supremacy as a hidden
ideology.
As Loury (2002) shows we are still practicing a form of, ―Aversive racism‖
(Kovel, 1970), could we today be in a language and discourse, an ideology, with DuBois
that keeps hidden the ongoing dynamics and double consciousness DuBois was trying to
clarify? Are we still not seeing covert white supremacy and double consciousness that
has been here between blacks and whites, but never thoroughly enough explored? Are we
in history, and are we the history of tomorrow, this way without noticing? If so, would
not discovering all that be edifying, empowering and interesting?
Even if double consciousness is untenable, at least our putting our heads together
about race across racial lines could help us see, really look at, how we connect,
misconnect, disconnect or ignore each other. Even if that does not succeed completely by
leading to more recognizing and more being recognized, at least it would be helpful for
all people to see that their perspectives, identities, views, memories, feeling, thoughts- in
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fact all of one‘s contents of consciousness- all of who their selves are to them- and even
their selves themselves- are conditionings.liii By raising issues of being stuck in a
language, discourse and ideology,liv Allen adds a tremendous dimension to double
consciousness while he overtly argues against the reality or studies of double
consciousness.
For example, one way Allen raises an issue of being stuck in a language,
discourse and ideology is by his saying,
Sensing little ―cultural‖ identification at all with the lives of the mass of black
folk, the so-called Talented Tenth accepted as ―universal‖ a set of values which
by the 1930s would be ultimately acknowledged by Du Bois, Carter G. Woodson,
and others as thoroughly Eurocentric. (2003, p. 26)
What did, ―Eurocentrism,‖ mean in the 1930‘s? Allen says,
Historian Willard B. Gatewood Jr. describes the overriding set of values that
governed the behavior of the educated black elite at the turn of the century:
―Reared in homes that placed a premium on middle-class values and a Victorian
code of behavior, they then often attended schools and colleges in which white
New England faculties stressed the same kind of virtues and pieties. The pattern
of education found at Oberlin, Fisk, Atlanta University, and Howard also
prevailed in numerous other schools, black and white, throughout the nation; the
objectives, ideologies, and even faculties were strikingly similar.
The curricula devoted virtually no attention to the cultural heritage of Africa, but
emphasized Anglo-Saxon or American culture. The educational experience of the
liii

―Colorblindness‖ can lead to our seeing race as a conditioning. Race consciousness and exploration of
double consciousness as part of white supremacy can recognize that every person is conditioned beyond the
range and capacity of ―free‖ conscious choice to be his/her race, culture, class and in some ways gender.
Instead of only seing just the particular conditionings, our seeing conditioning itself can help us realize that
our very self itself is a conditioning. Awareness of our being conditioned, of our being our conditionings, is
who we really are.
liv
Explaining Karl Mannheim, Paul-Albert Emoungu says, ―Ideologies refer to complexes of ideas and
thought patterns of socially privileged groups are ‗in full accord with the existing order‘ and whose modes
of thought are incongruent with social reality to which they are directed (e.g., Black Education). Ideologies
function unwittingly to protect the status quo by catering to vested interests of these groups‖ (1979, pp. 434).
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black upper class, then, conspired to mold it into a replica of middle- and upperclass white
America. Its values, style of living, and patterns of behavior, collectively known
as ‗respectability‘ and highly prized in the black community, bore a remarkable
resemblance to those of ‗respectable‘ white Americans. Elite blacks were
educated to take a paternalistic view toward blacks less fortunate than themselves,
in much the same way as the well educated, white New England teachers and
professors had often manifested toward them.‖ (2003, p. 26)
Around the same time, in the 1930‘s, Karl Mannheimlv reveals,
Once we recognize that all historical knowledge is relational knowledge, and can
only be formulated with reference to the position of the observer, we are faced,
once more, with the task of discriminating between what is true and what is false
in such knowledge. The question then arises: which social standpoint vis-à-vis of
history offers the best chance for reaching an optimum of truth? In any case, at
this stage the vain hope of discovering truth in a form which is independent of an
historically and socially determined set of meanings will have to be given
up…Thus the ideological element in human thought, viewed at this level, is
always bound up with the existing life-situation of the thinker. (1936, pp. 79-80)
The mainstream values of the early 1900‘s, including the meanings and prizes of,
―Respectability,‖ were part of an ideology within which African Americans, and all
Americans, were differently submerged within their different ―life-situations.‖ These
conditionings of the Talented Tenth and other Americans and the exposures of these
conditionings by Gatewood and Mannheim indicate that DuBois was inquiring into a
realm that was not part of mainstream thought. Rather, it was quite penetrating of
mainstream thought. In fact, Gatewood, Mannheim and DuBois may suggest that what is
now called, ―Postmodern,‖ can be traced back at least to African American struggles and
their critical thinking of the 1930‘s. Dick Hebdige says,
lv

Although connections are made between DuBois and Mannheim (Dennis, 1977; Emoungu, 1979; name,
yr?), they do not explicate the Eurocentrism of the 1930‘s as forms of ideology as explained by Mannheim.
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[M]odernism is discarded by some critical postmodernists as a Eurocentric
phallocentric category which involves a systematic preference for certain forms
and voices over others. What is recommended in its place is an inversion of the
modernist hierarchy- a hierarchy which… places the metropolitan centre over the
―underdeveloped‖ periphery, western art forms over Third World ones… (1996,
pp. 177-178)
This hierarchy includes the ―values, style of living, and patterns of behavior‖
(Allen, 2003, p. 26) of white mainstream society that dominated all Americans in the
1930‘s. Subverting this hierarchy and its conditionings by bringing awareness to double
consciousness may have been an un-apprehended and unarticulated goal of DuBois even
before the discourse of postmodernism was available to help identify, name, explore and
address the problems he might have been seeing.
What was available at the time was Mannheim‘s insight, ―[T]he ideological
element in human thought… is always bound up with the existing life-situation of the
thinker (1936, pp. 79-80).‖ If double consciousness is a struggle between self defined and
imposed identities, and if both identities are socially constructed as well, then the appeal
and denial of, ―Respectability,‖ could have been part of the torturous conflicts for African
Americans in the 1930‘s.
Helping to explain these conflicts by discussing the genre of the, ―Protest Novel‖
(many books of which were written before and in the 1930‘s - 1940‘s) Berry and
Blassingame explain,
The terrain covered by the black novelist is a white-controlled world devoid of
justice and sanity where ordinary and heroic Afro-Americans face
dehumanization. Outraged and embittered, the black characters assert their
humanity and resist white cultural dominance. The black novel is an exposure of
white oppression, violence, and economic and sexual exploitation. Although
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blacks wrote many kinds of fiction, their greatest artistic achievement was the
protest novel. (1982, p. 363)
Berry and Blassingame also refer to actual real-life dynamics around which these
protest novels were written. They say,
In their fight for equality, blacks also had to deal with the conservatism of whites.
While blacks wanted complete equality and a revolution in race relations, a 1942
poll revealed that six out of ten whites felt that Afro-Americans were satisfied,
that their status would not improve after the war, and that blacks were completely
responsible for the own plight. Such diametrically opposed views set the stage for
violent racial conflicts like the riot which occurred in Detroit in 1943. It left
thirty-four blacks and whites dead and had to be quelled by the National Guard. In
spite of the fact that riots occurred in 1946 in Tennessee, Alabama, and
Pennsylvania, the foundation had been laid for the civil rights revolution. (Berry
and Blassingame, 1982, p. 384)
The fights over respectability in the 1930‘s- 1940‘s involved blacks asserting their
humanity and, or by, resisting the white cultural dominance of views that blacks were
satisfied with their inferior positions and that they were responsible for their being
oppressed by whites. By viewing this dynamic as a violent conflict between white
supremacist ascription and black self definition, the issue of respectability can be seen as
a struggle with double consciousness for African Americans. What could have been done
instead of the rioting and killing?
Mannheim illuminates,
It seems inherent in the historical process itself that the narrowness and the
limitations which restrict one point of view tend to be corrected by clashing with
the opposite points of view. The task of a study of ideology, which tries to be free
from value-judgments, is to understand the narrowness of each individual point of
view and the interplay between these distinctive attitudes in the total social
process (1936, p. 81).
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This clashing, but also embracing, of other views that can show that the
narrowness and the terms of one‘s own views (e.g., of respectability, self and other) is
both an exposure of ideology and is possible through multilateral double consciousness.
Together, even today, by seeing ourselves as racial as we are seen by others, we can
expose our values, perspectives, identities, projections and expectations. We can expose
our submersion in those conditionings whether we are black, white, male, female, etc. We
can change that some people are more privileged than others and that some are more
privileged in some ways than others. We can make such changes because we can see that
we are all equal in our ideological submersion itself and in our being comprised of our
conditionings. When our being so conditioned is exposed, how we are conditioned (our
conditionings themselves) and the resulting hierarchies are illustrated too. Then the
conditionings and hierarchies lose their legitimacy and authority internally first within the
hearts, minds and spirits of Americans. Then society would change. Seeing that, though,
for many people, may take going through (not beyond) race; new understandings; new
wills; and new kinds of contacts as called for by the Kerner Report, Loury and`
Blackmun. This is one direction in which a study of double consciousness, Eurocentrism,
white supremacy and ideology can lead. However, such an inquiry is forestalled by Allen
even before it can start. He says,
[A]ny suggestion that members of the tiny, educated elite among Afro-Americans
were somehow torn between the values of, on the one hand, upper- or middleclass whites and, on the other, those of black sharecroppers, domestics, and other
working people (that is, as one might say today, between a Eurocentric and an
Afrocentric cultural orientation) is, quite simply, a proposition unsupported by the
evidence. (Allen, 2003, p. 26)
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There may not be clear evidence of African Americans being torn between black
and white values. However, evidence has been presented that and how, ―It is a peculiar
sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through
the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused
contempt and pit‖ (DuBois, 1965, p. 215).
Allen continues by discussing what double consciousness is not by first
explaining ideas of differences between black and white people and how those ideas did
not fit DuBois‘ conception of double consciousness. Allen says,
Western thinkers of the 18th and 19th Centuries commonly assumed that each
nationality or race (the terms were commonly interchanged) was enamored of
specific traits, generally differing in kind from those of others… And it is true that
Du Bois occasionally drew salient contrasts between what he perceived as African
American character traits and those of the dominant American population. But he
held such differences to be complementary rather than incompatible in nature,
specifically rejecting the thought that any kind of warring incongruities existed
between them. (2003, pp. 26-27)
Allen then describes some of DuBois‘ ideas of differences between black and
white Americans in the 1920‘s. To DuBois, blacks had a more ―sensuous, tropical love of
life‖ whereas whites had more ―cool and cautious New England reason.‖ Allen
emphasizes that these differences were not what double consciousness meant to DuBois.
To DuBois, the differences were complimentary and mutually beneficial. Therefore,
these differences were not the conflicts of double consciousness. Allen also shows how
this mistaken meaning of DuBoisian double consciousness has been presented as
DuBoisian double consciousness in academic publishing (Allen, 2003, p. 27).
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Double Consciousness: Literary and Medical Expressions
Next, Allen considers how DuBoisian double consciousness has been erroneously
combined with other forms and conceptions of division of or within self. Surveying the
intellectual landscape of the time, Allen explains,
[T]he growing fascination with the subject of the double and the divided self in
Western Europe and the United States throughout the Nineteenth Century had
mostly to do with formidable physical and spiritual dislocations experienced by
individuals at the hands of modernity: industrialization, urbanization, and
corresponding cultural changes befitting new modes of social organization. Often
drawing upon oppositional constructs inherited from early Christianity, such
expressions might assume, as with Paul or St. Augustine, a tension between the
flesh and the sacred, or between nature and spirit, respectively. Or perhaps a
theme rather common to Romanticism: a counterposing of the quotidian to the
ethereal, of everyday life to thoughts of the sublime. (2003, p. 28)
Allen situates DuBoisian double consciousness within the intellectual frameworks
and models of the day that ―DuBois [drew] upon while executing his own unique take on
them‖ (2003, p. 28). DuBois was exposing and addressing a particularly African
American double consciousness with which white Americans also had a particular
relationship. This specificity of DuBoisian double consciousness is not explicit in Allen‘s
writing, but he may imply that DuBois was referring to a conflict between ascribed and
self defined identities.

Alternative Source of Anguish: The Agony of Misrecognition
However, instead of looking into the specificity of DuBoisian double
consciousness, Allen generalizes where he might have explained just what DuBois could
have meant by ―Double consciousness.‖ Then, though, Allen does bring in a promising
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meaning of the term, but he takes it right away by stating that such a meaning is not the
meaning of double consciousness. In this opaque realm, Allen says,
However formulated, what all of these diverse expressions of double
consciousness—including that of Du Bois—held in common was a sense of
unresolved angst. Whether African Americans actually suffered a strain of double
consciousness is a matter yet to be determined here. But it is essential to point out
that an altogether different and powerful source of psychic distress in the souls of
black folk could be found in a process of misrecognition, or disrespect
encountered on a daily basis—that is, in the general refusal on the part of whites
to acknowledge the humanity of blacks… [Their] despair was an expression of the
anguish experienced by African Americans who could not help but have
internalized at least some of the negative sentiments that white society held
towards them. (2003, p. 28)
Now, the angst of DuBoisian double consciousness is what it has ―in common‖
with other forms of double consciousness, but the dehumanization, ―misrecognition,‖
―disrespect‖ and other sources of black ―psychic distress‖ are ―altogether different‖ from
DuBoisian double consciousness. Is not the angst actually and directly about the
dehumanization, misrecognition, disrespect and other sources of black psychic distress
that comes from white refusal to acknowledge that blacks are humans? How can angst
and experience be separated so the angst is part of a general double consciousness while
the sources of such angst are not part of double consciousness? In other words, instead of
distinguishing dehumanization, misrecognition, disrespect and other sources of black
psychic distress from double consciousness, could they be parts of the double
consciousness DuBois was trying to apprehend and reveal? Allen seems to be defining
DuBoisian double consciousness while also claiming that the term cannot be tenably
defined.
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The Agony of the Divided Self: Three Arguments
Allen then explicitly raises the question of what double consciousness meant to
DuBois. He says,
The question before us is how Du Bois himself defined double consciousness. But
quickly we discover that our quest for answers tends to be frustrated by enigmatic
references, seductive prose largely lacking in analytical fortitude, as well as
inadequate examples. Contributing to this evasive quality as well were the
multiple expressions of Afro-American duality given attention in his work.
Between 1897 and 1900 Du Bois elaborated three altogether different scenarios—
two of which were ultimately incorporated into Souls—where black folk were
described as being irreparably torn between their Negro-ness and their Americanness. (Allen, 2003, p. 29) (Emphasis added)
The initial frustrations and the multiple expressions of Afro-American duality do
not have to debilitate the entire subject of DuBoisian double consciousness. Rather,
perhaps the frustration means we are still not seeing what DuBois was trying to
apprehend and reveal. Then, instead of interrogating DuBois we could inquire with him
and with his helping us get started. As an example of the frustration and multiple
expressions of African American duality, Allen focuses on three examples from the early
years of DuBois‘ long career (in 1897- 1900, when DuBois was 29- 32 years of age),
―where black folk were described as being irreparably torn between their Negro-ness and
their American-ness‖ (Allen, 2003, p. 29). First, Allen says,
Take Du Bois‘ ―Conservation‖ essay, for example: ―Am I an American or am I a
Negro? Can I be both? Or is it my duty to cease to be a Negro as soon as possible
and be an American? If I strive as a Negro, am I not perpetuating that very cleft
that threatens and separates Black and White America? Is not my only possible
practical aim the subduction of all that is Negro in me to the American? Does my
black blood place upon me any more obligation to assert my nationality than
German, or Irish or Italian blood would? (2003, p. 29)
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A question in some ways very much like the last one is still at the core of
America‘s race debate. Today, though, we might ask, does the sociocultural significance
of race place upon blacks any more need for them to define, develop and assert their
African American identity than a German, or Irish or Italian ethnic background would?
And Allen might agree with this linkage between now and then because he refers to this
passage as showing ―the existence of fundamental political differences at the heart of the
issue‖ (2003, p. 29). Perhaps the political differences between blacks and whites could
still derive from the ongoing hidden struggles with covert white supremacy and resulting
double consciousness for African Americans.
Second, Allen suggests that ―DuBois comes closest here to advancing the
proposition that black folk were experiencing what we might denote today as ‗cultural
conflict‖ (2003, p. 30) by quoting DuBois as saying,
From the double life every American Negro must live, as a Negro and as an
American, as swept on by the current of the nineteenth while yet struggling in the
eddies of the fifteenth century,—from this must arise a painful self-consciousness,
an almost morbid sense of personality and a moral hesitancy which is fatal to selfconfidence. The worlds within and without the Veil of Color are changing and
changing rapidly, but not at the same rate, not in the same way; and this must
produce a peculiar wrenching of the soul, a peculiar sense of doubt and
bewilderment. Such a double life, with double thoughts, double duties, and double
social classes, must give rise to double words and double ideals, and tempt the
mind to presence or revolt, to hypocrisy or radicalism. (Allen, 2003, p. 29-30)
Allen goes on to say that DuBois ―superimposes‖ the double life of African
Americans on their ―anguished feelings of inadequacy generated during times of rapid
social upheaval… in late Nineteenth Century American life.‖ How and why there is
superimposition rather than overlap and perhaps symbiosis between black double
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consciousness and social changes is not clarified in the article. However, in general these
first two meanings of double consciousness are shown by Allen to include both
―political‖ and ―cultural‖ aspects, but they are not synthesized into a whole (Allen, 2003,
pp. 29-30).
Third, Allen discusses in detail DuBois‘ saying,
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking
at one‘s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one‘s soul by the tape of a
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,—
an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two
warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being
torn asunder. (Allen, 2003, p. 30)
And Allen analyzes,
The passage in ―Strivings‖ cited above contains a juxtaposition of two modes of
purported psychic turmoil which Du Bois insisted on treating as a single
phenomenon—two agonies dwelling in one, as it were. Here the source of internal
conflict is unclear: does the disturbance in black folks‘ psyches reside in the
internalization of contemptuous ideas which the world has of them? or is it rather
to be located in sets of conflicting thoughts, strivings, and ideals which they
simultaneously hold? (2003, p. 11).
The first psychic turmoil is shown to be the anguish of having to see oneself as
unrecognized and disdained by others. The second turmoil is ―a tortured clash of
thoughts, strivings, and ideals in the minds of Negro Americans seeking to affirm both
their American and Negro identities.‖ These turmoils are mutually exclusive to Allen
(2003, pp. 30-31) He says,
But there exists, as we say, a perilous ―disconnect‖ between the two sections of
Du Bois‘ text: one the one hand, an anguish resulting from one‘s humanity having
been systematically denied; on the other, a tortured clash of thoughts, strivings,
and ideals in the minds of Negro Americans seeking to affirm both their
American and Negro identities. The first stems from the refusal of whites to
recognize blacks as human beings; the second, from their refusal to acknowledge
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blacks as American citizens while at the same time holding them to the
responsibilities of citizenship. Although the second disclaimer is assuredly rooted
in the first, they are not the same thing. Yet here the resulting, distorted
consciousness and Angst associated with one type of experience is haphazardly
merged with the corresponding anguish of yet another. (2003, p. 31)
Whites refusing to ―acknowledge blacks as American citizens while holding them
to the responsibilities of citizenship‖ is, according to Allen, a ―perilous disconnect‖ from
the refusal of whites to ―recognize blacks as human beings‖ (2003, p. 31). Why is there
such a disconnect between white refusal to recognize blacks as humans and white refusal
to recognize blacks as American citizens? Allen grants that the latter refusal is rooted in
the former, but he does not explicate why, then, the association between the two is
haphazard. Rather than their association being haphazard, are not the two anguishes two
overlapping aspects of white supremacy and consequential black double consciousness?
Allen maintains that these two anguishes cannot be overlapping in his saying,
This creative and indiscriminate mixing of oranges and tangerines allowed Du
Bois to transform an acknowledged social problem— that of securing recognition
and concomitant self-respect for Afro-Americans in general—into a far more
esoteric one involving resolution of the supposed double consciousness of the
Talented Tenth. Touted on the one hand as a phenomenon experienced by all
Afro-Americans, the manner in which this double consciousness became a
problem uniquely identified with the educated elite occurred by way of a second
maneuver: Du Bois‘ selection of a narrow set of examples to illustrate his
argument. (2003, p. 31)
DuBois, though, was addressing the masses of blacks in addition to the middle
and upper classes. Manning Marablelvi explains that even before publishing Souls,

lvi

Marable is Professor of History and Political Science; Director of the Institute for Research in African
American Studies; and Professor in The Department of International and Public Affairs at
Columbia.
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DuBois was concerned with Philadelphia‘s forty thousand African Americans whose
economic hardship was attributable to racial prejudice and discrimination. In 1897
Philadelphia, as in the broader society, ―thousands of black young adults, denied
educational and vocational opportunity, had been unable to develop [Quoting DuBois],
‗fully the feeling of responsibility and personal worth.‘‖ Marable also writes, beginning
by quoting DuBois,
―The Negro who ventures away from the mass of his people and their organized
life finds himself alone, shunned and taunted, stared at, and made uncomfortable.‖
Du Bois‘s assessment of the Negro middle class was critical yet hopeful. The
black ―aristocracy‖ did not exhibit a clear race consciousness, a political and
social commitment to uplift the masses of poor blacks. The Negro elite usually
consumed more than it produced, and it had not begun to generate a program to
accumulate capital and to initiate economic enterprises that could employ black
workers. ―The better classes of Negroes,‖ Du Bois commented, ―should recognize
their duty toward the masses… Implicitly, Du Bois was expressing the kernel of
his famous ―Talented Tenth‖ thesis, developed several years later. (Marable,
1986, p. 26)
The denial of black humanity and the denial of black citizenship combined in
1897 to undermine the efforts of all classes of blacks to develop feelings of responsibility
and personal worth. DuBois is talking about different particular problems facing the elite
and the thousands of regular people, but class is not a decisive factor of their being
burdened with conflicts between ascribed and self defined identities in general. Nor are
the social and personal realms of identity and position, as explored by Andrews (2003)
(in ―Self-Reflection and the Reflected Self: African American Double Consciousness and
the Social [Psychological] Mirror‖), so separable as Allen situates them in his saying,
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This creative and indiscriminate mixing of oranges and tangerines allowed Du Bois to
transform an acknowledged social problem—that of securing recognition and
concomitant self-respect for Afro-Americans in general—into a far more esoteric one
involving resolution of the supposed double consciousness of the Talented Tenth. Touted
on the one hand as a phenomenon experienced by all Afro-Americans, the manner in
which this double consciousness became a problem uniquely identified with the educated
elite occurred by way of a second maneuver: Du Bois‘ selection of a narrow set of
examples to illustrate his argument. (2003, p. 31)
Even if DuBois did focus more on the elite than the masses, there is still evidence
that the black general population of 1897 was facing struggles between ascribed and self
defined identities. These struggles have been shown in this thesis in the earlier
discussions of Marable (1986) and of Krasner‘s (1995) article (―Parody and Double
Consciousness in the Language of Early Black Musical Theatre‖), on signifyin(g) in
black theater, specifically in Bob Cole‘s 1897 production of, ―Coontown.‖
Also, Allen does not tie in the personal and social levels of double consciousness
with his earlier examples of political differences (in his discussion of DuBois‘ asking,
―Does my black blood place upon me any more obligation to assert my nationality than
German, or Irish or Italian blood would?‖) and the cultural changes of the late Nineteenth
Century (Allen, 2003, pp. 29-30). If he did, perhaps a more cohesive meaning of double
consciousness would emerge as a struggle between ascribed and self defined identities.

Warring Thoughts, Strivings, Ideals: How Defined?
In this next section, Allen explains that DuBois‘ writing is unclear about the
meanings of, ―Warring thoughts, aims, strivings and ideals‖ (2003, p. 31). Allen
continues by showing how ―Du Bois‘ references to ‗thoughts‘ are much too broad to be
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meaningful to any discussion of double consciousness, as are those of ‗stirrings.‘ Du
Boisian ‗aims‘ are also vague…‖ (2003, p. 31). He then explains that the ideals of
African Americans are actually the same as those of white Americans by quoting DuBois
as saying,
If now once this great ground principle is fixed, that negroes are men,—an
indivisible part of that great humanity which works and aspires,—then what are
the ideals of life that interest them in common with other men? To ask that
question is to answer it. They are the same. They, with all men, strive to know and
to do, to organize and to dream, to fight in that great battle of the west in the glow
of the setting sun. (Allen, 2003, pp. 31-32).
With unclear meanings of terms and with common ideals between black and
white Americans, Allen raises the question, ―If such conflict [between black and white
ideals] cannot be demonstrated, if no warring ideals can be produced, what does that fact
portend for the existence of double consciousness?‖ (2003, p. 32). Allen‘s article then
goes in two contradictory directions. First, he presents a case against double
consciousness, but then he ends the paragraph with good evidence that double
consciousness is a conflict between ascribed and self determined identities. Continuing
from the previously quoted passage, Allen writes,
Du Bois circumvented this little difficulty by inventing what I have variously
termed lesser ideals and compromised ideals: ideals in name, but lacking the
moral authority of his more frequently invoked ethical standards such as
Goodness, Beauty, and Truth. What Du Bois was attempting to accomplish by
portraying Afro-American double consciousness as rooted in conflicting white
and black ideals, it seems, was to infuse the concept with a heightened sense of
moral authority. But deep down at the roots, of course, this was not so much a
conflict over ideals as a conflicted deliberation concerning the actual ability of
black people to hold ideals—that is, a question ultimately turning upon the
recognition of black folk as human beings. (2003, p. 32)
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The ultimate question is whether white Americans can, will and do recognize
African Americans as human beings. This raises questions of what recognition is and is
not, but that is not the subject of the article. The immediate issue is that his own
concluding idea of recognition does show the conflicting ideals for which Allen is
searching. The point seems to be about black people‘s ideal, like everyone‘s, of being
treated as human beings, but also their having to live with less as such a shared ideal of
equality, striving, organizing and dreaming is being compromised by others in their daily
lives.
This idea, though, seems quite similar Allen‘s conceptions of lesser and
compromised ideals, but the conclusions are different. Allen‘s meanings are that,
The ideals mentioned in the above examples include not only the universals of
Work, Sacrifice, Knowledge, and Beauty but the lesser ideal of seeking white
recognition or respect (characteristically expressed in negative form: that of
avoiding white misrecognition or disrespect) as well as what can only be viewed
as a compromised ideal: the embrace of quackery or demagogy. The claim that
one is torn between competing ideals suggests the existence of equally attractive
alternatives on either side, and the difficulty or impossibility of choosing between
them. (Allen, 2003, pp. 32-33)
One ideal is the universals and the other is avoiding white misrecognition and
disrespect. Self definition would certainly be a universal ideal and white misrecognition
would be an ascribed identity. In this way, Allen does not necessarily argue against
double consciousness as he says he does. Allen says these ideals must be equally
attractive and therefore impossible to choose between. Why? They do not have to be
equally attractive to be part of one‘s conditionings. People can be torn between ideals,
identities, conditionings and positions even though they do not like or notice what they
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are torn between or how they are so torn. If so, there would be no ―little difficulty‖ of
shared universal ideals that Allen says DuBois ―circumvented‖ (2003, p. 32). Rather, as
Allen rightly says, the ―question ultimately turning upon the recognition of black folk as
human beings‖ (2003, p. 32) would be about the double consciousness of ascribed and
self defined identities. Looking at double consciousness this way situates all people
within or as our conditionings. It opens a direction of inquiry into what it means to
recognize and to be recognized across, and even within, racial lines in a white
supremacist society.

Examples of Double Consciousness
Allen introduces and explains four examples of double consciousness that he will
critique and evaluate. He says,
In Du Bois‘ first illustration… one of the principal goals is to avoid ―white
contempt,‖ while the other invokes the universal ideals of individual work and
sacrifice, and their implementation in the service of the poorest, most
contemptuously held strata of African Americans. So where is the
Negro/American counterpoint? How can we possibly read this as a struggle
between substantive Negro and American ideals? If the task of uplift is
determined to be the Negro ideal, how do we categorize the avoidance of reproach
by whites? (2003, p. 33)
Perhaps African Americans‘ having to live with and avoid racism is a result of the
ascription side of double consciousness. If so, there would be universal principles shared
by all Americans. For African Americans, though, there would also the unique burden of
widespread, restrictive and deadly systemic racial contempt. If so, perhaps the
Negro/American counterpoint involves one‘s being part of a society from which one is
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misrecognized, excluded and dehumanized. The counterpoint might be about African
Americans,‘ like everyone‘s, being conditioned to believe in one‘s individuality and
identity, but then having that individuality and identity excluded, denied, or not
recognized by the same society from which it develops.
Discussing his second example of double consciousness, Allen says,
The dilemma of the ―Negro lawyer or doctor‖ consisted of adhering to, on the one
side, a compromised if not benighted ideal—that of shoddy and unprincipled
service— and on the other, in the face of white reproach, of working and
sacrificing to acquire skills which would never be put to the test. But if work,
sacrifice, or the securing of skills constituted American ideals, did that perforce
mean that quackery and demagogy were their Negro counterparts? (Actually, if
and where such negative behaviors actually existed, they likely signified the endcollapse of a debilitating process rather than the representative dynamics which
Du Bois sought to describe. (2003, pp. 33)
Perhaps in this example there are two ideals at war, but not exactly as suggested
in the article. The ideals could be, ―Being,‖ and, ―Being recognized as one‘s being.‖
Being a good doctor or lawyer could be part of a self definition while not being
recognized that way could be a part of a projected ascription. Then this might be a
meaning of double consciousness.
Continuing from his second example of double consciousness, Allen says,
[T]hirdly, [there is] the conundrum of the ―would-be black savant... confronted by
the paradox‖ that although whites possessed the knowledge needed by his people,
the knowledge capable of teaching whites (presumably that blacks too were
human) was an unknown quantity to [DuBois]. (2003, p. 32)
And later,
The third example was an observation rather than the representation of a practical
dilemma, a paradox centering on types of knowledge rather than an expression of
the clash of white and black aims. In a passage which might have been written
yesterday, Du Bois averred that the knowledge capable of teaching whites
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(concerning black humanity) was seemingly inaccessible. But because there are
no choices to be made in this example, one is forced to reject it as ―inauthentic‖
relative to the issue of ―warring ideals.‖ (Allen, 2003, p. 33)
Here Allen is talking about ―a paradox centering on types of knowledge‖ (2003,
p. 33). What types of knowledge derive from different (social, of course) racial positions
of black and white Americans? The question is as broad and as entrenched as black
humanity in a white supremacist society and white supremacy can be as subtle as covert
racism (Silberman, 1964; Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967; Kovel, 1970; Williams, 1991;
Gates, 1992; Morrison, 1992; Carr, 1997; Loury, 2002; Andrews, 2003; Bonilla-Silva,
2003). Especially with such depths and nuances of racism, black people cannot be held
responsible for persuading and teaching (sometimes passive or resistant) whites about
their own hidden racism and black humanity (personal communications, 1983-present).
There should be a difference though, between blacks just teaching whites on one hand
and on another hand people cooperatively, equally and dialogically exposing, looking at
and diminishing their conditionings together. If people of all sides of the color lines saw
and discussed themselves and each other as racial as they and each other see them, then
they all might learn more about themselves, each other and how they and others are
conditioned to be who they are and to think as they do. That might be an internal,
psychological, philosophical and spiritual war of ideals for everyone as we see ourselves
in ways that seem quite new and unexpected. Perhaps at this paradox of types of
knowledge, multilateral double consciousness could be explored. However, since this
inquiry is not literally about specifically defined warring black and American ideals of
African Americans, Allen ―reject[s] it as ‗inauthentic‘‖ (2003, p. 33). There is a lot of
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investigation into meanings and practices of white supremacy in the U.S. that is curtailed
with such dismissal.
Allen‘s fourth example of double consciousness is,
the artist whose agony stemmed from a need to remain aesthetically true to the
subject matter which he intimately knew, while surviving in a broad marketplace
hostile to the artistic values embodied in his work—not to mention antipathy
directed toward the real-life subjects he portrayed. The Negro artist‘s ideal
expressed itself in the form of a commitment to the ―soul-beauty‖ of his people,
while his American ideal— the first of Du Bois‘ examples where such a label
explicitly corresponded to its content—had to do with securing the broadest
possible audience for his art. (2003, p. 33)

Here, Allen provides an actual conflict between specific black and American
ideals. The conflicting ideals are contrary commitments. The black ideal is the artist‘s
commitment to his/her African American community. The American ideal is the artist‘s
commitment to succeed and survive through the mainstream venues of artistic production
and consumption.
Allen, says, ―But the dilemma of the artist cannot be permitted to stand as
representative of the dilemma of all Black Americans‖ (2003, p. 33). However, this
dilemma is more complicated than conflict between an artist‘s commitment to
community and commitment to mainstream success. In that complication, perhaps the
dilemma can be generalized. In his endnote to the passage quoted above, Allen says,
To belabor an important point, this artist‘s dilemma offers the clearest example
why the struggle between two ideals cannot be construed as a struggle between
cultures reflected in a single mind. There are two sets of aesthetic values
involved, but Du Bois‘ artist is not torn between them. That is, he was not torn
between American and Negro ideals, but between holding onto and expressing
African American aesthetic ideals in his work while at the same time gaining
recognition for them from whites. By the 1940s, abstract art offered black artists
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such as Hale Woodruff, Rose Piper, Romare Bearden, and Norman Lewis ―a
means of granting the ‗universal‘ to abstracted ancestral imagery without
succumbing to the racialization of recognizably African or African American
images.‖ (2003, p. 42)
With black abstract art of the 1940‘s that was not ―recognizably African or
African American,‖ whites were not confronted by their identified and unidentified
aversions to the self defined African American people who were behind the white
ascriptions. The white Americans‘ conflict between black self definition and white
ascription of blacks was avoided in abstract art. What happened, though, outside that
venue where whites could not avoid confrontation with their aversion to black self
definition in the 1940‘s?
White aversion to black self definition was privileged by its being situated and
enforced solely and entirely and utterly as a black peoples‘ problem. Then, it is not black
and American ideals between which African Americans are torn. Rather, Chester Himes
(1986) illuminates in, If He Hollers Let Him Go,
It came along with consciousness. It came into my head first, somewhere back of
my closed eyes, moved slowly underneath my skull to the base of my brain, cold
and hollow. It seeped down my spine, into my arms, spread through my groin
with an almost sexual torture, settled in my stomach like butterfly wings. For a
moment I felt torn all loose inside, shriveled, paralyzed, as if after awhile I'd have
to get up and die. (1986, p. 3)
Bob Jones is a, ―Leaderman,‖ or a foreman, at a shipyard in Los Angeles. He
moved there in 1941 to get a better job than he could find in Cleveland. However,
although Bob was optimistic and he did eventually get an appropriate job for his
qualifications, he says,
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They shook all that [optimism] in Los Angeles. It wasn‘t being refused
employment in the plants so much. When I got here practically the only job a
Negro could get was service in the white folks‘ kitchens. But it wasn‘t that so
much. It was the look on the people‘s faces when you asked them about a job.
Most of ‗em didn‘t say right out they wouldn‘t hire me. They just looked so
goddamned startled that I‘d even asked. As if some friendly dog had come in
through the door and said, ―I can talk.‖ It shook me. (Himes, 1986, p. 3)
Bob continues by explaining that he also had a related unsettled feeling about the
Japanese internment camps. He saw Americans of Japanese heritage taken away ―without
a chance. Without a trial. Without even giving [them] a chance to say one word. It was
thinking about if they ever did that to me, Robert Jones, Mrs. Jones‘s dark son, that
started me to getting scared‖ (Himes, 1986, p. 3).
Bob seems torn not between black and American ideals, but between who he is as
a person (a black person and an American person or however he sees himself) on one
hand and, on another hand, a stigmatized object negated by America‘s betrayal of its
claimed ideals. If so, that might be Bob‘s conflict between self definition and white
ascription and his double consciousness. A depth, severity and complication of this kind
of conflict is shown when Bob‘s girlfriend, Alice, says,
Bob, I‘ve been thinking seriously that perhaps I‘m not the type of woman for you.
I‘m ambitious and demanding. I want to be important in the world. I want a
husband who is important and respected and wealthy enough so that I can avoid a
major part of the discriminatory practices which I am sensible enough to know I
cannot change. I don‘t want to be pulled down by a person who can‘t adjust
himself to the limitations of his race- a person who‘d jeopardize his entire future
because of some slight or, say, because some ignorant white person should call
him a nigger. (Himes, 1986, p. 97)
Living comfortably with a negating ascription is required of Bob in order for him
to provide the lifestyle demand by his girlfriend. For her to feel like she is ―avoid[ing] a
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major part of the discriminatory practices,‖ Alice commands Bob to ―adjust himself to
the limitations of his race.‖ White ascription may actually divide Bob and Alice.
However, do these terms, conditions, expectations, limitations and choices have to
be organized and categorized into precise black and American ideals? Is that as much as
DuBois wanted to contribute with his insight and inquiry of double consciousness?
Perhaps rather he, Himes and others too hoped to help expose and confront the whole
conflict between African American self definition and white ascription. Is it not
important to consider how double consciousness makes white ascription a totally and
irreconcilable unilateral black problem? There is no white accountability when the
surface of platitudes (like ―colorblindness‖ and multiculturalism) is all that is seen and
the underlying privileges and burdens of institutional and personal, and overt and covert,
ascription are invisible.
Nor did the civil rights movement (as also shown by the Kerner Report, Kovel
[1970], and Loury [2002]) expose and address the deeper and hidden issues of ascription.
For example, seeming to generalize the struggles within ascription shown by Himes
(1986), Beverly Daniel Tatum (1987) asks,
What does it mean to be a middle-class Black parent living, working, and raising
children in the midst of a predominantly White community? An effort to answer
this question will help to add an important missing piece to the larger picture of
Black families in America. (p. 3)
What is the difference between black and white people asking this question? Also,
what does it mean to be a middle-class Black parent living, working, and raising children
in the midst of a predominantly White community? And what is the difference between
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black and white people‘s asking this question? There are many questions about
perspectives and awareness of other perspectives that could derive from Tatum‘s original
question. One part of an answer is alarmingly like the burden of Bob Jones, but this
response is more as Alice expected of Bob. Beginning by quoting an African American
man living with his family in a predominantly white community in 1987, Tatum writes,
―Just being Black makes it hard, because people look at you like you‘re not as
good as they are, like you‘re a second class citizen, something like that. You got
to always look over your shoulder like somebody‘s always watching you. At my
job, I‘m the only Black in my department and it seems like they‘re always
watching me, the pressure‘s always on perform. You feel like if you miss a day,
you might not have a job. So there‘s that constant awareness on my part, they can
snatch what little you have, so that‘s a constant fear, you know, especially when
you‘ve got a family to support…So I‘m always aware of what can happen.‖
[And Tatum says,] It seems that ―constant fear‖ would be a major source
of stress. But some might argue that being aware of the threat, understanding your
own dilemma, is part of ―knowing the rules,‖ [see ―how the system works,‖ p. 83]
and that is supposed to make life easier. Not knowing the rules will definitely
make life harder. (1987, pp. 98-99)
Both Bob Jones in the 1940‘s, and the middle class working family man in 1987,
are ascribed as incompetent by the outside white society. They have to deal with that
suspicion while not letting it interfere with how they feel and act. No wonder Tatum says
this ―would be a major source of stress.‖ This stress seems to part of a unilateral black
struggle of, or including, double consciousness as self definition and ascription.
However, even if a definite conflict between specific ideals is needed for double
consciousness, Cornel West (1993) shows such a conflict in Race Matters. Also, by
referring to Pecola of Toni Morrison‘s (1970) The Bluest Eye, West situates this conflict
across classes where it can burden the general black population as well as the middle
class or Talented Tenth. West explains,
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The eclipse of hope and collapse of meaning in much of black America is linked
to the structural dynamics of corporate market institutions that affect all
Americans. Under these circumstances black existential angst derives from the
lived experience of ontological wounds and emotional scares inflicted by white
supremacist beliefs and images permeating U.S. society and culture. These beliefs
and images attack black intelligence, black ability, black beauty, and black
character daily in subtle and not-so-subtle ways. Toni Morrison‘s novel, The
Bluest Eye, for example, reveals the devastating effect of pervasive European
ideals of beauty on the self-image of young black women. Morrison‘s exposure of
the harmful extent to which these white ideals affect the black self-image is a first
step toward rejecting these ideals and overcoming the nihilistic self-loathing they
engender in blacks. (1993, pp. 17-18)
―White beliefs and images‖ are the ascriptions that ―attack black intelligence,
black ability, black beauty, and black character‖ and self definition. West is showing that
there are white ideals, like beauty and language too, that do contradict black ideals, like
intelligence, ability, beauty and character. West‘s explanation helps lead toward an
answer to Tatum‘s question about what it means to be black in white America. Later,
West suggests a way to pursue a meaning of blackness in America. He says,
Instead of cathartic appeals to black authenticity, a prophetic viewpoint bases
mature black self-love and self-respect on the moral quality of black responses to
undeniable racist degradation in the American past and present. These responses
assume neither a black essence that all black people share nor one black
perspective to which all black people should adhere. Rather, a prophetic
framework encourages moral assessment of the variety of perspectives held by
black people and selects those views based on black dignity and decency that
eschew putting any group of people or culture on a pedestal or in the gutter.
Instead, blackness is understood to be either the perennial possibility of white
supremacist abuse or the distinct styles and dominant modes of expression found
in black cultures and communities. (West, 1993, p. 28)
Here, again, could be conflict between self definition and ascription. West seems
to be saying that black self-love and self-respect (perhaps as parts of self definition?) can
be based on the ―quality of black responses‖ to American white supremacy (which
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includes the ascriptions of black inferiority). Perhaps West is suggesting that the ways
Bob Jones, the man in Tatum‘s study and Pecola respond to their ascriptions are parts of
how they define themselves. Maybe this, then, is why ―blackness is understood to be
either the perennial possibility of white supremacist abuse [ascription?] or the distinct
styles and dominant modes of expression [self definition?] found in black cultures and
communities‖ (West, 1993, p. 28).
Allen, in fact, might seem to concur with a possibility of double consciousness as
conflict between self definition and ascription. Shifting his focus (from his discussion of
the artist in the 1940‘s) to earlier decades, Allen says,
If black physicians were beset by existential agony in the late Nineteenth Century,
perhaps its source might more readily be found in the respect or esteem denied
them by the dominant population as well as by their own people (the latter
manifestation constituting a form of internalized white supremacy) rather than a
divided consciousness on their own part. (2003, p. 34)
Could that existential agony (of self definition?) resulting from external and
internalized (ascriptions from?) white supremacy be part of double consciousness rather
than being separate from double consciousness? Could all these examples of conflicts
between self definitions and ascriptions be meanings of double consciousness? In the
next section of his article, Allen begins by sounding as though he might agree with
double consciousness as conflicts between self definitions and ascriptions.

A Tactical Choice in the Battle for Respect
In this section, Allen writes,
In the face of a violent suppression of Afro-American civil and political rights and
the imposition of segregation in all avenues of Southern life during the last
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quarter of the Nineteenth Century, black folk were in the process of being stripped
of fundamental vestiges of respect as human beings. Confronted with a sinister
engineering of signs and mores designed to fix the social and political inferiority
of Afro-Americans in perpetuity, black self-respect was severely put to the test,
with seeds of despair and self-doubt finding extremely fertile ground. (2003, p.
34)
The signs and mores might be seen as ascriptions while the assault on black self
respect might be seen as involving assault on self definition. It was because of these
obstacles that DuBois asserted that the Talented Tenth was needed to lead the general
African American population. To so lead, the middle class would need college education
and power through recognition and respect from whites (Allen, 2002, p. 34). ―However,‖
Allen continues, ―The Talented Tenth itself was in danger of succumbing to a selffulfilling prophecy [of feeling inferior because it was designated to be inferior]‖ (Allen,
2002, p. 34). Is not this succumbing a form of a self definition succumbing to a projected
identity? Was the Talented Tenth hindered by the negating ascriptions that challenged its
people‘s self definitions? If so, could this be related to double consciousness?
After helping to raise these questions, Allen explains that DuBois endeavored to
gain increasing recognition and respect for the black middle class from ―educated and
influential whites.‖ This would ―empower [the Talented Tenth] to carry out the task of
uplifting the masses with a greater determination and efficiency‖ and improve the ―social
policies affecting them in general‖ (Allen, 2003, pp. 34-35).
Allen continues,
[B]ecause double consciousness was already widely acknowledged as a
psychological malady among the learned, the tactical embrace of the concept by
Du Bois also seems calculated to elicit sympathy from educated whites, in lieu of
an appeal to their sense of justice. Moreover, the tactic held out an additional
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enticement in that such whites could be called upon to support the Talented Tenth
without having to admit their own culpability in perpetuating or tolerating a harsh
racial climate: who could be blamed for black folks‘ having come down with a
case of the double consciousness? (2003, p. 35)
The enticement for whites to eschew their own racism may be a treatment of a
symptom, rather than a cause, that is more accommodative and Washingtonian than
DuBoisian. Washington wanted to use black economic advancement as a route toward
better racial relations. He was working around, not through, race and racism. Washington
might have wanted to work around white supremacy by not directly confronting how ―the
case of double consciousness‖ was caused by overt and covert white supremacy.
Conversely, if DuBois was seeking exposure and ceasing of white ascription as a cause of
black double consciousness, then he may not have wanted to make superficial progress in
a round about way. He would not have wanted to further obfuscate deeper levels of white
inquiry into ―their own culpability in perpetuating or tolerating a harsh racial climate‖
(Allen, 2003, p. 35).
Treating the symptom by ―elicit[ing] sympathy from educated whites, in lieu of an
appeal to their sense of justice‖ by addressing the underlying delusion, institution and
ascription of black inferiority would only add to what Gaertner and Dovidio (see p. 53)
would later find in 1986. Their research illuminates that ―whites are consciously
concerned with maintaining an egalitarian and non-prejudiced self-concept even if they
hold negative sentiments toward African Americans‖ (Andrews, 2003, p. 66). The history
of this cultural trait, if studied, might be shown to lead back to, and before, the early
Twentieth Century. Also, Andrews states above (see p. 53),
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Gaertner and Dovidio note that discrimination is most likely to occur when
nonracial justifications for discriminatory behavior are available. It would appear
that, for better or for worse, other whites also look to find nonracial justifications
for the actions of other whites so as to diffuse racial angst of blacks and possibly
to further cement their own status as egalitarian and non-prejudicial. (2003. pp.
66-67)
Sympathy for the black middle class from the educated whites may only have
made a façade of justice seem surely like the real thing. Then what would appear as the
solution would actually be the cause of the problem. In other words, the façade of justice
would appear to be the solution, but it would really be just a symptom of covert white
supremacy. The risk of such corruption may have made DuBois hesitant to develop the
concept of double consciousness. However, that does not necessarily mean DuBois
rejected and abandoned the concerns he might have had about double consciousness as,
perhaps, conflict between self definition and ascription. In the next section, Allen asks,
―[W]hy did DuBois effectively jettison the concept after 1903?‖ (2003, p. 35)
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Why Was the Concept Dropped?
Three main reasons are offered for DuBois‘ ―dropping‖ of double consciousness.
Andrews explains that the idea itself could not be sustained and developed conceptually.
Second, Allen discusses that whites who did not recognize poor blacks could not be
expected to recognize middle class blacks (2003, p. 35). ―Thirdly,‖ Allen says,
[T]here came to Du Bois the eventual discovery that, rather than continue
expending energies to compel the recognition of white Americans—at least for
the purpose of healing the psychological scars incurred by racism—their
disrespect might be partially circumvented in other ways. (2003, p. 35)
Allen presents two ways this circumvention might have been approached. First,
he says,
One revelation gained was that protest against unjust conditions itself, whatever
the actual political outcome, tended to promote a healthy sense of self-respect
among its practitioners. (2003, p. 35)
And second, Allen says,
Another revelation for Du Bois and other middle-class Black Americans in
general, was that in after being forced into segregated communities during the last
quarter of the Nineteenth Century, they discovered recognition in and of
themselves: a renewed sense of mutual self-respect, collective self-esteem, and
black-on-black solidarity cutting across class lines. (2003, p. 35)
Both of these strategies against white supremacy do, as Allen explains, reject
dependence on white recognition of black humanity and equality. However, they do not
necessarily argue against black struggles with ascriptions as a part of double
consciousness. Whether or not, or however, blacks are ―compel[ling] the recognition of
white Americans,‖ they may still be burdened by negative projections that challenge their
identities and self definitions.
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This possibility may be similar to what Allen explains as he continues,
Although neither outward protest nor the rise of inner group-based mutual esteem
were able to change the dominant character of Nineteenth Century social relations
or material conditions, they contributed nonetheless in many ways to the overall
mental health of the race. Most importantly, in the process of mutual recognition
so necessary to identity formation, African Americans were not unilaterally
dependent on whites for their individual as well as collective sense of self. (2003,
p. 35)
Perhaps Allen is showing that self definition through collective rejection of
external negating ascriptions may have been a way African Americans contended with
double consciousness when white Americans were maintaining a façade of justice or out
rightly degrading African American people and culture. This would not argue against
double consciousness as a conflict between self definition and ascription.
Then, however, Allen says,
And finally, at no time was the Afro-American struggle for social justice in need
of double consciousness arguments to make its case. Direct appeals for justice
worked just as effectively—or ineffectively— as calls for ameliorating the claims
of double consciousness. (2003, pp. 35-6)
Here, Allen is stating that the arguments of double consciousness have never been
necessary because, ―Direct appeals for justice worked just as effectively—or
ineffectively — as calls for ameliorating the claims of double consciousness.‖ Why,
though, does there have to be a distinction and choice of either ―direct appeals for justice‖
or ―ameliorating the claims of double consciousness‖ as conflict between self definition
and ascription? Could the two, the direct appeals and the ameliorating, be more alike than
different? Could exposing and confronting the ascriptions (especially those of aversion
and coversion) be a direct appeal for justice?
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Double Consciousness: Mini-History of a Misconception
Beginning this section, Allen discusses how DuBois‘ conception of double
consciousness was considered and addressed by his contemporaries. First, Allen explains,
What was possibly the earliest reference to Du Boisian double consciousness in
the social sciences arrived in 1914 in the context of a discussion concerning the
purportedly divided mind of the mulatto. ―The unique position and hence the
peculiar influence of the mulatto on all racial questions,‖ wrote sociologist John
Moffatt Mecklin, ―...is due to the fact that the blood of both races courses in his
veins. Biologically he belongs to both and yet to neither, and corresponding to the
anomaly of his physical traits is his social status. He is a Zwischending (inbetween thing) ethnologically and socially.‖ (Allen, 2003, p. 36)
Allen indicates, ―Mecklin attributed double consciousness to biological causes‖
(2003, p. 36). This cause is obviously impossible because race is an entirely social
construct with neither biological essence nor significance. However, there is a connection
between biracial people (in this case people who are both African American and
European American), double consciousness and white supremacy.
White does mean human in the U.S. In and since the earliest decades of ―The
New World,‖ the biological fallacy of white supremacy did not stop it from being
cultivated and believed (Jordan, 1962; Morgan, 1975)lvii until it became an actual and
acquired designator of who could be whom, and who could be human, in U.S. society and
lvii

The, ―Jordan/Morgan debate,‖ is an ongoing study of whether American slavery or American racism
developed first and led to the other. Edmund Morgan argues that slavery preceded and led to racism while
Winthrop Jordan argues that racism was already developed when African and African American indentured
servitude was changed to slavery. Lerone Bennett, Jr. (1975, p. 69) and Eric Williams (1994 p. 7, 29)
support well Morgan‘s thesis that slavery was first. John Boles (1984, pp. 10-11) suggests sensibly that the
two processes were more symbiotic. However, in support of Jordan, an overriding issue might be that the
Africans were taken without choice while Europeans chose to be indentured servants. That was already a
worse treatment of Africans than that of the Europeans (Jessica Leroy, Leonardo Toppin, 2010, personal
communications). On the other hand, though, since many European indentured servants were criminals,
how much choice did they have when often their other option was imprisonment or death? Whether slavery
or racism came first, Africans were situated and naturalized as lowly and as inhumanly as could be done.
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mainstream culture (Morrison, 1992; Ellison, 1994). Biracial people have been situated
not only as black and white, but also as human and non-human. Racial inferiority,
whether ascribed to a whole person or any part is still a negation that can be part of
double consciousness as conflict between ascription and self definition. White supremacy
does not need race to be natural; white supremacy only needs race to be naturalized. How
could it be naturalized? Although there is no biological essence of black double
consciousness, if it became normal enough so that it was not really noticed by the people
involved and not involved, perhaps a black burden of unilateral racial double
consciousness and a white privilege of no racial double consciousness could be part of a
social essence, or an overarching invisible framework, of race.
Allen, however, argues against such a long history of black double consciousness.
He says as criticism,
[U]nder the indomitable pressure of Afro-American cultural nationalism of the
1960s, the levee gave way. Now almost everyone, it seems, was convinced that
the Negro had been afflicted with cultural double consciousness since the landing
of unfree Africans on Virginia soil in 1619! (Allen, 2003, p. 37)
It might not have been as far back as 1619 (when the first Africans arrived in
Virginia), but certainly by 1670, Africans and African Americans in Virginia and other
colonies were increasingly dehumanized through being forced from indentured servitude
(which led to freedom and did not exclude one from humanity) into slavery for life and
one‘s children‘s lives. They were increasingly denied recognition as human through
baptism (Morgan, 1975, p. 331). From then on at least, as Europeans defined themselves
and each other as white, their self esteem and social position rose collectively and
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individually at the expense of the self definitions of Africans and African Americans.
Ascription of black inferiority was and also is an ascription of white superiority (Bennett,
1975, p.78; Morrison, 1992, pp. 37-39). With unequal distribution of (and power over)
positive and negative racial ascriptions, black double consciousness could be linked to
white supremacy since very early in U.S. history. In fact, even in and before 1619,
Africans‘ being forced without recourse from their homes into Western slavery was a
direct and crushing assault on one‘s self definition. Nathan Irvin Huggins explains,
Two edges of the slave trade- the rupture of the African from the social tissue that
held all meaning for him and his conversion to a marketable object- cut the
deepest and cut each to the quick. (1990, pp. 26-27)
Also in this section, Allen discusses meanings of double consciousness explained
by five other scholars. Allen shows that in two of these considerations,
Although far more sophisticated than the biological determinism of Mecklin,
[1920‘s sociologist Robert E.] Park‘s [and 1920‘s sociologist Edward Byron
Reuter‘] formulation basically substituted the role of a determinant culture for that
of Mecklin‘s biological forces in the life of the mulatto. (2003, p. 36)
In both cases, as Allen quotes Park, ―The cultural life and traditions of two
distinct people‖ (2003, p. 36), are so incompatible and so averse that the mind of, ―The
Marginal Man‖ (2003, p. 36), suffers. Although this does not raise any clear distinction
between being black and being American, when, ―Whiteness,‖ means, ―Human,‖ and,
―American,‖ as perhaps DuBois critically perceived, his warring ideals can be seen as
involving peoples‘ self definitions as humans and African Americans against their being
ascribed as less.
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Allen then shows examples of Sociologists Everett. V. Stonequist and E. Franklin
Frazer that seem to agree with Allen‘s argument of there being no evidence of clear
warring ideals between black and American ideals. Both Frazer and Stonequist inquire
into the conflicts of being part of two conflicting cultures (2003, p. 37). Although these
examples of double consciousness might not show conflicts between black and American
ideals, they could be examples of double consciousness as conflict between human self
definition within one (African American) culture and inferior ascription within another
(mainstream white American) culture.
If a whole system of white privilege, with its government and economy in
support, can work only with the inferior status of blacks and other people of color then
the pressure from white supremacist society to maintain that position of black inferiority
would be as strong and crucial to its survival as a natural law. It would be a naturalized,
but social, law of the social system just like a natural law is of a natural system.
Naturalization and tradition (and so hiding from real questioning) of black invisibility and
exploitation can seem as intractable as nature itself, especially in the U.S. where profit
and so much profit is to be made. Perhaps this is how race, especially double
consciousness, and class are so entwined. Perhaps the ascriptions and the ensuing
conflicts with self definitions are necessary and must stay unexposed in order for white
Americans to function and interact in ways that they find comfortable, convenient and
manageable.
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Was an Afro-American Double Consciousness Possible?
This concluding section begins with Allen‘s reviewing that double consciousness can
not be found as a conflict between black and American ideals. He says, though, that there
is one more issue that needs to be considered before we ―advance the claim that any
discussion of Afro-American double consciousness, whether in the context of Nineteenth
Century life or today, is of dubious value‖ (2003, p. 37). Allen goes on to explain the
duality between white Americans‘ claims to justice and practices of covert forms of white
supremacy (such as aversive racism or discrimination in contact). Then Allen says,
The consequence was a situation in which many, if not the majority of AfroAmericans, simultaneously felt themselves to be a part, yet not a part of American
society, virtual exiles in the land of their birth. Here was an institutionalized
encounter which might lend itself readily to a Du Boisian characterization. (2003,
p. 38)
This exile within one‘s home might be a way, Allen seems to suggest, DuBoisian
double consciousness can involve conflicts between one‘s self definition and ascribed
identity. Returning, though, to strict adherence to double consciousness as conflict
between ideals (or in this case, identities), Allen says,
On the other hand, there was no guarantee that alienation from or ambivalence
towards American society would lead to a conflict between one‘s American and
Afro-American identities. All depended on conditions. (2003, p. 38)
What were the conditions and how did all depend on them? Also, as Allen likely
ironically means, there should not be a need for a guarantee of anything in order to look
into whether DuBoisian double consciousness is more tenable as a conflict between self
definition and ascription rather than as a conflict between black and American identities.
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Instead of looking into double consciousness as that kind of conflict, though, Allen
considers different conflicts and different conditions of late Nineteenth Century U.S.
society.
The conditions to which Allen refers were the increasing violence and segregation
forcing African Americans to develop and maintain their own community resources self
sufficiently. Simultaneously, white nativists were calling for all Europeans to forsake
their home-identities and assimilate a new American identity. Success in the U.S.
required assimilation into mainstream whiteness, but African Americans could only
succeed with the help and support of their own communities (Allen, 2003, pp. 38-39).
Also, African Americans were necessarily kept out of the white mainstream so it
and its members could be white, mainstream and assimilated at all and all together. Allen
explains how this black segregation and white assimilation happened together. He
explains that,
Separate developments created by European immigrants on U.S. soil were viewed
as a menace by the larger society; but since the very presence of African
Americans was considered menacing to whites, similar developments mandated
by law and otherwise for them were viewed as a necessity. Nonetheless, queried
Du Bois, if Afro- Americans opted for self-help and solidarity, were they not
perpetuating the same type of cleft of which immigrants were being accused? On
the other hand, had Afro-Americans any more obligation than the more recently
arrived Germans, Irish, or Italians to downplay their sense of group identity and
corresponding group aims? (Allen, 2003, p. 39)
First, Allen seems to be saying, segregated European ghettos were criticized by
the mainstream, but segregated African American ghettos were preferred by the
mainstream. This immediately raises questions about what such demography would do to
one‘s self definition.
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Then, Allen continues, DuBois wondered whether accepting that segregation
would not worsen divisions between blacks and whites. Here, the question arises whether
there can be such strong exposure and rejection of ascription that it cannot be accepted
among people.
Last, Allen reminds that African Americans are not immigrants. Their being seen
as foreign to U.S. society and culture is, itself, a form of covert white supremacy that
defines, ―White,‖ as, ―American,‖ and, ―Black,‖ as, ―One of us in a way, but not really.‖
All three of these points can include issues of self definition contradicted by
ascription. Allen asserts, ―If ever there were an institutional basis for the existence of
‗two souls dwelling in one,‘ this was it‖ (2003, p. 39). Does this mean inquiring about
double consciousness might help lead to exposure of covert white supremacy and
equality of privilege? Perhaps it might, but Allen cautions,
However, acknowledging the existence of objective grounds for the formation of
a specific form of Afro-American double consciousness at a particular moment in
history does not imply that every Afro- American individual felt the pulls of
divided loyalties in the same way, or even that he or she experienced any such
tension at all. Much depended on one‘s class position, socialization, and perhaps
even individual temperament. Ultimately there arose a general consensus among
Afro-Americans that, come what may, progress would only arrive from a
consolidating of resources internal to black communities. But whether that
advancement might arrive by the grace of manual training and success in
commercial enterprise as advocated by Booker T. Washington, or following Du
Bois‘ counsels, by cultivating a Talented Tenth to lead the race as well as oversee
the dispensing of ―cultural gifts‖ to the dominant society, it would assuredly have
to materialize someday, they believed—and with it an end to the separation of
Afro-Americans from vital centers of American life. (2003, p. 39)
Allen cautions against generalizing too much. Is it too much to question whether
DuBoisian double consciousness might be part of something, a whole invisible system of
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white supremacy and white privilege, larger than double consciousness itself? Allen
earlier suggests,
Given such inadequate examples [of double consciousness as conflict between
black and American ideals], not to mention the altogether slippery quality of
critical definitions, one is led to conclude that Du Boisian double consciousness
was not so much a usable concept as an exquisitely crafted metaphor. (2003, p.
33)
Perhaps double consciousness was an observation that could not, and still cannot,
be explained within the reasoning available within current language, discourse and
ideology. If so, double consciousness could be an observation that reveals the limitations
and therefore the existence of our all being within the parameters, contexts and values of
our languages, discourses and ideologies. Identifying our being so situated would be a
way of our being aware of our, and each others‘, subjectivities.
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CHAPTER 14
LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSION

Allen effectively shows how double consciousness is not a conflict between black
and American ideals. His evidence, however, does not resolve that double consciousness
is untenable as a concept and irrelevant to racial struggles of African Americans. In fact,
Allen‘s evidence seems to concur with the operational definition of double consciousness
in this thesis (double consciousness is conflict between self definition and ascription).
The issue of difficulty with the meaning of double consciousness is not with the viability
of the concept, but with the language of the concept. The same limitations of critical
thought about race faced DuBois and face us today. We still do not know what he was
trying to talk about. For example, we still do not know how to explore and address the
overlaps of self definition and ascription as they both derive from the social environment.
Toward what questions (for everyone) about choice over identity does that lead? Is our
sense of choice over self definition just a conditioning? Is having and/or choosing an
identity a conditioning?
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While discussing meanings and roles of race in recognition and invisibility
between people, MIT political science professor, Melissa Nobles (2000, personal
communication) said, ―We don‘t have a language for that.‖ We do not have a language
for how some of the most sensitive and personal issues of race are also the most
nourishing dynamics of racial inequality. Perhaps one way to approach such difficulties
without too much aversion would be to start by looking at how we all may be caught
within a system or web of thought, positions and dynamics that limit our perspectives and
perceptions. Perhaps all of us multilaterally looking at ourselves as racial and as racial
others from across color lines could help reveal how ascriptions of black inferiority are
projected and how they unequally affect black and white self definition as aspects of
covert white supremacy.
To help with the development of this language, the research of this thesis seeks
specific interactions in African American literature and non-fiction where (1) a black
perspective can be identified; (2) a white perspective can be identified; (3) and a black
response to the white perspective can be identified. It is in (3) the black response to the
white perspective that evidence of black double consciousness (as conflict between self
definition and ascription) is sought. This inquiry will endeavor to help answer the
research question of this thesis: Does African American writing illustrate DuBois‘
concept of double consciousness? Pursuing this question involves situating Richard
Wright (through his novels, Native Son and Black Boy) as an ideal example of implicit
discussions of double consciousness in African American writing. Then, other writings
can be considered to explore whether or not they provide further examples of double
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consciousness. If instances of double consciousness are in the literature, then to see them
would be seeing covert white supremacy actually happening to and between people at the
moment of the negation and ascription. Exposing that would make DuBoisian double
consciousness more accessible and more traceable than when it is hidden and invisible as
though, like covert white supremacy, it is not there at all.
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PART II
METHODOLOGY
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CHAPTER 15
METHODOLOGY

Bounding and Sampling
The methodology of this thesis involves and asserts the presence of an African
American literary canon. Henry Louis Gates Jr., in, Loose Canons (2002), defines a
canon by saying,
I suppose the literary canon is, in no very grand sense, the commonplace book of
our shared culture, in which we have written down the texts and titles that we
want to remember, that had some special meaning for us. (2002, p. 21)
Gates then reviews historical debates and the formation of an African American
canon by American scholars. He addresses whether there is a distinct African American
canon, or whether a single American canon includes the diversity of this country. Gates
maintains that since the mid-eighteenth century, a unique African American canon has
been developed in the many anthologies of African American literature (2002, pp. 22–
31). Gates himself (1997) is one of the general editors of The Norton Anthology of
African American Literature. These anthologies are a physical part of the canon,
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comprised of shared stories that have special meanings for African Americans. They help
serve as the commonplace book of African American shared culture.
Another way to identify a canon is to include books that are not necessarily
compiled into anthologies, but that are the foundational texts for literary studies in
secondary and higher education. Books are considered classics and canonical when they
speak to human conditions and situations that relate to people beyond their own unique
lives. Such books are considered to expose and explore human conditions and qualities
that can be found across communities and cultures, giving them both particular reference
to their own unique contexts and broad reference to shared human conditions and
struggles. (1982, high school teacher, Benjamin Finke, personal communication).
Many of the books used for this thesis can be considered canonical because they
fit either or both meanings of a canon. Some books are parts of anthologies that show
shared culture, as Gates discusses. Other books are considered canonical because they are
considered fundamental texts of African American experiences. As a Black Studies major
in college, I was assigned many books that were considered to show relationships,
dynamics, politics, and struggles faced by a broad range of African Americans.
By beginning with these books that fit the meaning of canonical, I sought parts of
the books that might elaborate—implicitly, at least—on DuBois‘ concept of double
consciousness. I then searched for other books that, although not considered canonical,
might also show examples of double consciousness.
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The concept of double consciousness sets the boundarylviii of this study. The
boundary—the theme and issue of double consciousness—is a focus on a single aspect of
writings within and between a wide range of cases in African American literature. Within
each of these writings, single-case data provides depth and specificity, while the crosscase data shows themes and patterns that link texts. This bounding with single- and
cross-case data produces the frame.lix With the research defined and organized around
double consciousness, the detailed single-case data and the linking cross-case data reveals
how double consciousness is indicated by the data as an undergirding construct.
Two sampling strategies are used with these bounding and framing methods.
First, theory-based samplinglx reveals passages of texts that fit within the boundary and
frame of double-consciousness data. These samples are then analyzed as data that details
the occurrences of individual double-consciousness issues. Second, critical-case
samplinglxi links common features of the double-consciousness issues between texts
within writings. Coding systems are used to identify instances of double consciousness in
the texts and to collect and organize data within the frame.
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Boundaries ―define aspects of your case(s) that you can study within the limits of your time and means‖
(Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 27).
lix
―You need to create a frame to help you uncover, confirm, or qualify the basic processes or constructs
that undergird your study‖ (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 27).
lx
―Finding examples of a theoretical construct and thereby elaborate and examine it‖ (Miles and
Huberman, 1994, p. 28).
lxi
―Permits logical generalization and maximum application of information to other cases‖ (Miles and
Huberman, 1994, p. 28).
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Data Coding and Display
Each book is coded within a single case matrix. Coding details represent the
nuance and specificity of each source. Simplicity of coding is necessary, since the
literature has a wide variety of formats, including novels, poetry, nonfiction analysis,
personal narratives, and history texts. A role-ordered matrix leads toward such detail and
simplicity. In a role-ordered matrix, a role is a set of actions that people do and are
expected to do that correspond to their positions and functions within groups. A roleordered matrix organizes information about role performance in columns and rows (Miles
& Huberman, 1994, p. 122). This kind of matrix is useful for textual doubleconsciousness exploration because it can organize for comparison many instances of
actions and expectations that demonstrate how people are forced to contend with imposed
identities and social positions while maintaining their self-definitions.
The roles sought in the texts include double consciousness. It is in the
relationships between the black and white characters that evidence of black double
consciousness develops. Three roles—or, more precisely, three perspectives—can be
illuminated and related to show how double consciousness is present and functioning in
the interactions. These roles or perspectives are coded as:
1. Black Perspective (BP). BP refers to parts of texts that show the authors‘
portrayals of views, feelings, attitudes, and positions of blacks in society.
This is the first of the two consciousnesses. Sometimes, though, it is more
of an awareness that the author or character might not identify
consciously. Whether conscious or not, this first perspective is the initial
context and outlook of the black person from which the interaction with
the white character develops.
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2. White Perspective (WP). WP refers to parts of texts that show the
authors‘ portrayals of views, feelings, attitudes, and positions of whites
toward African Americans. This perspective conflicts with the black
perspective, but the conflict can be completely invisible to the white
character because that person is in a dominant position of imposing his or
her perspective without equal negotiation or dialogue about the terms of
the interaction.
3. Black Response (BR). BR refers to parts of texts that show the authors‘
portrayals of how blacks are responsive to whites‘ imposed perspectives.
This meta-awareness, whether identified by the black person or not, is
what defines double consciousness. The black person begins with his or
her own context, feelings, attitudes, views and ideas as the ‗black
perspective.‘ Then the ‗white perspective‘ is imposed without equal
negotiation or dialogue. The result is a black response that must
unilaterally try to contend with the conflict between how a person defines
him/herself and how the outside society, through its white members,
imposes negating and conflicting identities, positions and interactions. .
BR shows double consciousness because it is how black Americans
respond to whites according to how blacks perceive themselves and are
treated by whites. There is not equal negotiation or dialogue. Instead,
blacks just have to follow others‘ lead under others‘ control of the
interaction. Such interactions do not allow whatever kinds of relationships
the black people might want. They can only respond within the limits of
what the white people want.

One important distinction between code 1 and code 3 is that code 1, Black
Perspective, serves as the overall context of each situation in the texts. It is a black
perspective with which the white participant interacts in code 2, White Perspective. With
both codes 1 and 2, there is a relationship, interaction, and power dynamic between black
and white people. Then, within this context, double consciousness as the black response
to this power dynamic is revealed in code 3, Black Response. The third coding shows
how the African American person responds to the white American‘s projected identity.
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When that response involves a negotiation between projected and self-defined identities,
then that response is double consciousness.
For detail, the codes of BP, WP, and BR refer to specific passages that, in the
matrices, are indicated by page numbers and short quotes or paraphrases. Those page
numbers, quotes, and paraphrases are the data within the matrices. The rows of the
matrices are the books and other sources. The columns are the codes themselves.
In most cases, only one example is sought from each text. The purpose and goal
of this choice is to gain a broad view of how many African Americans show implicit or
explicit examples of double consciousness. An alternative would be to demonstrate how
fewer authors show more examples within their writings, but that would not help reveal
whether double consciousness is a ubiquitous condition revealed by a wide range of
writers.
Each matrix begins as single-case studies for each source and is then stacked
together as a cross-case matrix. By stacking the single-case role-ordered matrices, crosscase construct cables develop (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 184) (see Appendix). This
display format helps shows how a single concept, double consciousness, is portrayed in a
multitude of texts (see Table 1).
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Table 1

Text 1
Text 2
Text 3
Text 4

Black Double Consciousness Matrix
Black Perspective
White Perspective
Black Response
Pg, quote, paraphrase Pg, quote, paraphrase Pg, quote, paraphrase
Pg, quote, paraphrase Pg, quote, paraphrase Pg, quote, paraphrase
Pg, quote, paraphrase Pg, quote, paraphrase Pg, quote, paraphrase
Pg, quote, paraphrase Pg, quote, paraphrase Pg, quote, paraphrase

As with the single-case data, the Construct Tables have page numbers, quotes,
and paraphrases as the data within the matrices. There are texts in rows and codes in
columns. Although the data, and the writings about the data, refer to complicated and
nuanced uniqueness within each case, the simplicity of the coding allows the general
meanings and themes of double consciousness to emerge and recur through the wide
range of formats, and through the broad scope of the double-consciousness literature.
Also, these relationships between double consciousnesses allow for analysis of different
types of double consciousness in the data analysis section.

Typologies of Double Consciousness
By grouping the data from the matrices according to shared or related messages,
seven categories or models of double consciousness emerge. Each model groups
examples of double consciousness in a way that illuminates an aspect of double
consciousness. At first, some texts seemed linked by common dynamics, which then led
to the broader categories. Other typologies emerged as I considered forms of racism and
192

looked for forms of double consciousness that might correspond to those kinds of racism.
Seven double-consciousness typology categories emerged from my analysis. The
typologies are:
Conventional or Overarching Definition of Double Consciousness
This model begins with DuBois‘ original explanation of double consciousness. It
expands this concept with examples from Richard Wright and Gayle Pemberton that
reinforce and clarify the general meaning of double consciousness as the power dynamics
and personal struggles of African Americans being forced to view themselves through the
perspectives of others while maintaining their own self-definitions.
Blatant and Violent Double Consciousness
This typology refers to how black double consciousness in African American
literature can be evoked by an African American person when exposed to blatant
psychological and physical violence from white people. For example, in The Fire Next
Time, Baldwin (1963) urges his nephew to try to feel love toward the whites who impose
negative identities. White psychological violence against blacks is shown to require an
understanding and acceptance of whites as trapped in their violence. Seeing that through
double consciousness can help African Americans free both the whites and themselves
from that violence.
Accommodated-Tension Double Consciousness
This typology shows how black double consciousness is demonstrated by African
American characters in African American literature during social dynamics where blacks
consciously work to prevent whites from becoming aware of how whites can be seen as
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offensive from black perspectives. For example, Mabry (1995) feels awkward and
uncomfortable with his white friends at a predominantly white preparatory high school.
When he finds that there is not the overt hostility he expects, as Baldwin discusses,
Mabry is forced to negate his own uneasiness and the more-subtle tension he feels. By
accommodating instead of negotiating the more-nebulous tension, Mabry is forced into
double consciousness because he has to help whites prevent themselves from facing the
discomfort of noticing how they can be seen as offensive from black perspectives.
Cultural and Institutional Double Consciousness
So far, double-consciousness typologies have been situated within personal
dynamics. Another typology goes beyond individuals and extends into the broader realm
of culture and institutions. Ellison, first published in 1953, and later, Morrison (1992),
help show how racial positions and dynamics can be part of the broader culture that
reproduces itself when individuals are socialized to internalize and fit their positions. In
the United States, contradictions between democratic ideals and racial inequalities can
lead to double consciousness when cultural and institutional factors, like a ―Master
narrative‖ (Morrison, 1992) or a ―Master plan‖ (Ellison 1994) create, reproduce, and
situate African Americans in inferior social positions that are beyond the scope of
individual interactions. This typology involves African Americans being forced to view
themselves as a negated group and a self-defined group within the broader context of
American democracy and racism.
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Personal and Invisible (to Whites) Struggles with Double Consciousness
This type of double consciousness occurs in texts that highlight whites who have
no awareness of the struggles African Americans face in negotiating and dealing with
their double consciousness as oppressed people. This typology exists between the two
categories of ―Accommodated-Tension Double Consciousness‖ and ―Cultural and
Institutional Double Consciousness.‖ The texts that illustrate this double consciousness
suggest a relationship between how African Americans are forced to accommodate white
people who have no double consciousness, and the broader political and social systems
that impose black double consciousness. For example, with whiteness as the norm, many
African Americans are forced to embrace a foreign identity in school (Fordham, 1991).
When whites are not aware of their involvement with maintaining white normalcy, then
they cannot appreciate the struggles and objections to these conditions that African
Americans may wish and need to express (Cose, 1993). Double consciousness can be a
form of silencing. These texts illustrate that African Americans have to struggle with
double consciousness and with reconciling two vastly differently representations of
themselves as black Americans, while, and because, the problem itself is off the table,
and whites remain conveniently unaware of the phenomenon.
Black Resistance to Double Consciousness
This typology of double consciousness shows some of the ways that African
Americans conceptualize and confront their position of double consciousness. This
category emerges in texts that reveal how double consciousness is used as a response by
African Americans to whites‘ negative views of blackness. These texts show that it is not
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double consciousness itself that is the problem; the real problem is whites‘ failure to
appreciate—even as they contribute to—the struggles of African Americans with double
consciousness. For example, Gates (1992) explains how whites can oppose efforts to
define blackness positively because the whites oppose the concept of race. This white
―colorblindness,‖ however, reproduces and exacerbates double consciousness when
attention that could expose double consciousness is seen as racist. Instead, white race
consciousness can illuminate and oppose the trap of double consciousness.
Irony, Broadening, and Sharing of Double Consciousness
This typology shows how double consciousness can refer to a cognitive ability of
irony that is shared by a wide range of African Americans, as well as other people of
color. It also shows how whites who lack double consciousness can grow intellectually
and socially by learning from those who have developed sophisticated and sharp skills of
double consciousness. For example, Hughes (1969) explains that it is in the liminal
spaces of categories, identities, interactions, and negotiations that people can explore how
they see and are seen by and as others. Building a new space or entering a borderland can
open perspectives and identities to new understandings of old outlooks. In that way,
sharing of double consciousness, or multilateral double consciousness, is a step beyond
resistance to double consciousness because it can involve blacks and whites together in
consideration of how identities can or cannot be negotiated. In these ways, Hughes and
other writers show double consciousness as part of one‘s cognitive skills, including the
ability to shift mental mind-sets and the ability to entertain irony.
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Pattern Coding
Pattern coding (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 69) illuminates and organizes the
themes and meanings of double consciousness in the bodies of literature. After the tables
are completed with black perspectives, white perspectives, and black responses, and after
the data is organized into the seven typologies of double consciousness, pattern coding
shows three common themes across the seven typologies and the three perspectives.
These seven typologies and the three perspectives within them are composed of data that
show the common and recurring themes and patterns across the data. Three general
themes that emerge across these groups are:
1. Subjugated people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social
position.
2. Subjugated people are dehumanized, and they struggle with their position and
with the perspectives of the domineering population.
3. The struggle with domineering perspectives, the struggle with double
consciousness, is a survival tactic and form of resistance against dehumanization.
The data from the tables is pattern-coded into these three categories and serves as
evidence and examples of the three pattern-coded categories. Pattern coding, then, is part
of both data collection and data analysis. The data is analyzed through coding as it is
collected and synthesized into the categories that are being revealed.
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PART III
FINDINGS: THREE RECURRING PERSPECTIVES WITHIN SEVEN TYPOLOGIES
OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

The Findings section organizes and discusses the selected texts according to
typologies of double consciousness. These typologies are:
1. Conventional or Overarching Definition of Double Consciousness;
2. Blatant and Violent Double Consciousness;
3. Accommodated-Tension Double Consciousness;
4. Cultural and Institutional Double Consciousness;
5. Personal and Invisible (to Whites) Struggles with Double Consciousness;
6. Black Resistance to Double Consciousness;
7. Irony, Broadening, and Sharing of Double Consciousness.
The texts are grouped and discussed according to how they comprise and reflect
these seven types of double consciousness. The texts are shown to provide evidence and
explanation of the seven different types of double consciousness.
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Within the seven typologies, the texts are shown to provide evidence of a black
perspective, white perspective, and black response. A discussion of the texts is focused
on the three perspectives in order to show how they demonstrate double consciousness
within the texts.
Before exploring the texts in detail, a brief synopsis of the books is provided to
contextualize each text and the data within each text. This Findings section begins with
the first double-consciousness typology, conventional double consciousness.
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CHAPTER 16
FINDINGS SECTION ONE:
CONVENTIONAL OR OVERARCHING DEFINITION OF DOUBLE
CONSCIOUSNESS: GENERAL MEANINGS PROVIDED BY DUBOIS AND OTHER
WRITERS

This typology reflects DuBois‘ original concept of double consciousness. The
conventional meaning of double consciousness is presented as the subjugated positions
and perspectives of African Americans who are forced to view themselves through the
oppressive perspectives of the outside white community, while maintaining their own
self-definitions. This overarching meaning is elaborated with examples from Gayle
Pemberton (1992), Richard Wright (1940, 1944), and Chester Himes (1945), which
reinforce and clarify how the imposed and self-defined perspectives are projected and
experienced by the characters in the writings. Each writer reveals:
1. a black perspective;
2. a white perspective; and
3. a black response to the white perspective.
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Also like all seven typologies, each of the three perspectives combine to form a
general exploration of double consciousness and the dynamics between black and white
Americans. This combined exploration leads to the pattern codings that reveal the
common issues within and between all seven models. The three pattern codings are:
1. Subjugated people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social
position.
2. Subjugated people are dehumanized, and they struggle with their position and
with the perspectives of the domineering population.
3. The struggle with domineering perspectives, the struggle with double
consciousness, is a survival tactic and form of resistance against dehumanization.
These three common themes suggest that, in addition to double consciousness
being a burden of oppression, it can also enable subordinated people, such as African
Americans, to define, participate in, and respond to the broader social context with
dialogue and agency. In this first section, the general overview of Dubois‘s conventional
definition of double consciousness, African Americans‘ possession of double
consciousness can enable them to better understand the social context within which
African Americans exist in subordinated status. Although they may not call it double
consciousness, the literature shows that when African Americans see themselves through
the perspective of white others, and through their own perspectives, they employ a metaawareness and agency that can enable them to respond to, resist, and negotiate who they
are, as well as how and by whom they and their social situations are defined.
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W. E. B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk
First published in 1903, DuBois‘ The Souls of Black Folk explores a wide range
of positions and psychological, spiritual, and emotional struggles that African Americans
face within themselves and within American society. In addition to introducing the
concept of double consciousness, DuBois writes of the historical background of
emancipation; his ongoing debate with Booker T. Washington; relationships between
class and racial subjugation; and religion and other ways African Americans contend with
oppression in America.
Black Perspective
First, in a conventional definition of double consciousness, the black perspective
is shown in The Souls of Black Folk (1965) when DuBois discusses, ―The unasked
question,‖ and when he explains the meanings of twoness and double consciousness. The
following quote reflects DuBois‘ introductory comments in Souls of Black Folk (1965, p.
209). He comments that the book is an effort to show the ―spiritual‖ struggles of African
Americans that arose after emancipation. Although DuBois does not explain exactly what
he means by ―spiritual,‖ he calls on the reader to engage with his writing in order to
develop a shared or negotiated dialogue between blacks and whites in America. DuBois
is opening a dialogue here, not presenting a manifesto. He is trying to talk about
dynamics and positions that are not clear or even recognized.
He says,
Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by
some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly
framing it. All, nevertheless, flutter around it. They approach me in a half hesitant
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way . . . To the real question, How does it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a
word. (1965, p. 213) (Emphasis added)
How can the problems of race be discussed when, since at least1903, a tension
and aversion to the discussion itself has existed? DuBois is asking whites to recognize
that it is their very aversion to the issue that exacerbates the problem, which is then
projected onto blacks. White aversion becomes part of the dynamic that makes blacks
seem like the problem, when the problem is actually the aversion itself. DuBois is asking
for dialogue about this conundrum. Issues of delicacy, framing, fluttering around, and
hesitation are parts of the evasion DuBois is putting on the table.
Double consciousness is revealed by DuBois in his understanding of the way
questions are asked, not asked, and not answered. He observes how he is seen as black by
whites. Dialogue about the problem of projected identity cannot develop when there is no
interracial discussion of how blacks feel about being seen as the problem. Such absence
of dialogue is a part of white supremacy, because it maintains a superior position for
whites that includes their not having to talk about their superior position. However,
DuBois is aware of this element of white supremacy, and he is trying to raise it as a topic
of discussion. It is his own double consciousness that enables him to see his own
perspective and the position that is imposed upon him by whites.
Another example of a black perspective presented by DuBois in Souls of Black
Folk involves his earliest experience with the ―veil of twoness.‖ He writes,
Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the
others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their
world by a vast veil. (1965, 214) (Emphasis added)
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DuBois became aware of his perceived inferiority. He also became aware that he
was not different from the white others in his heart, life, and longing. This awareness of
sameness and difference is not only part of being shut out of the broader world in
political and economic ways, but it is also part of being shut out in terms of the very
dialogue about being shut out. Perhaps in response to his being asked by whites, ―How
does it feel to be a problem?‖, DuBois is asking, ―How does it feel to call me a
problem?‖ This may be the dialogue DuBois is trying to initiate.
DuBois is painfully aware of the contempt and pity that is part of his projected
identity, and he is quite articulate at explaining his position. However, it is the projected
identity itself that prevents the interracial dialogue about these conditions from taking
place. DuBois is making a very powerful point: He is aware that he is invisible to the
outside white population. He seems to be showing a part of himself—the fact that he‘s
aware of his invisibility (not his inferiority, but his perspective on his inferior position)—
to those who project and/or do not discuss that inferior position, thereby making him
invisible.
White Perspective
―White perspective‖ refers to African American writers‘ explanations of how
whites see them as inferior—as problems. DuBois shows how white perspectives of
blacks, and of themselves, can be very different from blacks‘ perspectives of blacks and
whites. DuBois writes,
[Whites] say, I know an excellent colored man in my town; or, I fought at
Mechanicsville; or, Do not these Southern outrages make your blood boil? (1965,
p. 213)
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Statements like these do not address the imposed identities and invisibility that
DuBois is sharing as his concerns and as topics of dialogue. Rather, they are white claims
to recognition of blacks that actually reinforce black invisibility. In a way, then, DuBois
is suggesting that these evasions could be topics of dialogue that can help expose how
whites can project positive, but self indulging, identities (of being antiracist and
interested in dialogue) onto themselves without any critical feedback from blacks.
DuBois is aware that he is expected to accept and accommodate these projections
even if they are obviously absurd to him. He does so superficially only. DuBois writes,
At these [comments or projections or positionings] I smile, or am interested or
reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. (1965, p. 213)
DuBois writes about how he has to keep his own perspective to himself in
different ways, as required by each individual situation. By writing about that
superficially accepted but truthfully denied accommodation, DuBois is rejecting the
accommodation and putting the dynamics on the table for negotiation. The fact that he is
doing this may not be noticed by whites, however, who are too busy making sure they
feel accommodated by DuBois and other blacks. If so, then the accommodation itself is a
projected identity onto both blacks and whites.
This ability of DuBois to write about white perspectives of blacks is itself an
indication of double consciousness that many whites do not share. (After all, how many
white people are familiar with how they are seen as whites, and how their whiteness is
seen, by people of color? And how many feel that this is an important concern? Although
there are many books about White Studies, how many of them are about whiteness from
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white perspectives? How many are dialogues with African Americans about how
whiteness is constructed and defined through various forms of black invisibility?)
DuBois and the following black writers go beyond merely writing about white
perspectives of blacks and whites. They also write the responses of blacks to these often
negative and racist and evasive white perspectives. The third category discussed in this
thesis is that of black responses to whites.
Black Response to White Negation and Projected Identities
This third coding is what reveals double consciousness by showing not just black
perspectives, as in the first coding, but by showing black responses to specific white
perspectives that the authors reveal in their writings. DuBois explains that African
Americans are forced to view themselves from the negative perspectives of the outside
society. According to DuBois, having two antagonistic identities means that a lot of time
and energy has to be spent negotiating and enduring the conflicts experienced within
twoness—the sense of irreconcilability between who DuBois is as a person and how he
struggles to live in the outside world that normalizes its misrepresentation of DuBois.
Even worse, the internal conflict is exacerbated because the external misrepresentation is
projected inside DuBois, behind the veil, as who he is. Having one‘s own sense of self
juxtaposed against the imposed contempt and pity for an ascribed self—having
twoness—is what DuBois calls double consciousness. The true self-consciousness
prevented by this condition may be a merging of two positive identities (black and
American) without the harmful ascription, contempt, and pity from the outside world.
DuBois says,
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The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife,- this longing to
attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer
self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not
Africanize America . . . He would not bleach his Negro soul . . . He simply wishes
to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being
cursed and spit upon by his fellow, without having the doors of Opportunity
closed roughly in his face.
This, then, is the end of his striving; to be a co-worker in the kingdom of
culture . . . (1965, p. 215)
Instead of antagonism between one‘s own sense of self and imposed contempt,
DuBois is suggesting a merging of positive meanings of blackness and one‘s individual
identity. He wrote extensively and in detail about the positive meanings of blackness in
terms of Africa‘s early civilizations and their contributions as leaders to world history
(see The World and Africa). It is these contributions, and these meanings of African
heritage, that have been supplanted by the negative contempt with which blackness has
become associated. Instead of a merging of being both black and American, each in a
positive way, twoness and double consciousness remain.
DuBois‘ main response involves his ―contradictions of double aims‖ and his
efforts ―to merge his double self‖ (DuBois, 1965, p. 215). The contradiction is that
DuBois has to confront the obstacles imposed by his inferior position in relation to whites
while also struggling to improve and advance his own situation and live as he wishes to
live, regardless of the hassles, harassment, and dangers from outside. Merging his double
self, however, is challenged by his contradiction of double aims. The outside world keeps
DuBois divided, making him struggle to deliberately ―reduce the boiling to a simmer‖
(DuBois, 1965, p. 213).
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This is the harm of unilateral double consciousness: African Americans are forced
to face and manage a division of self that is imposed by white society. DuBois has no
recourse. As superordinates, whites do not need the meta-awareness to understand how
blacks and other subordinates see their own invisibility to whites. Without their own
double consciousness, whites cannot consider and discuss how they are seen as whites,
and what that means to subordinated people, from their perspective. DuBois is not heard
when he objects to being seen as a problem by people who will treat him that way, but
then neither acknowledge nor discuss their treatment. And his having to try to live with
and sort all this out takes a lot of time and energy he might prefer to spend otherwise.
The three codings of black perspective, white perspective, and black response to
white perspectives recur through numerous black writings across a wide historical range.
For example, Gayle Pemberton‘s essay, ―The Zen of Bigger Thomas,‖ from her book,
The Hottest Water in Chicago (1992), faces the same struggle as DuBois when
confronted by a white American who forces her to contend with an imposed identity that
is not negotiable. However, Pemberton is writing ninety years after DuBois wrote Souls
of Black Folk. Pemberton by no means remains silent as DuBois had done, when he could
only smile and stay silent as he listened to white pronouncements of their having black
friends as a claim to recognition of blacks—a claim that actually reinforces black
invisibility. Instead of only smiling and trying to reduce her anger, Pemberton puts the
problem back onto the shoulders of the white person, only to find that the white person is
not prepared, not able, to talk this way.
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Gayle Pemberton, The Hottest Water in Chicago
Gayle Pemberton‘s (1992) The Hottest Water in Chicago is a collection of essays,
autobiographical narratives, and social criticisms that give readers a sense of Pemberton‘s
own experiences and perspectives as an African American intellectual of the later
twentieth century. In ―The Zen of Bigger Thomas,‖ Pemberton explains and connects (1)
her own experiences with violence within the black community; (2) black invisibility to
whites, as shown in Richard Wright‘s (1987) Native Son (originally published in 1940)
and Ralph Ellison‘s (1989) Invisible Man (originally published in 1947); and (3) her own
experiences with being invisible to well-meaning whites who reinforce her invisibility
even as they try to understand Pemberton.
Pemberton‘s connections are about the images projected onto and held by African
Americans and how they can or cannot oppose those images. The questions she raises are
about how imposed identities can seem to be self-definitions, and how they can be
difficult to cast off. For example, Pemberton explains that just before Bigger is executed
for accidentally suffocating Mary, he realizes that his identity and role had been defined
without his own negotiation and conscious choice. In contrast, Pemberton shows that
Invisible Man is aware of and critical of the kind of trap that has caught Bigger, but
Invisible Man still has to struggle, even though he has a better sense of who he is and
who he is not.
At the end of this essay, Pemberton shows her own relationship with the imposed
identities and positions that make African Americans invisible to whites. She writes of an
exchange she had with a white woman at a conference about racism. She shows her own
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perspective, the first coding, by saying, ―A woman was coming toward me, a clipper ship
in full sail with me as port . . .‖ (1992, p. 174). This metaphor suggests a haste and
determination on the part of the white woman and a predetermined role and service from
Pemberton that is happening quickly and without recourse for Pemberton. She has been
targeted as the clipper ship‘s immobile destination and the ship is approaching in full sail.
The second coding, the white perspective, is shown when Pemberton says, ―She
held out her hand to shake mine . . . and demanded, ‗Tell me about your pain‘ ‖ (1992, p.
174). On the surface, and to the white woman, this demand could be seen as her opening,
demonstrating her caring and willingness to share and perhaps empathize with
Pemberton. Perhaps the white woman thinks that there has been too much silence and too
much fear of really sharing experiences and feelings, so she has just decided to break the
ice, even if it is in an abrupt way. However, the white woman is asking a very personal
question of Pemberton. So, for all of her good intentions, the white woman is arrogant
and condescending toward Pemberton, whose pain is not, without Pemberton‘s consent,
available for public display and discussion, even if the white woman‘s intentions seem
worthy to her.
In response, Pemberton writes,
Then I told her, ―Since the surgery, thank you, my left knee is working much
better . . .‖ She backed off, wearing a most peculiar expression on her face. (1992,
p. 174)
This response is a clear, utter, and absolute rejection of the positions and
dynamics that attempt to put Pemberton in a position to accommodate the ―good‖
intentions of the white woman, which actually reinforce Pemberton‘s utility to the white
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woman. The issue becomes the fact that Pemberton‘s pain is none of the white woman‘s
business, and how dare she disrespect such limitations? By commenting on her knee,
Pemberton changes the meaning of pain, and, specifically, her pain and who she is.
Pemberton defines herself (or at least who she is not) and her interaction by exposing, not
accommodating, the ―good‖ intentions and disrespectful impositions of the white woman.
Pemberton‘s clipper-ship woman may be similar to the white people who ask
DuBois how it feels to be a problem. In both cases, the white people in the books
maintain a distance from the black people they are questioning, even as they ask intimate
questions about the ways black people are mistreated and disrespected by whites. The
whites assume a familiarity with the blacks that is projected as a generous reaching out,
even though it is actually demanding and disrespectful. The questions themselves are
about how the black people are disrespected by whites, but the questions themselves are
examples of the disrespect, the forced intimacy and patronizingly superodinate and
distant position they ask about.
When DuBois is put in this position, as he explains in Souls of Black Folk, he says
nothing. About ninety years later, Pemberton shows that the positions of white supremacy
and white expectations of black accommodation have not changed, but that black
responses can be different. She too says nothing to answer the white person‘s impertinent
question about Pemberton‘s pain as a subjugated black woman, but Pemberton challenges
the white woman‘s perception of her as someone who is just waiting to serve the
privileges of the white woman by answering her questions and by revealing whatever the
white woman wants to know. And by presenting the white woman as a clipper ship in full
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sail, Pemberton indicates that the white woman is demonstrating not a confidence, but an
arrogance of good intentions. The white woman feels that she is exonerated from any
critical reflection because she has the power of good intentions, as understood from her
own perspective, which she imposes on Pemberton without being open for negotiation.
Pemberton‘s double consciousness is not just an awareness of her subjugation to
projected identity, but also an exposure of and resistance to projected identity. Pemberton
recognizes her subjection to the white woman‘s projected misrepresentations, and she
plays with that projection by intentionally misinterpreting the question as a morerespectful question about physical pain, rather than the pain caused by suffering within
the bounds of white supremacy. Pemberton is redirecting the white woman to moreappropriate behavior as she pretends to misunderstand the question.
The message is that Pemberton recognizes the white woman‘s voyeurism; even
though both women might already understand that the white woman‘s question is
attempted voyeurism, the surprise—the rejection of the role—is that Pemberton is calling
attention to the white supremacist roles and interactions that the white woman expects
Pemberton to accommodate. Like DuBois, Pemberton surely has better things to do rather
than deal with people like the Clipper Ship woman.

Richard Wright, Native Son
In Native Son, Bigger Thomas lives with his mother and his younger brother and
sister in Chicago, around 1940. They are struggling economically, so Bigger agrees to
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take a job as a chauffeur for a wealthy white family as a way to receive government aid.
Bigger is uneasy with white people, so his anxiety about the job is high.
On his first day of work, he meets Mr. and Mrs. Dalton, and has a chance to talk
with Peggy, the African American woman who cooks for the Daltons, when she brings
Bigger to his room. At first, Bigger feels like the people and the job might not be too bad;
then he meets Mary, the teenage daughter, who makes him extremely uncomfortable.
Bigger feels like she is teasing and playing with him in friendly but mocking ways that he
does not understand, and to which he cannot respond. Bigger feels that this girl could,
and very well might, get him fired, which would mean his family would lose their aid.
Bigger is told to drive Mary to the library. In the car, however, Mary tells Bigger
to take her to see her boyfriend, Jan. When they arrive, Jan is coming out of a meeting of
his Socialist group. Jan treats Bigger with the same kind of playful mocking, which, like
Mary‘s behavior, seems simultaneously friendly and ridiculing. Jan holds out his hand to
shake hands with Bigger (Wright, 1987), saying, ―First of all . . . Don‘t say sir to me. I‘ll
call you Bigger and you‘ll call me Jan. That‘s the way it‘ll be between us. How‘s that?‖
(Wright, 1987, p. 67).
Bigger‘s own perspective, the first coding, is revealed when ―Bigger‘s right hand
gripped the steering wheel and he wondered if he ought to shake hands with this white
man‖ (Wright, 1987, p. 66). Bigger eventually lets Jan shake his hand, reluctantly, but
there is complete misunderstanding of each other‘s feelings and intentions. Bigger just
wants to be left alone to do his job.
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The second coding, the white perspective, is shown when Jan and Mary impose
their own dynamics on Bigger without any negotiation of equal dialogue. Jan and Mary‘s
forced and excessive friendliness is an assumption of familiarity that makes Jan and Mary
feel closer to Bigger, while Bigger feels that they are not noticing or respecting any of his
signs of his feelings (or even acknowledging that he might have any feelings of his own).
It is as if Jan and Mary are excited for Bigger because now he has some white people
who want to be his friends—not because they know and like him as a person, but because
he is black.
Perhaps that is why Bigger wonders,
Did not white people despise a black skin? Then why was Jan doing this? Why
was Mary standing there so eagerly, with shining eyes? What could they get out
of this? Maybe they did not despise him? But they made him feel his black skin
by just standing there looking at him, one holding his hand and the other smiling.
He felt he had no physical existence at all right then; he was something he hated,
the badge of shame which he knew was attached to a black skin. It was a shadowy
region, a No Man‘s Land, the ground that separated the white world from the
black that he stood upon. (1987, pp. 67–68)
This powerful but unresolved consternation is Bigger‘s double consciousness, the
third coding of black response. He is forced to see himself not only through the
perspectives of others, but also through perspectives that he does not even understand.
Having familiarity assumed and forced upon him, without any recourse, denies Bigger‘s
choice over how he participates in the interaction and in the social setting. And why does
this happen? It happens because Bigger is black, so that is all Bigger can feel, because
that is all he is to the others.
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Richard Wright, Black Boy
Wright‘s Black Boy was originally published in 1944. It is a novel based largely
on Wright‘s own experiences as a poor and hungry African American young man from a
religious family in the American Jim Crow South. Wright does not feel drawn to religion,
but he loves to write. He gets published in a local black newspaper when he is a young
man. He also works many jobs during his teenage years, trying to cope with the demands
and abuses of his white employers so he can help support his family. Wright eventually
moves to Chicago with his aunt and takes a job in a restaurant, where he becomes
acquainted with some of the white waitresses. His mother and the rest of the family plan
to join them soon.
The first coding, the black perspective, is shown when, one day at the restaurant,
one of the waitresses arrives late and rushes to start working. She asks Wright to tie her
apron. He hesitates briefly, but then pulls back the apron ties, and fastens the apron
around her waist. The waitress takes Wright‘s hand and thanks him, and they both get to
work. It feels personal and comfortable, but Wright reflects on the complications and
implications that such contact would have had in the South (Wright, 1993, p. 319), where
black men were lynched just for looking at or speaking to a white woman.
Wright does not develop strong or deep relationships with the waitresses. He says,
showing the first coding of the black perspective,
I did not feel any admiration for the girls, nor any hate. My attitude was one of
abiding and friendly wonder. For the most part I was silent with them, though I
knew I had a firmer grasp on life than most of them. (Wright, 1993, p. 319)
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Wright does not take them too seriously, and he is not threatened by the girls.
They seem to leave each other alone for the most part, even though they can be close in
superficial ways. Wright does have a general sense of the waitresses, however. His
explanation of their outlook is the second coding, the white perspective:
During my lunch hour, which I spent on a bench in the near-by park, the
waitresses would come and sit beside me, talking at random, laughing, joking,
smoking cigarettes. I learned about their tawdry dreams, their simple hopes, their
home lives, their fear of feeling anything deeply, their sex problems, their
husbands. They were an eager, restless, talkative, ignorant bunch. They knew
nothing of hate and fear, and strove instinctively to avoid all passion. (Wright,
1993, p. 319)
The girls expose themselves to Wright in more depth and detail than mere
acquaintances ordinarily do. Their perspective seems to be that they can sit with Wright
and talk openly with each other in front of him, even though Wright is not really part of
their group, or their conversation. The waitresses feel a comfort and familiarity that
allows them to be open in front of him because there is a distance, an abyss, between
them that prevents any meaningful closeness.
In response to this dynamic, Wright‘s double consciousness, the third coding of
black response, is revealed when he says,
For these poor, ignorant white girls to have understood my life would have meant
nothing short of a vast revolution in their lives. (1993, p. 320)
To see themselves as Wright sees them would have brought radical changes to the
lives and perspectives of the girls. Wright is aware of how he is seen by the waitresses, to
the point of being able to show his position from their perspective, but apparently, they
have no interest at all in how they are seen from his perspective. Wright also has a sense
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of what seeing themselves from his perspective would do to the girls‘ senses of
themselves, and to their sense of Wright. Wright does not explain what this vast
revolution would be like, but his point is that it would change the girls profoundly, and
introduce them to the dynamics between them. They would understand that they are
privileged to be able to ignore what Wright has to cope with on his own, as if the
problems are his alone. That may be why Wright writes,
And I was convinced that what they needed to make them complete and grown-up
in their living was the inclusion in their personalities of a knowledge of lives such
as I lived and suffered containedly. (1993, p. 320)

Chester Himes, If He Hollers Let Him Go
In Chester Himes‘s (1986) If He Hollers Let Him Go, first published in 1945, Bob
Jones is a crew foreman at a shipbuilding facility in Southern California during World
War II. Racial tensions are high as Bob‘s family pressures him to assimilate while his
coworkers resist and harass Bob as he tries to do his job and work as an equal.
For example, Marge, a white woman who works at the shipyard, uses the mutual
attraction between her and Bob to flirt with him. However, Marge soon puts Bob in
extreme danger by accusing him of attempting to rape her. She almost gets Bob killed by
the white men at the shipyard. Bob attempts to confront this problem head-on. During a
lunch break, Bob sees Marge sitting alone, eating her lunch. Himes writes (first coding,
black perspective),
[I] started toward her, my heart pumping like a rivet gun and my legs wobbly
weak . . . ‗Just who do you think you are?‘ My voice came out of the top of my
mouth, light and weightless and stilted. (Himes, 1986, p. 129)
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Bob is both assertive and anxious about confronting Marge as he demands an
explanation, while his heart races and his legs wobble. His own perspective includes
outrage at being put in profound danger, and his understanding that the danger, regardless
of his outrage, is very real and humiliating.
Marge is not bothered by so many dangerous conflicts and feelings. Bob‘s anger
and anxiety is fun for Marge. She is sadistically playing with him. The second coding,
white perspective, is shown when Himes writes of Marge,
After all the crazy, wild-eyed, frightened acts she had put on, the white armour
plate she‘d wrapped herself up in, the insurmountable barriers she‘d raised
between us, here she was breaking it down, wiping it out with a smile; treating me
as casually as an old acquaintance. (1986, p. 130)
Marge mocks Bob. She mocks his being in the position that she has put him in.
She mocks him by reducing a very serious danger to friendly banter that she can control
and manipulate at her whim. Marge‘s perspective is that at any time, she can become
Bob‘s helpless victim; or his friendly, bantering partner; or the death of him, depending
on her mood and on how she can most effectively harass him. And she knows exactly
what she is doing. She knows that Bob has no agency, because the outside community—
the white men of the shipyard and the white society beyond the shipyard—will support
her position and perspective and act accordingly toward Bob.
Although Bob tries to confront the games and power of his white female
antagonist, he ends up receiving more of the same abuse that he is trying to oppose.
Marge won‘t (because she doesn‘t have to) accept the terms of confrontation asserted by
Bob. Instead, she makes light of Bob‘s assertions; ultimately, he knows that he cannot
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negotiate these terms of interaction. He is trapped in her terms, in her role for him. This is
Bob‘s double consciousness (the third coding, black response), because he sees himself
and his position from Marge‘s perspective. That may be why Himes writes,
It was too much, just simply too much, for one person to be able to do. I must
have looked very funny at the moment, for she burst out laughing. (1986, p.131)
Himes, if not Bob, is showing how Marge uses her position as a white woman to
link her personal relationship with Bob to her access to white power outside their
relationship. She can treat Bob as a person, a sexual interest, or a racially subjugated
object, however and whenever each choice suits her. Seeing how Bob is trapped in
Marge‘s game is double consciousness. Bob is aware of his plight within the novel, but
Himes uses his own double consciousness to expose the whole dynamic within which
Bob and Marge interact.

Pattern Codings
The pattern codings are:
1) Subjugated people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social
position.
2) Subjugated people are dehumanized, and they struggle with their position and
with the perspectives of the domineering population.
3) The struggle with domineering perspectives, the struggle with double
consciousness, is a survival tactic and form of resistance against dehumanization.
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First, DuBois, Pemberton, Bigger, Wright, and Bob know they are in
disadvantaged positions. They have to contend with white perspectives, even as whites
are quite free to dismiss, ignore, and play with black perspectives. Pemberton is clever
enough to deflect the white person, but she has to contend with the imposition anyway.
Second, this subjugation is dehumanizing. It almost gets Bob killed. It torments
Bigger. It casts DuBois into silence. Even Pemberton, who knows how to protect herself,
is forced to remain on guard and vigilant in order to defend herself.
Third, this double consciousness is a survival tactic that helps black people, to
varying degrees, to live with white people in domineering positions. Bigger has very little
ability to use his double consciousness as protection, but Pemberton has the benefit of
being older than Bigger, of having read Wright‘s books, and of living later than Wright‘s
characters. She has developed double consciousness into an effective tool of retaliation.
Bob, however, is trapped between Bigger and Pemberton. He has Pemberton‘s
awareness, but he is like Bigger in that he does not know how to respond effectively.
There is also a spectrum for the behavior of white people. At one extreme, Mary
and Jan are simple youths who, like the waitresses Wright discusses, know nothing but
the conveniences of racial privilege. At the other extreme, Marge plays with her privilege
deliberately, combining her domineering status with her sadistic cruelty. These
parameters raise the question of where other whites appear on the spectrum. How many
whites try to prevent themselves, deliberately or thoughtlessly, from developing double
consciousness? Do they want to stay domineering through naiveté or sadism, or are they
simply the victims of privilege because they lack the ability or willingness to apprehend
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their own double-consciousness deficit? An even more disturbing question is whether
Madge does have her own double consciousness as a weapon to contradict Bob‘s human
equality and social inferiority. If so, that bilk really has to be exposed.
This general overview of double consciousness has shown that DuBois introduces
the problems of black racial subjugation, and shows how blacks are forced to see
themselves through the perspectives of others while maintaining their own selfdefinitions. Pemberton (1992), Wright (1987, 1993), and Himes (1986) show implicit
examples that substantiate the overall problems DuBois introduces.
In the next section, Blatant and Violent Double Consciousness, other African
American writers show specifically how implicit examples of psychological and physical
violence against African Americans can evoke, reveal, and involve black double
consciousness.
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CHAPTER 17
FINDINGS SECTION TWO:
BLATANT AND VIOLENT DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

This model shows how black double consciousness can involve exposure to
blatant psychological and physical violence from white people. The violence here is both
physical and psychological because in either case, the violence directly harms African
Americans. These sources combine when violence, whether or not it is considered violent
by the perpetrator, is committed against African Americans. What may appear to be
nonviolent to those without double consciousness may be seen as blatantly violent to
those with double consciousness. This section includes Michele Wallace (1990),
Gwendolyn Brooks (1960), Amiri Baraka (1964), and James Baldwin (1964). After the
three codings (black perspective, white perspective, and black response) are shown, the
data is pattern-coded to show the common themes and issues.
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Michelle Wallace, Invisibility Blues
Invisibility Blues by Michelle Wallace (1990) is a collection of essays that
explores Wallace‘s perspective as an African American woman who is insightfully
critical of American racial dynamics and positions. Wallace combines her own insights
with cultural theory to show how African American perspectives can be missed or
negated by whites. For example, Wallace describes how white people volunteer at prisons
to try to help the inmates by teaching them arts and crafts. Wallace says (first coding,
black perspective), ―A woman inmate would start to tell a story that was truly horrible.
The do-gooder would stop to listen: she would be paralyzed by guilt‖ (1990, p. 48).
This situation involves a black woman explaining a story that upsets and
overwhelms a white woman who has taken a position as a helper or listener. The term dogooder suggests a condescending attitude that African Americans see as more selfserving to the white people than helpful to African Americans. This black perspective
suggests that blacks can see whites as imposing themselves into the struggles of blacks as
a way of using, or exploiting, the blacks to make the whites feel better about themselves.
For the second coding, the white perspective, Wallace says,
The do-gooder goes home feeling empty, disgusted with herself, realizing that she
has done nothing to improve the lives of women in prison . . . She decides that
what she has to bring is revolution, not art, to the prisons . . . (Wallace 1990, p.
48)
Wallace is showing a turning point at which whites could begin to think about
how they appear as do-gooders—as well-intentioned but patronizing people—to the
prisoners. However, rather than learning double consciousness, Wallace is saying that
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whites prefer to maintain their domineering position instead of seeing themselves as
others see them. Instead of dialogue, which could make them allies, they seek some
different, unspecified, form of revolution that they could impose in order to assuage their
guilt, while also maintaining their superior position as helpers.
Wallace‘s perspective shows that she not only has black double consciousness,
but she also has the white‘s double consciousness, the double consciousness of the other,
that the others cannot develop for themselves. In other words, Wallace has the ability to
see how whites would see themselves both from their own perspective and from
Wallace‘s perspective. Wallace also has her own double consciousness of how she,
herself, is seen by others. Wallace has two double consciousnesses. The do-gooders have
none. This is why Wallace can say (third coding, black response),
Another Sunday had passed, the women inmates had not learned anything about
art, anything about staying out of prison, had only learned that people are as full
of shit as ever. (1990, p.48)
These whites are not laughing at the prisoners as Marge, as discussed in Section
1.E, laughs at Bob. They are not trying to be sadistic for the sake of sadism. Rather, their
frustration may come from their efforts to be helpful and yet patronizing at the same time.
They may want to maintain their superior position so they can help subjugated people
learn to deal with their subjugation. This is the violence of their good intentions—the fact
that they are do-gooders. Whites can be violent by being patronizing, even if it‘s through
their good intentions. Wallace‘s ability to reveal whites in ways that whites do not
understand or wish to notice comes from her own double consciousness.
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If so, this helps explain DuBois‘ point about the contradiction of double aims.
Blacks are forced to try to merge their struggles against racial oppression with their
aspirations as Americans, endeavoring to succeed in American society. Are the dogooders helping to resolve this contradiction, or are they merely reinforcing the
contradiction so they can feel like they are helping, even though they‘re really only
helping themselves to stay on top of those they claim to want to free? Don‘t the whites
also have their own contradiction of double aims? With their own double consciousness
to see themselves as whites from perspectives of people of color, whites might find that
they could be more equal by trying to help by listening/learning more.

Gwendolyn Brooks, The Lovers of the Poor
In 1930, when she was thirteen, Gwendolyn Brooks published her first poem.
Brooks continued to publish poetry and at least one novel through the 1990s. Her friends
and influences included James Weldon Johnson, Langston Hughes, and Amiri Baraka.
Brooks describes her writing as focusing on life around her in her African American
community of Chicago.lxii
Like Wallace, but writing thirty years earlier in 1960, Brooks shows the
transparency of the white double-consciousness deficit. Also like Wallace, Brooks shows
that the white deficit is transparent to African Americans. In this way, white Americans
are shown to be visible to black Americans. Concurrently, white Americans do not
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Gates, McKay (eds.), (1997). The Norton Anthology of African American Literature, pp. 1577–1578.
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realize that they are recognized by black people, who are invisible to them. This message
is provided by Brooks (1997) in her poem, ―The Lovers of the Poor,‖ first published in
1960 in her collection, The Bean Eaters. She says (first coding, black perspective),
The Ladies from the Ladies Betterment League
Arrive . . .
Of proud, seamed faces with mercy and murder hinting
Here, there, interrupting, all deep and debonair,
The pink paint on the innocence of fear;
Walk in a gingerly manner up the hall. (Brooks, 1997, p. 1589)
These white people are visiting housing projects to give charity to the poor.
Brooks‘ reference to mercy and murder suggests that these are do-gooders who are
struggling, perhaps unknowingly, with the same double aims of help and domination, or
condescension and psychological violence, that Wallace describes. Brooks shows the
whites treating African Americans with murder and mercy covertly, and with a violent
innocence. Brooks elaborates on this duality when she shows the white perspective (the
second coding):
Their guild is giving money to the poor.
The worthy poor. The very very worthy
And beautiful poor. Perhaps just not too swarthy?
Perhaps just not too dirty nor too dim
Nor—passionate.
In Truth, what they could wish
Is—something less than derelict or dull. (Brooks, 1997, p. 1589)
The ladies of the guild give charity in the form of money, but they are also
sharing their feelings of disgust for and with those they want to help. This white
perspective of ―charity with disgust‖ is the psychological violence of murder and mercy
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that the ladies commit. They might not even notice their white perspective, or how clearly
they are expressing their contempt, but the feelings are very clear to Brooks.
Although there is no part of ―The Lovers of the Poor‖ in which Brooks responds
explicitly to the white perspective with her own perspective (her own double
consciousness), the way she writes about the white perspective is signifyin(g). (See
discussion of David Krasner‘s (1995) ―Parody and Double Consciousness in the
Language of Early Black Musical Theatre,‖ in the Literature Review section of this
thesis.) By drawing attention to the charity and contempt, the murder and mercy of the
ladies, Brooks parodies the ways African Americans are seen by whites in relation to how
African Americans see themselves. That parodying is, in and of itself, double
consciousness, because it includes both imposed and self-defined identities.

Amiri Baraka, Dutchman
Amiri Baraka‘s (1964) Dutchman is a play about Clay, a black man, and Lula, a
white woman, who meet on the subway in the mid-1960s. In this play, Baraka shows the
deadly physical violence that can result when African Americans confront contradictions
of whites as shown, for example, by Wallace (1990) and Brooks (1997). In Dutchman,
however, instead of the white duality involving charity and aversion, Baraka explores a
contradiction of white duality involving sexual attraction and aversion.
Clay, a twenty-year-old black man, is reading a magazine on the subway. Lula, a
thirty-year-old white woman, is waiting on the platform for the train. The first coding, the
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black perspective, is shown when Baraka introduces the setting of the play. Baraka
writes,
The train slows after a time, pulling to a brief stop at one of the stations. The man
looks idly up, until he sees a woman‘s face staring at him through the window;
when it realizes that the man has noticed the face, it begins very premeditatedly to
smile. The man smiles too, for a moment, without a trace of self-consciousness.
(1997, pp. 1885–1886)
Baraka shows that Clay is not looking for anyone through the window, or trying
to look at anyone, but Lula is staring at him; then, she smiles at Clay. In these two ways,
Lula initiates interaction with Clay. Lula enters the train, stands next to Clay‘s seat, says
hi, and then asks if she can sit down next to Clay. He agrees, and they start talking
(Baraka, 1997, p. 1886).
The conversation is highly flirtatious and includes bantering about who was
staring at whom through the window of the train at the station. Lula quickly turns the
conversation toward herself, telling Clay what she believes she knows about him simply
by looking at him. This is part of the second coding, the white perspective. Clay is very
curious about how Lula can seem to know so much about him—where he is from, his
friends, and even a party that Clay is going to attend. He thinks they must have met
before.
Then, also as if it had all been done before, Lula leads the conversation to
imagining how they would go to the party together, hang out with the people there, and
then go back to Lula‘s apartment together. From this white perspective, Lula seems to
know Clay, as if the two strangers are reminiscing about each other and their experiences
together.
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Then the white perspective, Lula‘s direction of the conversation, changes from the
tension of flirtation to the hostility of racial animosity. The hostility is anonymous, as it
focuses on Lula‘s abstract sense of Clay, while also seeming familiar, since Lula seems to
know Clay; after all, they just shared the putative reminiscing about each other and their
imagined intimacy. Lula‘s white perspective indicates that she knows everything about
Clay even though she has never met him before.
The change from flirtation to animosity includes Lula‘s overtly sexual singing and
dancing in the aisle, especially when she tries (unsuccessfully) to get Clay to join her.
Lula insults Clay, condemning his assimilation as ―crossing a line‖—entering into
mainstream society—something he is neither entitled to nor welcome to do, from Lula‘s
white perspective. She says,
Be cool. Be cool. That‘s all you know . . . jackets buttoning up to your chin, so
full of white man‘s words . . . Clay. Clay, you got to break out. Don‘t sit there
dying the way they want you to die. (Baraka, 1997, p. 1586)
Finally, when a drunken man starts dancing with Lula, Clay shoves the man away
and pushes Lula into her seat as she screams in resistance. Lula again calls Clay an Uncle
Tom, and Clay slaps her twice across her mouth. Within this violence, Baraka shifts the
focus of the play from Lula‘s white perspective to Clay‘s response, the third coding. Clay
says what he really thinks of the way Lula has treated him, and how he feels about his
own position in relation to that treatment. He says,
You don‘t know anything except what‘s there for you to see. An act. Lies. Device.
Not the pure heart, the pumping black heart. You don‘t ever know that. And I sit
here, in this buttoned-up suit, to keep myself from cutting all your throats.
(Baraka, 1997, p. 1887)
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The assimilation for which Lula condemns Clay is not a trap, or not only a trap,
from which he wants to break out. Clay uses his assimilation as an act and device through
which to fit into a hostile white world, and with which he can keep his heart pure, in
whatever way that might be to Clay. That buttoning-up of his suit while keeping his heart
pure is the double consciousness of seeing oneself from the perspective of others while
maintaining one‘s own identity.
That outside white world, however, includes Lula‘s hostility toward Clay‘s
finding a way to deal with, and protect himself from, the hostility that he can encounter at
any subway stop. Lula seems unconcerned with whether or not Clay assimilates; rather,
she seems concerned only with helping to ensure that black people never find or keep any
peace. It is the purity of black people‘s hearts, or their human struggles to maintain some
purity, that Lula wants to corrupt. Perhaps that is why, when she learns of Clay‘s ability
to live with his accommodation and purity of heart in some manageable way, she stabs
him in the chest and kills him.

James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time
Baldwin‘s (1962) The Fire Next Time is composed of two letters, the first of
which is discussed in this thesis. These letters are personal narratives about Baldwin‘s
experiences and assessments of racial dynamics in the United States in the early 1960s. In
the first letter, ―My Dungeon Shook,‖ Baldwin writes to his nephew, James. In contrast to
the deliberate sadism shown in Baraka‘s (1997) Dutchman, Baldwin explores a moresubtle, but no less deadly, kind of violence.
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In this letter, Baldwin begins by explaining how his father, the grandfather of his
nephew,
[w]as defeated before he died because, at the bottom of his heart, he really
believed what white people said about him . . . You can only be destroyed by
believing that you really are what the white world calls a nigger. [italics in
original text] (1962, p. 18)
Although Baldwin is already implicitly talking about double consciousness (the
struggles between imposed and self-defined identities), he adds a new aspect of white
innocence to the problem of black double consciousness. Baldwin says (first and second
codings: black and white perspectives),
I know what the world has done to my brother and how narrowly he survived it.
And I know . . . that they have destroyed and are destroying hundreds of
thousands of lives and do not want to know it . . . It is the innocence that
constitutes the crime. (1962, pp.19–20)
Baldwin brings both black and white perspectives together by indicating that there
is a relationship between black survival (through positive self-definition) and white
violence (through the projection of negative identities). To this combination, Baldwin
adds his observation of a putative innocence with which white Americans can maintain
the destruction of African Americans—what was experienced by Baldwin‘s father and
narrowly escaped by his brother.
It is the innocence of whites that makes them dangerous. Whites may be innocent
because, except for the overt sadists, they mean (or intend to mean) to do good, but they
are unaware of how much harm they can do from their domineering position. Violence is
not always deliberate, and it‘s not always seen as deliberate by the perpetrator. In
Baldwin‘s letter to his nephew, this form of violence is not specific, but it is the violence
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of imposed perspectives that, as with Baldwin‘s father, can undermine one‘s sense of self
and lead one to possess an identity of inferiority.
This ―innocent violence‖ is the issue Baldwin asks whites to notice, but he is
more focused on helping his nephew deal with the unlikelihood that whites will be
willing to notice this innocent violence. Baldwin implicitly uses his double consciousness
to try to accept the limitations of these whites. Baldwin says (third coding: black
response),
There is no reason for you to try to become like white people and there is no basis
whatever for their impertinent assumption that they must accept you. The really
terrible thing, old buddy, is that you must accept them. And I mean that very
seriously. You must accept them and accept them with love. For these innocent
people have no other hope. (1963, p. 22)
Within his view of himself from the perspectives of whites, Baldwin realizes that
he is kept invisible to whites by their sense of their own innocence. When invisibility is
invisible, the innocence that keeps it that way is a weapon in and of itself. And Baldwin
knows of this innocence even if whites prevent themselves from becoming aware of it. In
this way, Baldwin is seeing himself as whites see him. Also, Baldwin has a view of
himself as being invisible to whites and this is a view of Baldwin that the whites do not
even realize they have. Baldwin‘s own perspective of himself and of whites would
undermine the whites‘ sense of innocence. His message to his nephew is that he has to
accept, in order to survive—that he cannot expect to free whites, and himself, from their
sense of their innocence.
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Pattern Codings

For the pattern codings, Wallace, Brooks, Baraka, and Baldwin show a
combination and overlap of psychological and physical violence involving double
consciousness. In pattern coding one,
1. Subjugated people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social
position.
Wallace and Brooks show that this awareness can encompass the knowledge that
do-gooders want to help in patronizing ways even as they maintain their distance. This
contradiction is not physically violent, but it is psychologically violent. Patronizing help
without equal dialogue and negotiation forces African Americans to accept the whites‘
terms and perspectives.. This dynamic is revealed by African American writers,
indicating their awareness of the violence of the social position that leads to unilateral
black double consciousness.
However, Baraka shows what can happen if black people confront their
oppressors too vehemently. Neither Wallace nor Brooks show what can happen when
blacks directly confront their imposed position. Baraka shows how easily and instantly
white psychological violence can turn to deadly physical violence when the
psychological violence is confronted. Perhaps this is why Baldwin suggests that loving
the oppressors is the only way to survive the self-claimed innocence of the oppressors‘
psychological violence. All these responses demonstrate the second and third pattern
codings:
233

2. Subjugated people are dehumanized, and they struggle with their position and
with the perspectives of the domineering population.
3. The struggle with domineering perspectives, the struggle with double
consciousness, is a survival tactic and form of resistance against dehumanization.
The psychological violence, the physical violence, and the thin line between the
two dehumanizes African Americans who are prevented from directly confronting their
oppressors. They can struggle within their position, but not confront it. This is a
subversion of agency that is dehumanizing. Awareness of this position, however, as
shown especially by Baldwin, can be a way for African Americans to maintain a critical
view of their situation. Double consciousness in this context means maintaining a critical
sense of self in opposition to imposed psychological and physical violence. In this way,
double consciousness can be a form of resistance against dehumanization.
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CHAPTER 18
FINDINGS SECTION THREE:
ACCOMMODATED-TENSION DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

This typology shows how black double consciousness is part of a dynamic
whereby blacks are forced to compensate for whites‘ double-consciousness deficit by
helping whites prevent themselves from facing the discomfort of noticing how they can
be seen as offensive or psychologically violent from black perspectives. This model
includes Marcus Mabry (1995), Patricia Williams (1991), and August Meier and Elliot
Rudwick (1975). These texts are shown to reveal the three codings of black perspective,
white perspective, and black response. They are then pattern-coded to illustrate their
common themes and messages.

Marcus Mabry, White Bucks and Black-Eyed Peas
Marcus Mabry is an African American man who grew up in a poor neighborhood
in New Jersey. He later went to Stanford University and then worked as a reporter for
Newsweek. In his autobiography, White Bucks and Black-Eyed Peas, Mabry writes of his
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high school experience as one of the few students of color at a school he calls,
―Lawrenceville,‖ a traditional preparatory high school during the late 1980s.
Mabry‘s experience at Lawrenceville is positive in general. He enjoys his
teachers, classmates, friends, and activities. When Mabry decides to run for Student
Council, he feels that he‘s respected enough by his peers to have a good chance of
winning the election. However, the winner is Nick Roegner, one of Mabry‘s good
friends, who was a white student. The two had remained friendly during the campaign,
but became less and less close. Each of them had different groups of friends and social
scenes (Mabry, 1995, p. 125).
After the election, Roegner visits Mabry in his dorm room. There is mutual
tension as they begin to talk, but their earlier familiarity and closeness soon returns. They
decide to order a pizza for dinner. After they eat, Mabry tells Roegner that he has been
keeping a journal of all his personal thoughts and feelings about the campaign that he
would not share in public. Mabry shares that he has felt hostility toward and from
Roegner. Roegner reveals that he has also been keeping a journal. Mabry suggests they
read what each other has written, and both friends agree to share their journals (Mabry,
1995, p. 126). Mabry writes,
I read each sentence, then read it again. I couldn‘t find the seething hatred I had
expected. I had written whole passages about how my friend [Roegner] had
betrayed me, how it was racially motivated. If I had been a white boy, naturally, I
would have been elected. How hypocritical, I had written, that they call me
arrogant. No one would have called me arrogant if I too had come from
Greenwich and my father was a CEO. Then I‘d be ―confident.‖ (1995, p. 127)
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Mabry reveals two important views in this passage: First, he expects his hostility
toward Roegner to be reciprocated in Roegner‘s journal. Second, he feels that his race
and class background make him appear arrogant to others, whereas higher racial and class
status would have made him appear merely confident. In other words, personal traits of
wealthy whites can be considered positive characteristics, but when poor blacks exhibit
these same traits, they are seen as arrogant. Perhaps Mabry expects to find this double
standard in Roegner‘s writing. This is the first coding, the black perspective.
Mabry, however, does not find the hostility and hypocrisy he expects from
Roegner. Roegner‘s response to Mabry is that he didn‘t know Mabry felt this way about
him. This is the white perspective, the second coding. Mabry writes,
[Roegner] said he had no idea I had felt that way. He never suspected that I had
seen everything in racial terms, when, in fact, the house‘s rejection of me [for
president] reflected how moody I had become, how deliberately I had cut myself
off from people, nothing racial, he said. (1995, p. 127)
It seems that Mabry withdrew and became moody because he suspected his
friends and classmates of racial discrimination. And that suspicion is confirmed by
Mabry‘s expectation that Roegner would have referred to him as a ―n——‖ in his journal.
Mabry reveals Roegner‘s response:
Staring at me, his mouth dropped open. Then, with disdain, he asked, ―You
thought I would write that. Fuck, Marc, you don‟t know me. (1995, p. 128)
This part of the white perspective is very revealing, because it dismisses one kind
of hypocrisy and double standard while, or in order to, reinforce another perhaps moresubtle hypocrisy and double standard. The hypocrisy that can be dismissed is that
Roegner has overt discrimination, as in considering Mabry arrogant, or a ―n——.‖
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However, such absence of overt discrimination is used to dismiss the possibility that there
might be other more-subtle and unexplored kinds of discrimination. If these more-evasive
forms of discrimination are dismissed because only overt forms of discrimination are
recognized, then the absence of overt discrimination can itself be a mechanism by which
covert discrimination is allowed, because the covert discrimination is invisible when
discrimination is defined only as the overt variety. And that is what happens, so Mabry
apologizes to Roegner for suspecting him of overt discrimination (1995, p. 128).
When Mabry apologizes for his suspicions, he is accepting fault for his feelings,
which are, in fact, quite valid. First, Mabry becomes moody during the campaign because
he suspects racial discrimination, which contributes to his losing the election; then, he
later apologizes for suspecting discrimination. For what, though, is Mabry really
apologizing? It is not only for suspecting overt racism. The apology is also for suspecting
the kinds of discrimination that are considered impolite and too personal for whites to
address. Mabry apologizes for breaking the unspoken rule: ―If it is not deliberate, it is not
discrimination.‖ This coattail apology develops because Mabry feels angry, but his anger
is superseded by Roegner‘s anger, because there is a discourse for rejecting overt
discrimination, so Roegner can dissociate himself from that. However, there is no
discourse for the subtle and covert forms of racism, so Mabry cannot engage Roegner in
that way. Mabry can only apologize for his suspicion of the overt discrimination, to
which apologizing for covert discrimination is coattailed.
His valid feelings about covert discrimination, even if not consciously identified,
do come out when Mabry is asked to give a speech to the whole school as part of Martin
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Luther King Jr. Day. In this speech, Mabry‘s double consciousness, the third coding, can
be found. To the school community, Mabry says,
[P]eople have a way of saying . . . I can hardly end racism in America, or even in
my own dorm, so why even talk about it? [. . .] The first reason is the simplest.
Listen. I stood erect and looked silently into the crowd. I made eye contact with as
many people as I could. I let the minutes drift on. The silence became oppressive.
―Silence,‖ I finally said, letting the word hang in the still air.
―Silence. What happens in silence? . . . Nothing.‖
Later, Mabry says,
Well, to put it simply you can help end racism by trying to guard against it in your
own thoughts, and your own perceptions of others . . . I am Black, a fact of which
I am very proud. Yet it is only one facet of my personality. And when you
approach me, I expect you to realize my color, of course. Yet, when you try to
place me into certain categories as a result of that Blackness, we have problems. .
. . So deal with me as an individual, a Black individual, but nonetheless an
individual. (1995, pp. 131–134)
What are the treatments Mabry is arguing against? In what ways does he feel that
others do not treat him as a black person and as an individual? Is he only talking about
overt racists, or is he also talking about more-subtle treatments that whites might not even
notice are negating, oppressive, offensive, or disrespectful? And what measures, like
apologizing, does Mabry have to take to accommodate white unawareness, white silence,
and white ―not listening,‖ so he can hold their perspective of him (so he can have double
consciousness) in order to enable them to get along with him even though they cannot, or
will not, entertain his perspective of them? These are some of the questions that Mabry
helps open up for interracial discussion, especially with people who are opposed to
racism.
However, Mabry writes, ―My classmate said it was all fire and fury to him‖
(1995, p. 135). He did not get the kind of engagement that might have opened up new
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avenues of discussion through which black and white students could learn more about
how they think about and see each other. Mabry is forced to accommodate this silence
through double consciousness, because at least one white student finds breaking the
silence, even as a way to fight racism, too fiery and furious.
What the white student says, ultimately, is that white people determine what
forms of racism they will oppose and what forms they will permit through a combination
of silent practice and dismissal of that practice. This arrangement—of white people
determining the terms of debate and black accommodation through double
consciousness—is itself a form of covert racism that would be exposed if Mabry was
heard and engaged as openly and as personally by whites as he is presenting himself to
them.
Patricia Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights
The Alchemy of Race and Rights is an autobiographical narrative in which Patricia
Williams (1991), a law professor, shows many examples of white discrimination and
legal-system discrimination against African Americans that might not seem
discriminatory to many readers. The ―alchemy‖ of the book is Williams‘s ability to reveal
the examples of discrimination by leading the reader to a shift between perspectives, and
to see what can go unnoticed without such shifting. This shift not only helps reveal the
unseen discrimination, but it also helps illuminate the very perspectives that had
previously kept the discrimination hidden.
One way Williams accomplishes the shifting of perspectives is by first reviewing
legal cases and decisions, and then, by explaining her own views of the assumptions and
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biases presented in the cases and decisions. This comparison encourages readers to
discuss Williams‘s views of the assumptions and biases, and the assumptions and biases
themselves.
In her essay, ―The Obliging Shell (an informal essay on formal equal
opportunity),‖ Williams helps readers shift between perspectives by writing,
If racism is artificially relegated to a time when it was written into code, the
continuing black experience of prejudice becomes a temporal shell game
manipulated by whites. Such a refusal to talk about the past disguises a refusal to
talk about the present. If prejudice is what‘s going on in the present, then aren‘t
we, the makers and interpreters of laws, engaged in the purest form of denial? Or,
if prejudice is a word that signified only what existed ―back‖ in the past, don‘t we
need a new word to signify what is going on in the present? Amnesia, perhaps?
(1991, p.103)
Williams is talking about the legally institutionalized and overt racism that was
outlawed in the 1960s. She is also saying that such civil rights legislation did not end all
forms of discrimination. Prejudice can still exist, regardless of what laws are passed. The
―shell game‖ refers to the fact that legislation can be used to dismiss discrimination, even
as it has continued to survive and thrive. One way this has happened is because of a kind
of denial and amnesia that seeks to attribute to the past what is still occurring in the
present. For example, Williams explains a situation in which,
Not long ago, a white acquaintance of mine described her boyfriend as ―having a
bit of the Jewish in him.‖ She meant that he was stingy with money. I said, ―Don‘t
talk like that! I know you didn‘t mean it, but there are harmful implications in
thinking like that. She responded with profuse apologies, phone calls, tears, then
anger . . . As we argued, words like ―overly sensitive,‖ ―academic privilege,‖ and
―touchy‖ began to creep into her description of me. She accused me of building
walls, of being unrealistic, of not being able to loosen up and just be with people.
She didn‘t use the word ―righteous,‖ but I know that‘s what she meant. I tried to
reassure her that I didn‘t mean to put her on the defensive, that I had not meant to
attack or upset her, and that I deeply valued our friendship . . . She didn‘t want me
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to understand merely that she meant no harm, but wanted me to confess that there
was no harm. Around this time, my sister sent me an article about the difficulties
of blacks and whites in discussing racial issues in social settings. (1991, pp. 125–
126)
This situation of prejudice remaining even after civil rights legislation and the
conflict between Williams and her white acquaintance shows all three codings of black
perspective, white perspective, and black response. The black perspective, the first
coding, is Williams‘s awareness of how prejudice continues while, or because, it is
attributed to an earlier time. She writes of the manipulative shell game, which suggests
that whites make an effort, whether conscious or less conscious, to not face and address
racism, but instead, to dismiss and evade the problem so that discrimination can be
considered a thing of the past, even though it still exists.
The white perspective, the second coding, is the denial, amnesia, and
defensiveness of whites when the shell game, as shown by Williams‘s acquaintance, is
put on the table to be addressed. Exposing and addressing the shell game is breaking a
taboo. Whites can be highly offended, as Williams shows, by such opposition to their
manipulation.
Williams‘s black response to this situation, her double consciousness, is revealed
in both her personal and political insights into the problems. She writes,
We [African Americans] resent those [African Americans] who are not wellgroomed and well-masked and have not reined in the grubbiness of their anger,
who have not sought the shelter of the most decorous assimilation possible. So
confusing are the ―colored‖ labels, so easily do they masquerade as real people,
that we frequently mistake the words for ourselves. (1991, p.120)

242

Williams reveals a condition of assimilation and masquerade by African
Americans that is necessary, but not always possible or preferable, in order for blacks to
be accepted by whites in American society. The double consciousness is apparent in
Williams‘s awareness of the necessity and burden of this navigation of assimilation and
masquerade. Part of this double consciousness is Williams‘s having to explain how her
white acquaintance is offensive while also accommodating her acquaintance‘s
expectation to have her tears and her claims to non-racism accommodated by Williams.
There is a double standard of white discrimination being part of the burden that blacks
must endure and accept in order for whites to not have to feel that they have the double
standard. White denial and amnesia become the duty of blacks to maintain so whites can
feel that racism ended with civil rights legislation. Williams requires double
consciousness both for her own sense of self, and also to navigate the accommodation of
whites that is imposed on her without any negotiation. This position is a form of covert
racism that is actually hidden by a singular focus on civil rights legislation that addresses
overt racism. Williams writes,
The rules may be colorblind, but people are not. The question remains, therefore,
whether the law can truly exist apart from the color-conscious society in which it
exists. (1991, p.120)
Even if whites do not have hidden biases and prejudices, there are still unequal
positions that can leave blacks in inferior positions. Whites do not have to try deliberately
to stay dominant. However, not being open to recognizing how such positions function,
and getting upset when the positions are exposed, is a way white people can dominate
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while claiming to be equal. Then, blacks are blamed for objecting to their own
subordination.

August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement
One question arising from Williams‘s insight that rules can be color-blind, even
though people are not, is about how this problem has developed. Evidence of this
problem can be found in the civil rights movement itself. Meier and Rudwick (1975)
explore the origins and history of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). They explain
in detail the struggles, negotiations, successes, and failures of CORE as a civil rights
organization, from its beginnings in the 1940s to its transition to Black Power in the
1960s.
One strength of this book is how it shows CORE as it functions within the civil
rights movement, as well as how it functions with its own internal relations between more
conservative and radical members and between blacks and whites. Some of the dynamics
explained in the transition to Black Power, in chapter 12, ―A House Divided,‖ help reveal
how the covert and subtle forms of discrimination experienced by Mabry and Williams
were there, but also unaddressed, during the civil rights movement itself.
In the mid-1960s, there were conflicts and divisions within CORE regarding
whether the organization should officially oppose the Vietnam War or remain focused on
helping to organize African American people living in slums. There were also conflicts
about maintaining nonviolent tactics, the appropriate roles for whites, and whether the
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group should have an integrationist strategy or whether it should become more separatist
(Meier and Rudwick, 1975, pp. 375–376).
Although CORE had national leadership, its local chapters, all over the country,
had the autonomy to choose their own leaders and issues. Often, such choices in the mid1960s involved how much local black community organizing would be pursued and how
whites could or could not contribute in leadership or fieldwork toward that community
organizing (Meier and Rudwick, 1975, ch. 12).
One aspect of the conflict over the role of whites is illustrated by a situation that
existed in the San Fernando chapter of CORE in 1964. White members used group
meetings to vent their guilt, which drew attention away from the issues of direct action
and community organization, focusing instead on the whites, who were already seen by
many people as impeding progress. Meier and Rudwick write,
[W]hites in many chapters sensed aloofness or brusqueness from some of their
black colleagues. It became less frequent for black and white members to act as a
cohesive in-group which socialized together . . . [White] withdrawal [from the
organization] usually occurred without an open struggle against what seemed like
an irresistible tide of growing [black] nationalism. (Meier and Rudwick, 1975, p.
383)
CORE was facing severe challenges in its struggles for racial equality in the
broader American society, and it was also facing serious struggles within itself. Some of
these internal struggles can be seen as problems of double consciousness. The black
perspective, the first coding, is revealed in this passage:
Underneath there was a basic distrust of educated white people who tried to
participate in the black community. (Meier and Rudwick, 1975, p. 386)
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This black perspective suggests that the racial equality and harmony CORE was
seeking in the broader U.S. was very difficult for the group to achieve within itself. The
black distrust of whites was an inherent part of the issues faced by individual chapters,
including how chapter leadership was determined, and how decisions were made about
community organization, direct action, opposition to the Vietnam War, and other issues.
The white perspective included whites using CORE meetings as a venue to vent
white guilt. Other parts of the white perspective involved the kinds of work whites did
within the chapters. Meier and Rudwick say (second coding, white perspective),

Whites shouldered a great deal of the work, from performing clerical chores
through participating in negotiations with city officials to organizing tenants . . .
(1975, p. 386)
Whites were involved in the practical workings and relations between CORE and
the broader community. Concurrently, whites became increasingly isolated socially from
their black peers with whom they were working. Therefore, from the black perspective,
there was distrust of whites, while from the white perspective, there was formal
participation combined with social division. This dynamic of black distrust, white guilt,
white clerical involvement, and interracial social distance is not shown by Meier and
Rudwick as a dynamic that was discussed by and between the black and white members.
The tension increased, leading toward black rejection of whites instead of subsiding
through effective dialogue and negotiation. This black rejection of whites in CORE may
have resulted from the absence of the dialogue and negotiation that occurs when social
bonds between two parties deteriorate, or never even develop.
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Meier and Rudwick write (third coding, black response), ―Several blacks began to
ask openly, ‗Who are the whites to define the issues for us?‘ ‖ (1975, p. 386). This
question might be part of a transition, from accommodating tension with double
consciousness to critiquing what happens with that accommodation. By questioning the
position of whites as those who define, the blacks are actually exposing and challenging
whether they should be recipients of white definitions, or equal participants in negotiating
definitions of issues and identities.
This is a good question that could alert whites to the problem that blacks face—of
having to see themselves through white perspectives even though whites do not have to
reciprocate. A part of black double consciousness is when blacks ask why whites should
be able to define issues for blacks. Black people are forced to accept the fact that their
issues are defined, explained, and addressed through white perspectives, when there is
very little negotiation of these issues in relation to how whites can work with black
issues, as defined by blacks. Whites also pay little attention to their own use of meetings
to vent their white guilt, or to the fact that they perform clerical work without social
closeness to their black peers.
The tension that leads to blacks openly asking who whites are to define black
issues was brought into the open during the civil rights movement. However, such a
question does not arise years later when Mabry and Williams have to use their double
consciousness to accommodate whites. The accommodation that was challenged by
CORE is tolerated once again, as it was before CORE and Black Power. Perhaps CORE,
although it was fighting for racial equality, was not itself racially equal. Perhaps the
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invisibility of double consciousness during the civil rights movement prevented the
movement from addressing double consciousness as an ongoing issue of black
accommodation of racial tension.

Pattern Codings
Double consciousness is recognized by Mabry, Williams, and Meier and Rudwick
for its accommodation of tension with whites. The first pattern coding focuses on the fact
that subjugated people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social position.
Mabry, Williams, and Meier and Rudwick raise the question of black awareness versus
articulation of their inferior position of accommodating white double-consciousness
deficit. Mabry apologizes for his suspicions at first, but then reveals and challenges the
deeper issues of silence that strengthen and validate his suspicions. Williams shows how
whites can be dominant by requiring blacks to accept good intentions as good enough.
She shows that when this standard is questioned, whites can reinforce their demands for
accommodation simply by getting upset and reasserting their claims to the sufficiency of
their good intentions. Meier and Rudwick provide a historical background of CORE to
show how these problems were not addressed in that organization. Perhaps the civil rights
movement itself was not integrated properly enough, and didn‘t have enough mutual
negotiation of positions and identities to succeed at addressing more-subtle levels of
racial inequality.
In the second pattern coding, the silence such accommodation requires is how
subjugated people are dehumanized, leading to their struggle with their position and with
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the perspectives of the domineering population. They have to stay silent and voiceless in
order to not upset the whites. This accommodated-tension double consciousness can be a
survival tactic, the third pattern coding, which becomes a form of resistance as well as a
form of accommodation.
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CHAPTER 19
FINDINGS SECTION FOUR:
CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

The problems of double consciousness within CORE, in the civil rights movement
and since, indicate that double consciousness can be generalized to an institutional and
cultural level in the U.S. Problems of double consciousness were hidden within the civil
rights movement itself, which fought overt racism while perpetuating, through ignorance,
inattention, and accommodation, the covert racism of double consciousness. And this is
not a problem only at the individual level. This typology, Cultural and Institutional
Double Consciousness, shows how the double-consciousness problems that were
perpetuated by and after the civil rights movement have become, or were already,
institutionalized within American society and culture.
The writers in this section are June Jordan (1994), Toni Morrison (1992), and
Ralph Ellison (1953). After a discussion of how these writers reveal the three codings of
black perspective, white perspective, and black response, they are pattern-coded to
indicate the common themes and issues of the texts. These writers offer related messages
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that expand the context of double consciousness to show some of its broader
sociopolitical dimensions.

June Jordan, Technical Difficulties
June Jordan‘s (1994) Technical Difficulties is a collection of essays and personal
narratives that present Jordan‘s perspectives on American culture and society. She
illuminates many contradictions between ideals or claims to justice and equality and
conditions or practices that betray the ideals or claims.
In chapter 7, ―Don‘t You Talk About My Mother,‖ Jordan discusses how African
Americans help each other survive and succeed through their families. She contrasts this
strength and resilience with the ways the broader white community views black poverty
as a result of black inferiority and a failure of black families.
Jordan begins chapter 7 with a main theme that recurs throughout the whole
chapter. She talks about the roles of black women in maintaining black families and the
struggles and obstacles they have to, and do, overcome. This is the black perspective, the
first coding. Jordan says,
From the time you learned how to talk, everybody‘s momma remained the holiest
of holies. Yes, we were young. And a lot of people probably thought we were
hoodlums, or something like that. But we knew we were smart; we made and kept
ourselves ready to deal on those dangerous streets. Many of us, there, in BedfordStuyvesant [Brooklyn], were poor. But very few of us were stupid. You couldn‘t
be. In those days, as now, Black kids enjoyed damned little margin for error.
So we never lost track. We could feel it. We could see it. We could hear it.
We could not deny it. And we did not ever forget it, this fact, that the first the last
and the most, that the number on persevering, resourceful, resilient, and devoted
person our lives was, and would always be, your mother and my mother. (1994,
pp. 65–66)
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Jordan is explaining that black mothers were, and are, the foundation of their
children‘s lives. This is probably universal, but for black children living within a
uniquely racist broader society, Jordan explains that the roles and challenges of their
mothers are unique. It is the mothers who are targeted by the broader society as the
causes of black poverty, struggle, and exclusion from mainstream society. Linking this
blaming-the-heroin treatment to the civil rights movement, and therefore to the work of
groups like CORE, Jordan reveals,
[W]e, the people of this allegedly ‗pathological ghetto culture,‘ were waging the
most principled, unassailably moral revolution of the twentieth century: we, the
pathological community of black folks were forcing these United States to finally
honor the democratic promises responsible for the First American Revolution.
(1994, p. 69)
Jordan shows that the black struggle to bring democracy to America is resisted by
people who treat the fight for democracy as a pathology, while presenting the results of
oppression as the inferiority of blacks and their mothers. This problem helps explain the
criticisms of CORE members. For blacks to define their own issues, as CORE members
demanded, they would have to be heard on their own terms. This might include changing
the view of black mothers, to see them as persevering, resourceful, resilient, and devoted,
rather than as inferior and incompetent.
However, the subtlety and dimensions of these problems escaped the awareness of
mainstream Americans. They just blamed blacks for not fitting into a democracy that they
would only be able to fit into after helping to create that democracy through their selfrepresentation, which has not been allowed by the white majority. Jordan shows that
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blacks were criticized for not fitting into a democracy that did not exist, and were blamed
for being excluded from a system that did not exist. She says (second coding, white
perspective),
Back in 1965, Daniel P. Moynihan issued a broadside insult to the National Black
Community. With full support of the Democratic administration that was tired of
Negroes carrying on about citizenship rights, and integration, and white racist
violence, Moynihan came through with the theory that we, Blackfolks, and that
we, Black women, in particular, constituted the problem . . . it was the failure of
Black families to resemble the patriarchal setup of white America that explained
our unequal, segregated, discriminated-against, and violently hated Black
experience of nondemocracy, here. (1994, p. 67)
Moynihan, who went on to become a New York senator (1977–2001), decided to
define a pillar of the black community as a malady. He gave black mothers blame for the
position of African Americans instead of credit for their endurance. This perspective, and
the assaults on welfare it included, shifted attention away from how African American
perspectives are required for democracy, and helped reinforce a sense of democracy that
excluded difference and difference in outlook. Black CORE members asked who whites
were to define their issues. Jordan is asking who whites are, and who Daniel P.
Moynihan is, in particular, to define people‘s mothers.
Questions and definitions should also be asked and considered about black
fathers, but these equally important concerns are neither addressed nor even mentioned in
Jordan‘s book.
Despite the exclusion and negation of black perspectives, Jordan shows that these
perspectives are strong and clear to African Americans. In response to Moynihan and
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others, Jordan shows double consciousness, the third coding of black response, by
writing,
[F]rom under the whip through underpaid employment, and worse, Black folks
have formulated our own family, our own home base for nurture and pride. We
have done this from extended kinship methods of taking care to teenagers thrilled,
not appalled, by the prospect of a child: a Black child. We have loved our own
inside a greater environment of systematized contempt. (1994, p. 71)
This ―loving their own inside an environment of systematic contempt‖ is an
example of double consciousness. Jordan has shown that the larger environment, led by
Moynihan and others, has endeavored to instill self-hatred and, perhaps worse, hatred of
black mothers, within the minds and hearts of black people. Jordan, however, can see
herself through this hostile and imposed perspective while also maintaining her own view
of herself on her own terms. She elaborates on her double consciousness when she writes,
[O]ur Black lives have never been standard or predictable or stabilized inside a
benign, nationwide environment. We have been flexible, ingenious, and
innovative or we have perished. And we have not perished. We remain and we
remain different, and we have become necessarily deft at distinguishing between
the negative differences—those imposed upon us—and the positive differences—
those that joyously attest to our distinctive, survivalist attributes as a people.
(1994, p. 73–4)

Toni Morrison, Playing in the Dark
In, Playing in the Dark, Toni Morrison (1993) shows literary origins and
examples of the institutional negation Jordan reveals. Morrison explores the roles and
positions of African Americans in mainstream American literature. She reviews and
explains how blackness and race is created, reproduced, and reflected through the
writings of many white American authors. Morrison shows that the presence of blackness
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(or blackness as a concept and a position that defines whiteness) is produced and
reproduced in ways that can make the concept both familiar and invisible when the
creation of that black presence is not exposed and explored.
In chapter 2, ―Romancing the Shadow,‖ Morrison (1993) shows the literary role
of race in forming and reproducing racial positions and identities of white Americans.
She explains racially defined meanings and parameters of freedom and civilization.
Morrison discusses what Herman Melville (1819–1891) calls, ―The power of blackness‖
(1993, p. 37). Morrison explains,
[T]here was a resident population, already black, upon which the imagination
could play; through which historical, moral, metaphysical, and social fears,
problems, and dichotomies could be articulated. The slave population, it could
and was assumed, offered itself up as surrogate selves for meditation on problems
of human freedom, its lure and its elusiveness. (1993, p. 37)
Blackness is defined and used to provide an opposite against which whiteness,
and freedom, morality, savagery, wilderness, and civilization, can be defined. Morrison
continues,
Black slavery enriched the country‘s creative possibilities [. . . through . . .] the
projection of the not-me. What rose up out of collective needs to allay internal
fears and to rationalize external exploitation was an American Africanism—a
fabricated brew of darkness, otherness, alarm, and desire that is uniquely
American. (There also exists, of course, a European Africanism with a counterpart
in colonial literature.) (1993, p. 38)
Morrison is revealing a fabricated brewing of the not-me. Blackness is constructed
as a negative against which whiteness, civilization, savagery, and America could be
constructed. Morrison writes,
[C]ultural identities are formed and informed by a nation‘s literature, and what
seemed to be on the ―mind‖ of literature of the United States was the self255

conscious but highly problematic construction of the American as a new white
man. (1993, p. 39)
Morrison goes on to explore some ways this construction of whiteness in relation
to the construction of blackness is shown in writings of early American writers. In
addition to Morrison‘s framework leading toward a more detailed inquiry of the
development of whiteness and blackness within American writings, her framework can
also lead toward a broader exploration of the construction of blackness as the not-me that
supports the white identity and claim to civilization. This broader exploration includes
the projection of the not-me as a projected identity that negates one‘s own self-definition.
As the construction of the white identity requires the projection and negation of the black
identity, the white identity also depends on black double consciousness.
Based on this defining background of cultural formation early in American
literature and history, Morrison can be shown to offer a black perspective, white
perspective, and black response that fit with the double-consciousness model pursued in
this thesis. The black perspective, the first coding, is that,
[T]he imaginative and historical terrain upon which early American writers
journeyed is in large measure shaped by the presence of the racial other.
Statements to the contrary, insisting on the meaninglessness of race to the
American identity, are themselves full of meaning. The world does not become
raceless or will not become unracialized by assertion. The act of enforcing
racelessness in literary discourse is itself a racial act. Pouring rhetorical acid on
the fingers of a black hand may indeed destroy the prints, but not the hand.
Besides, what happens in that violent, self-serving act of erasure to the hands, the
fingers, the fingerprints of the one who does the pouring? Do they remain acidfree? The literature suggests otherwise. (1993, p. 46)
Morrison earlier explained how blackness was deliberately constructed so
savagery, civilization, and whiteness could be developed in relation to blackness. Now,
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however, she is saying that the literature that was written for such racializing purposes is
read as if it is color-blind. The racializing of America is now seen as being nonracial
through assertion and enforcement of racelessness in the literature that did the racializing
in the first place. It seems, from Morrison‘s black perspective, that first, people want to
become white by making others black. Later, others want to read such cultural
productions and positions as if they are not racial. Why, one might wonder, would people
do that? Morrison answers and explains the white perspective, the second coding, by
writing,
Africanism is the vehicle by which the American self knows itself as not
enslaved, but free; not repulsive, but desirable; not helpless, but licensed and
powerful; not history-less, but historical; not damned, but innocent; not a blind
accident of evolution, but a progressive fulfillment of destiny. (1993, p. 52)
African Americans are still the measure by which white Americans define
themselves. Now, though, they accomplish this by dismissing race, not blacks. The
racialization remains, but the racialization is dismissed. Blacks are not overtly dismissed,
but their being black, and whites being white, is dismissed. And this happens through
assertion and enforced racelessness. Can people do that? Perhaps Americans have to,
need to, see themselves as being able to do that in order to maintain the old sense of
freedom, individuality, civilization, innocence, license, and destiny that they derived
from cultural formation.
If so, the black perspective and white perspective are at odds with each other. The
black perspective sees blackness negated, and then sees that negation being negated later
on through color blindness. The white perspective sees the later, or color-blind, negation
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of earlier black negation (because race has no biological essence) as progress toward a
time when race will not matter. Whiteness remains pure, civilized, and individual, even
though—or, actually, because of the fact that—it has completely shifted from basing
itself on race consciousness to color blindness. That whiteness can shift its being from
race consciousness to color blindness is how it can sustain itself—not the way it
deteriorates. Morrison‘s double consciousness about these perspectives is shown in her
writing:
How could one speak of profit, economy, labor, progress, suffragism,
Christianity, the frontier, the formation of new states, the acquisition of new
lands, education, transportation (freight and passengers), neighborhoods, the
military—of almost anything a country concerns itself with—without having as a
referent, at the heart of the discourse, at the heart of definition, the presence of
Africans and their descendants?
It was not possible. And it did not happen. What did happen frequently
was an effort to talk about these matters with a vocabulary designed to disguise
the subject. It did not always succeed, and in the work of many writers disguise
was never intended. But the consequence was a master narrative that spoke for
Africans and their descendants, or of them. The legislator‘s narrative could not
coexist with a response from the Africanist persona. Whatever popularity the
slave narratives had—and they influenced abolitionists and converted
abolitionists—the slave‘s own narrative, while freeing the narrator in many ways,
did not destroy the master narrative. The master narrative could make any number
of adjustments to keep itself intact. (1992, p. 50)
Morrison knows how African Americans have been and are spoken of and for.
The acid-pouring as a metaphor for color blindness discussed earlier may be her
explanation of how the master narrative is making adjustments now to keep itself intact.
In Morrison‘s writing, the double consciousness is evident in her exploration of
how the master narrative can shift and adjust so that no matter what it or others say about
it, whites will remain innocent, civilized, and individual; and just because blacks have to
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see themselves from the perspective of the master narrative, whatever it is at whatever
time, whites do not—and will not ever have to—see themselves from black perspectives.
And that is a burden the master narrative perpetually imposes on others for them to deal
with on their own.

Ralph Ellison, Shadow and Act
Ralph Ellison‘s (1994) Shadow and Act is a collection of essays through which
Ellison explores and explains his own development as a writer and as an American who
grew up in Oklahoma during the 1920s. Ellison broadens the personal by discussing
meanings of being American and black in relation to writings of other authors, including
Richard Wright, Mark Twain, Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner, and others.
Ellison wrote Shadow and Act about forty years before Morrison wrote Playing in
the Dark. Both books explore similar themes of how literature can reveal cultural
positions and relationships between black and white Americans. For example, in the
second section of chapter 1, ―Twentieth-Century Fiction and the Black Mask of
Humanity,‖ Ellison discusses Mark Twain, Ernest Hemingway, and William Faulkner.
He shows how Twain‘s Huckleberry Finn chooses to free his friend, Jim, a slave, when
Jim is caught as a runaway as they float down the Mississippi River. Huck‘s decision,
Ellison explains, is difficult because he has to decide between his own sense of
friendship, humanity, and justice on the one hand, and broader society‘s slavery laws and
their meanings of justice. Ellison explores how and why Huck chooses to free Jim, even
though Huck knows this is wrong according to society‘s laws (Ellison, 1994, pp. 32–33).
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Ellison then draws contrasts between Twain and Hemingway, the latter being,
according to Ellison, ―the prime example of the artist who ignored the dramatic and
symbolic possibilities presented by this theme [of personal choice as intervention into the
broader social and political morality of race]‖ (1994, p. 29). Ellison also discusses
Faulkner as a writer who both views black Americans as racial stereotypes while also
―explor[ing] perhaps more successfully than anyone else, white or black, certain forms of
black humanity‖ (1994, pp. 29–30). By investigating these contrasts, Ellison emphasizes
how ―the stereotype is no less personal than political. Color prejudice springs not from
the stereotype alone, but from an inner need to believe‖ (1994, p. 28).
Ellison‘s sense of the personal being political is illuminated by his discussion of
how black and white Americans do or do not identify with American literature, or how
they do or do not identify certain literature as being American. It is through these issues
that black and white perspectives, as well as black responses as double consciousness,
can be found in Ellison‘s writing. Explaining both black and white perspectives, Ellison
writes,
Obviously the experiences of Negroes . . . have not been that of white Americans.
And though as passionate believers in democracy Negroes identify themselves
with the broader American ideals, their sense of reality springs, in part, from an
American experience which most white men have not had, but one with which
they are reluctant to identify themselves even when presented in forms of the
imagination. Thus when the white American, holding up most twentieth-century
fiction says, ―This is American reality,‖ the Negro tends to answer (not at all
concerned that Americans tend generally to fight against any but the most
flattering imaginative depictions of their lives), ―Perhaps, but you‘ve left out this,
and this, and this. And most of all, what you‘d have the world accept as me isn‘t
even human.‖ (1994, p. 25)
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Ellison is explaining that black and white Americans often have the same
identification with abstract American ideals. However, the ways blacks experience the
practices and violations of these ideals are not embraced by whites. In this way, black and
white perspectives are connected together. The black perspective is one of a unique
American experience that is not accepted, even by the imaginations, of whites. The white
rejection of black perspectives is what allows whites to consider most American fiction
as reflecting reality. The double consciousness of African Americans comes from their
having to maintain their own sense of reality while also accepting white claims to the
American reality presented in their fiction that negate and dismiss African American
humanity. Perhaps this is why Ellison refers to ―Richard Wright‘s remark that there is in
progress between black and white Americans a struggle over the nature of reality‖ (1994,
p. 26). In his own words, Ellison writes,
[T]he American himself has not been finally defined . . . this struggle between
Americans as to what the American is to be is part of that democratic process . . .
the ideal American character . . . is slowly being born. (1994, p.26)
However, part of this struggle involves conflicts between broader democratic
ideals that Americans value and the violation of these ideals, which can undermine the
sense of American justice. Ellison explains how these conflicts—and, therefore, the
critical perspectives of African Americans—are excluded from rather than brought into
the debate. The result is that,
[The] Negro . . . is also a key figure in a magic rite by which the white American
seeks to resolve the dilemma arising between his democratic beliefs and certain
antidemocratic practices . . . The Negro was placed outside the democratic master
plan, a human ―natural‖ resource . . . so that white men could become more
human. (Ellison, 1994, pp. 28–29)
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Being placed outside the master plan so whites can become more human puts
blacks in a position of having to maintain a sense of white humanity and American
democracy, where neither are accurate because they exclude blacks. So blacks are both
subordinated by the system and forced to support it through their dehumanization.
However, white dehumanization of whites through the dehumanization of blacks is
turned around into white humanization of themselves when blacks are forced to help
support or accommodate their own dehumanization. Ellison‘s double consciousness is his
ability to explain these dynamics while also maintaining his own sense of himself, and
his sense of what it means for America to actually and honestly become equal—at least in
the form of imagination. Ellison‘s awareness of how he views himself, and how others
see him as a function of the larger American society, is double consciousness not only on
an individual level, but also as a broad literary, historical, and political position.

Pattern Codings
Ellison, Jordan, and Morrison reveal not only double consciousness of
themselves, but they also show that double consciousness can be a form of political
analysis and social criticism. With this broader use of double consciousness, these writers
expand the scope of the pattern codings.
The first pattern coding is that subjugated people are often aware and critical of
their disadvantaged social position. These authors reveal that they are aware of their
position as being larger in scope, beyond themselves. Jordan shares her own awareness of
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the contradictions between the aims and limitations of the civil rights movement as they
pertain, and perhaps led, to the later assault of blaming black mothers and families. She is
aware that the blame is used to shift attention away from the political deficiencies of the
nation and American society as a whole. Morrison and Ellison show how the politics
behind the image of American freedom can be exposed and explored through a critical
reading of American literature. In these ways, the writers reveal how they, as subjugated
people, are aware and critical of their disadvantaged social position
The second pattern coding is that subjugated people are dehumanized and struggle
with their position and with the perspectives of the domineering population. Making
sense of this position brings the subjugated people beyond the mere personal problems
they have with others, and toward a deeper assessment of the structural of American
culture and society. Jordan shows how she, and other African Americans, are
dehumanized in this passage:
[W]e, the people of this allegedly ‗pathological ghetto culture,‘ were waging the
most principled, unassailably moral revolution of the twentieth century: we, the
pathological community of black folks, were forcing these United States to finally
honor the democratic promises responsible for the First American Revolution.
(1994, p. 69)
Jordan shows how dehumanization has remained even after African Americans
waged a revolution to lead America closer to its own ideals. Morrison and Ellison show
how this ideal of ―democracy for everyone‖ is in direct conflict with the role of blackness
in creating a sense of whiteness, civilization, and freedom. For blacks to help develop
American democracy in a more equal way, whites would have to accept that their own
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sense of civilization and freedom is grounded in their whiteness as a position that is
dependent on black exclusion.
The third pattern coding is that the struggle with domineering perspectives, with
double consciousness, is a survival tactic and form of resistance against dehumanization.
By locating the problem outside themselves, the focus of the solution shifts from concern
with what seems wrong with blacks to concern with how this blame is in and of itself part
of a problem that blacks can confront, rather than a problem with blacks themselves.
Jordan shows that her view of black mothers (which comes from others‘ perspectives)
can enable her to view the imposed perspective, rather than the blacks themselves, as the
problem. Her double consciousness is a form of resistance because it exposes and
critically rejects the broader institutional, or commonly accepted, views of blacks.
Morrison and Ellison provide a literary framework that reveals a whole systematic
literary tradition through which black and white identities and positions have been
created. All three authors use their double consciousness as a survival tactic, of
awareness of, instead of submersion in, the negating perspectives that are imposed on
blacks.
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CHAPTER 20
FINDINGS SECTION FIVE:
PERSONAL AND INVISIBLE (TO WHITES) STRUGGLES WITH DOUBLE
CONSCIOUSNESS

This model shows more-subtle personal and political ways black Americans
struggle to function with double consciousness while, and because, whites have no
awareness of these struggles. Black double consciousness is both a problem that black
people confront and one that is often invisible to whites. This invisibility can lead whites
to blame blacks for the problems they encounter, although part of the problem is white
unawareness of black double consciousness. This kind of double consciousness is shown
by Signithia Fordham (1991), Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Cornel West (1996), and Ellis
Cose (1993). After showing how these writers are coded by black perspective, white
perspective, and black response, they are pattern-coded to reveal their common themes.
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Signithia Fordham, “Racelessness in Private Schools: Should We Deconstruct the
Racial and Cultural Identity of African-American Adolescents?”

Signithia Fordham‘s article, ―Racelessness in Private Schools: Should We
Deconstruct the Racial and Cultural Identity of African-American Adolescents?,‖ was
published in Teachers College Record (1991). In this article, Fordham explains how
black students in six New Jersey private preparatory high schools faced conflicts between
their own identities and the ―racelessness‖ imposed on them by their schools. Although
Fordham does not give an explicit operational definition of racelessness for this article,
she discusses how black students have senses of themselves as individuals and as black
people that are invisible and dismissed by the schools in order for the schools to claim
equality and inclusion. Fordham says,
In this article, I argue that racelessness is a concept that symbolizes the effort to
deconstruct the historically constituted relationship between black and white
Americans, including its intrusion into the notion of academic adequacy and
African-American students‘ enrollment in private schools. (1991, p. 472)
So it is by ignoring, dismissing, and negating race that the schools claim to
equalize students of color and white students. This color blindness seems to be what
Fordham implies, but does not denote, as her meaning of racelessness.
This racelessness or color blindness is shown to have severe impacts on the black
students. However, these negative impacts are not noticed by the school administrators or
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the parents. They see the racelessness as healthy rather than as harmful to the black
students. Fordham explains,
Achieving academic success in a context where a Eurocentric ethos dominates
necessitates divorcing one‘s commitment to a changing yet familiar AfricanAmerican identity and embracing instead an unpredictable, unfolding meaning of
both Self and Other. For African-American adolescents, learning to cope with the
―burden of ‗acting white‘ ‖ is (or becomes) an academic imperative, an
undeniable breach of the Self. (1991, p. 471)
The black perspective, the first coding, is the sense of self, other, and coping that
black students bring to school. This sense of self, other, and coping is quite different
from, and incompatible with, the sense of self, other, and coping that is expected by the
schools or by the white perspective, the second coding. For example, Fordham shows the
black perspective by discussing Edmund, his sense of self, how he interacts with others,
and how he understands himself within his broader environment of American racism.
Explaining Edmund‘s perspective, Fordham says,
Personal racism you can deal with. Someone calls you a nigger and you can
smack him in the mouth, and if you are bigger than him, he‘s gonna know not to
call you a nigger again. Edmund had dealt with that kind of racism all his life—
we all do—but before he went to Exeter, he had never, ever in his life dealt with
institutional racism. That was something he couldn‘t fight against. How do you
fight an assumption? How do you tackle history? How do you get your hands on
an environment? You can‘t—you can‘t even begin to come to grips with it. That‘s
what makes it so insidious and hard to deal with. And the thing is, it‘s never
personal. It‘s just there. (1991, p. 479)
Both Edmund and Fordham share this perspective on visible forms of personal
racism and obscure forms of institutional racism that is just there—impersonal, but very
harmful in personal ways. This black perspective seems to be an orientation, an
understanding of both identifiable and hidden dangers, that can give black people a sense
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of themselves and of others, and a way to cope with a personally and institutionally racist
society. And black teenagers have to know how to deal with all of this.
However, the white perspective is shown by Fordham to be incompatible with the
black perspective. This white perspective is just too simple, and simple-minded. Sylvester
Monroe, a Newsweek journalist, is quoted by Fordham as saying,
What bothered me [at St. George‘s Academy] was that some people found it
easier to pretend I was something else (other than African American). ―We‘re
colour-blind here,‖ a well-meaning faculty member once told me. ―We don‘t see
black students or white students, we just see students.‖ But black was what I was;
I wasn‘t sure he saw me at all. (1991, p. 479)
How does this well-meaning color blindness treat the sense of self, other, and
coping with personal and institutional racism that Fordham attributes to African
American teenage students? The treatment is negation, but it is called recognition. This
sublimation is insidious, according to Edmund. However, it does not have to be; if it is
exposed as simple-minded sublimation, it can be deconstructed as a form of institutional
racism that black youth face in personal ways.
The question, and the third coding of black response, then arises from Fordham‘s
writing about the insidious sublimation of negation to recognition. Are there two forms
(known and unknown) of double consciousness? Does Edmund have double
consciousness that is unknown to him, while Monroe is aware of his double
consciousness? Edmund asks many questions about how he can fight an assumption,
tackle history, and get his hands on an environment. To him, the struggle to maintain his
own sense of self while living with his imposed negation is amorphous. Perhaps he is
caught with double consciousness of which he is unaware, leaving him trapped between
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awareness and unawareness of that trap. Conversely, perhaps Monroe knows more
cognizantly that he is balancing, negotiating, and confronting the simple-minded color
blindness that is presented as inclusion and recognition, even as it dismisses his sense of
the self and the other in the name of equality. Fordham says (third coding, black
response),
Achieving academic success in a context where a Eurocentric ethos dominates
necessitates divorcing one‘s commitment to a changing yet familiar African
American identity, and embracing instead an unpredictable, unfolding meaning of
the Self and the Other. Consequently, learning to cope with the burden of acting
white becomes an academic imperative for African American adolescents, a
quintessential violation of the Self. (1991, p. 481)
―Acting white‖ can be seen as the outcome of black double consciousness. It then
gives whites the false impression that they and blacks are the same. However, this
unilateral double consciousness cannot make people the same. Rather, they could be
more similar, more the same, if both parties had their own double consciousnesses. Then,
with that in common, they could talk about their differences with a common grounding in
each other‘s perspectives, and with a shared understanding of the complexities and
intimacies of double consciousness. That would be the sameness that whites would have
to work and struggle for, on equal terms with people of color. Instead, they try for an easy
feeling of sameness that only exacerbates, by hiding more deeply, the differences that
make whites uncomfortable. Color-blind whites claim to be fighting racism by pretending
that black invisibility is, itself, invisible. Then it is only those who see the differences,
who expose the delusion of sameness, who are seen as the racists. The messengers are
blamed for the message.
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Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Cornel West, The Future of the Race
Gates‘s and West‘s (1996) The Future of the Race includes one essay by each
author, both of which address DuBois‘ concept of the ―Talented Tenth‖ (1996, p. 139).
According to DuBois, the Talented Tenth is the educated leadership elite of the African
American community. This group is comprised of teachers, businesspeople,
professionals, religious leaders, and others who can help the African American masses
acquire the hope, education, and opportunities needed for successful participation in
mainstream society. DuBois explains,
But I have already explained that human education is not simply a matter of
schools; it is much more a matter of family and group life—the training of one‘s
home, of one‘s daily companions, of one‘s social class. Now the black boy of the
South moves in a black world—a world with its own leaders, its own thoughts, its
own ideals. In this world he gets by far the larger part of his life training, and
through the eyes of this dark world he peers into the veiled world beyond. Who
guides and determines the education which he receives in this world? His teachers
here are the group leaders of the Negro people—the physicians and clergymen,
the trained fathers and mothers, the influential and forceful men about him of all
kinds; here it is, if at all, that the culture of the surrounding world trickles through
and is handed on by the graduates of the higher schools. (1996, pp. 149–150)
The Talented Tenth consists of those members of the black community who can
lead the other members through self-help toward successful training to participate in the
―veiled world beyond.‖ DuBois is talking about a leadership group that has transitioned
into the white, veiled world and can help others learn how to make this transition.
In their essays, however, Gates and West each show how the Talented Tenth
model is much more difficult to put into practice than it is to theorize about; for example,
Gates shares, through personal narrative, his own experiences and challenges as a first270

generation college student at Yale in the 1960s. He also contextualizes this narrative
within a broader consideration of the complicated and controversial dynamics between
African Americans. He says,
Even today [as in the 1960s], however, the enormous class disparities within the
―black community‖ are discussed only gingerly and awkwardly, and that‘s
because they undermine the very concept of such a ―community‖ in the first
place. (1996, p. 37)
So the notion of a Talented Tenth may be too idealistic to pertain to the
complexities of African American communities of the civil rights and post–civil rights
eras. In his essay, Cornel West helps elaborate on Gates‘ critique. West says,
[T]he Enlightenment worldview held by DuBois is ultimately inadequate, and in
many ways, antiquated, for our time. The tragic plight and absurd predicament of
Africans here and abroad requires a more profound interpretation of the human
condition—one that goes far beyond the false dichotomies of expert knowledge
vs. mass ignorance, individual autonomy vs. dogmatic authority, and self-mastery
vs. intolerant tradition. Our tragicomic times require more democratic concepts of
knowledge and leadership which highlight human fallibility and mutual
accountability, notions of individuality and contested authority which stress
dynamic traditions; and ideals of self-realization within participatory
communities. (1996, p.64)
By suggesting more-democratic concepts of knowledge and leadership, West
implies a need for negotiation rather than authoritarianism. Toward this goal, West
suggests a focus on self-realization within participatory communities. This reorientation
does not dismiss the Talented Tenth, but it might help reposition the elite in a morecooperative, and less authoritarian, role within black communities and within broader
American communities.
West suggests a different role for the Talented Tenth and the masses. He
maintains the crucial contributions of the educated and professional class, but he
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recommends more cooperative and equal relationships between all African Americans.
West explains,
The fundamental role of the public intellectual—distinct from, yet building on,
the indispensable work of academics, experts, analysts, and pundits—is to create
and sustain high-quality public discourse addressing urgent public problems
which enlightens and energizes fellow citizens, prompting them to take public
action . . . Intellectual and political leadership is neither elitist nor populist; rather
it is democratic, in that each of us stands in public space, without humiliation, to
put forward our best visions and views for the sake of the public interest. And
these arguments are presented in an atmosphere of mutual respect and civic trust.
(1996, p. 71)
In West‘s view, there should not be an elite guiding the masses, but there should
be a cooperative and mutually negotiated dialogue between all participants. One of the
issues that need such dialogical attention, West writes, is Black Nationalism and white
supremacy. He explains Black Nationalism and white supremacy by writing,
Black nationalists usually call upon black people to close ranks, to distrust most
whites (since the reliable whites are few and relatively powerless in the face of
white supremacy), and to promote forms of black self-love, self-defense, and self
determination. It views white supremacy as the definitive systemic constraint on
black cultural, political, and economic development. More pointedly, black
nationalists claim that American democracy is a modern form of tyranny on the
part of the white majority over the black minority. For them, black sanity and
freedom requires that America not serve as the major framework in which to
understand the future of black people. Instead, American civilization—like all
civilizations—rises and falls, ebbs and flows. And owing to its deep-seated
racism, this society does not warrant black allegiance or loyalty. White supremacy
dictates the limits of the operation of American democracy—with black folk the
indispensable sacrificial lamb vital to its sustenance. (1996, p. 73)
This is a reorientation from the Talented Tenth helping the masses to assimilate
into mainstream American society. Instead, West argues that public intellectuals need to
maintain a dialogue with fellow citizens in order to help illuminate the functions of white
supremacy as tyranny against the assimilation DuBois was suggesting. These are the
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issues that need to be debated dialogically. To do that, the Talented Tenth needs to
assume a role not so much as guides toward assimilation into the mainstream of white
supremacist society, but rather as equal partners with the masses in defining and opposing
white supremacy.
This reorientation leads to West‘s discussion of DuBois‘ concept of double
consciousness. West discusses all three codings—black perspective, white perspective,
and black response—in this passage:
To be a black human being under circumstances in which one‘s humanity is
questioned is not only to face a difficult challenge, but also to exercise a
demanding discipline.
The sheer absurdity of being a black human being whose black body is
viewed as an abomination, whose black thoughts are perceived as debased, and
whose black pain and grief are rendered invisible on the human and moral scale is
the New World context in which black culture emerged. (1996, p. 80)
This challenge, and the discipline of living with one‘s humanity made invisible, is
double consciousness. A critical and dialogical focus on this issue, instead of a focus on
assimilation, could be part of West‘s reorientation of the Talented Tenth from elitist
directors to equal negotiators with all African Americans, and, perhaps, with other people
of color, and hopefully with some white people.
In this writing, West illuminates the elitist pitfalls of DuBois‘ model of the
Talented Tenth, but he repositions that class in a more-democratic and more-dialogical
relationship with the less-assimilated African Americans. The result is a return to DuBois
that links his concepts of the Talented Tenth and double consciousness in a more
dialogical and empowering way. West writes,
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Black people will not succeed in American society if they are fully and freely
themselves. Instead, they must ―endure petty insults with a smile, shut [their] eyes
to wrong.‖ They must not be too frank and outspoken and must never fail to
flatter and be pleasant in order to lessen white unease and discomfort. Needless to
say, this is not the raw stuff for healthy relations between black and white people.
Yet this suppression of black rage—the reducing ―the boiling to a
simmer‖—backfires in the end . . . After playing the role and wearing the mask in
the white world, one may accept the white world‘s view of oneself. (1996, p. 87)
Exposing, explaining, and debating this danger of double consciousness (instead
of promoting assimilation through wearing a mask, which can backfire) seems to be
West‘s view of how the Talented Tenth can help the black and broader American
communities clarify and overcome white supremacy.

Ellis Cose, Rage of a Privileged Class
In Rage of a Privileged Class, Ellis Cose (1993) organizes interviews and
testimonies into shared narratives of middle-class African Americans. Cose reveals
widespread experiences of success in school and earning desirable and respected
employment positions. These successes, however, are often followed by limited
opportunities for further advancement and episodes of ―subtle discrimination‖ (Cose,
1993, p. 17).
For example, Cose shares the story of Joseph Boyce, who served as bureau chief
of Time magazine in Atlanta. Boyce was transferred to New York to become the assistant
bureau chief there, and according to their policy, Time Inc. offered to pay Boyce 105
percent of the appraised value of his house. Boyce, however, got an appraisal from a
realtor that he knew was too low. He asked his white secretary to pretend the house was
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hers when the next appraisers came. They appraised the house at a 15 percent higher
value (Cose, 1993, p. 43). Although it may be argued that the second realtor may have
offered the higher appraisal to Boyce, as well, Cose shares many examples of whites
offering better deals and more trust to whites than to blacks. The examples add up to a
pattern of discrimination. Cose generalizes the responses to this kind of racism by
writing,
Few human beings of any race could survive the psychic toll of uninterrupted
anger. Those who did would be in such a miserable state that they could scarcely
cope with life, much less succeed at it. In successful individuals, especially those
who are members of racial minority groups, even righteous rage tends to be
leavened with humor and grace. What is constant is not anger but awareness,
awareness that even the most pleasant interracial encounter can suddenly become
awkward, ugly or worse. (1993, p. 44)
Cose reveals a relationship between awareness, anger, and humor that many
African Americans are burdened to navigate. And since this condition can result from the
subtle racism that white Americans deny and dismiss, the whole problem is attributed to
African Americans, while white participation and accountability is denied. This situating
of subtle racism as a black problem of awareness, anger, and humor is part of the problem
of double consciousness. Blacks are forced to deal not only with white perspectives and
white unawareness of how they have to deal with white perspectives, but blacks also have
to keep their responses to subtle racism suppressed with awareness and humor, so they do
not upset the whites by illuminating their racist behavior. Showing the black and white
perspectives, the first and second codings, Cose writes,
Among successful blacks—and among many who belong to other ethnic minority
groups as well—the number who spend much of their energy fighting desperation
is alarmingly high, notwithstanding that we live in an age where legions of white
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men [sic: and white women] have concluded that they are the group most
discriminated against. That the pain of those blacks is generally invisible to
whites in part reflects that voicing of it can carry consequences. (1993, p. 35)
So there are levels of subtle racism. There is a surface level of promotion
discrimination, real estate discrimination, shopping discrimination, and other forms of
subtle inequity. There is also a psychological level involved, whereby black people have
to keep their feelings about the surface discrimination inside themselves so they do not
upset the whites, who are practicing or ignoring the surface discrimination. Black
awareness, grace, and humor become survival tools not just for blacks, but for whites too.
Blacks carry the double burden of being oppressed and of keeping their oppression from
upsetting the whites. That may be why, Cose says (third coding, black response),
Alan Poussaint, associate professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and
a close advisor to Bill Cosby, sees black self-censorship as a simple tool of
survival. ―It‘s always a risk for a black person in a predominantly white
corporation to express individual anger,‖ he says, ―because whites do not
understand what the anger is about.‖

Pattern Codings
In this section, Personal and Invisible (to Whites) Struggles with Double
Consciousness, Fordham begins by showing the struggles black students face between
their own identities and the identities imposed by their schools. Cose shows that the
imposed identities are continued after high school and in the professional world. These
conflicts are the first pattern coding, as facing the conflicts indicates that the subjugated
people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social position. The confusion
experienced by the high school students and the anger of the adults is their awareness of
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the dehumanization they face because of the perspectives of the domineering white
population. Cose reveals that blacks have to be cautious about maintaining a sense of
humor and grace because they know how quickly whites can become upset and
dangerous when their sense of color blindness is questioned. This humor and grace is one
way black double consciousness is a survival tactic and a way to fight dehumanization,
but it is a heavy burden, nonetheless, necessitating complicated navigation between who
one is and how one responds to the expectations of white others.
West extends the role of double consciousness as a survival tactic and form of
resistance to dehumanization. He does this by first suggesting a new relationship between
the educated and professional African American class and the masses. Instead of an elitist
Talented Tenth leading from an authoritarian and distant position, West is calling for
dialogical participation and equality between all groups of African Americans. If this
dialogue and equality leads toward new exposures and negotiations of double
consciousness—instead of maintaining the accommodationalism of racelessness and the
silencing of anger—then the personal and hidden aspects of double consciousness might
become clearer and more open for discussion. In that way, double consciousness might
become a more-empowering survival tactic.
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CHAPTER 21
FINDINGS SECTION SIX:
BLACK RESISTANCE TO DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

This model reveals some of the ways African Americans conceptualize and
confront their position of unilateral double consciousness. Double consciousness can be a
sophisticated and insightful response to those who lack double consciousness. Double
consciousness of some can challenge the double-consciousness deficits of others. To
show these dynamics, Henry Louis Gates (1992) in Loose Canons, Donaldo Macedo
(1994) in Literacies of Power, and Ralph Ellison (1989) in Invisible Man (first published
in 1947), are first coded to show black perspective, white perspective, and black
response. They are then pattern-coded to illuminate their common messages.

Henry Louis Gates Jr., Loose Canons: Notes on the Culture Wars, and Donaldo
Macedo, Literacies of Power
Gates‘s essays in Loose Canons (1992) were originally written as oral presentations
to be delivered by Gates. He collected them into this published volume to help contribute
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to the development of shared understandings and respect between the divided racial,
cultural, and ethnic groups in American and international societies. Through Gates‘s
discussions of American literature and American culture, the book calls for and helps
shed light on how academia in the U.S. is already multicultural, and how it can continue
to grow intellectually through multiculturalism. Gates writes with the optimism, hope,
and openness, that,
[a]ny human being sufficiently curious and motivated can fully possess another
culture, no matter how ―alien‖ it may appear to be. (1992, p. xv)
This view—that people can truly share each other‘s cultures—supports the idea that
double consciousness can be a positive ability. If double consciousness can help people
interact with another culture by helping people see how they appear to people of that
culture, then double consciousness could become a form of cultural mobility or border
crossing. Although Gates does not discuss it explicitly, some of his writing does
implicitly address double consciousness.
In chapter 2 of Loose Canons, ―The Master‘s Pieces: On Canon Formation and the
African-American Tradition,‖ Gates implicitly appropriates double consciousness. He
turns the concept from a negative and harmful condition to a healthy and empowering
sense of agency. Gates begins the chapter by reviewing the history of African Americans‘
efforts to define and compile an African American literary canon. He offers a meaning of
canon by explaining,
I suppose the literary canon is, in no very grand sense, the commonplace book of
our shared culture, in which we have written down the texts and titles that we
want to remember, that had some special meaning for us. (1992, p. 21)
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A commonplace book of shared culture would likely show common histories,
experiences, positions, tastes, perspectives, values, and ideals that help form a record of
the shared ways of life that lead to a sense of belonging. Perhaps that is part of the special
meaning of the texts to which Gates refers.
Gates continues by briefly exploring the long African American history of
compiling texts into anthologies to bring together some of the African American writings
that reveal the shared experiences of black Americans. These include anthologies by
Armand Lanusse (as far back as the antebellum period, in 1845), William G. Allen in
1849, James Weldon Johnson in 1922, Alain Locke in 1925, V. F. Calverton in 1929, and
the anthology Gates himself edited with Kwame Anthony Appiah (Gates, 1992, pp. 24–
31).
Gates then discusses some views that are opposed to black canon formation. Here,
in response to these oppositions, is where Gates appropriates double consciousness,
turning it from an oppressive condition to an empowering form of agency.
Gates explains that William Bennett ―claims that black people can have no canon,
no masterpieces . . .‖ (Gates, 1992, p. 33). This position maintains that introducing a
black canon would politicize the established and mainstream literary canon. The question
is raised about whether a black canon would politicize academics, or whether it would
illuminate the fact that literary canons, like all of academics, are already political, but just
not seen as political. Donaldo Macedo shows how this is true of the mainstream canon,
and how a black canon reveals, but does not create, the politics of canons. Macedo writes,
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[T]here was never a ―common culture‖ in which people of all races and cultures
equally participated. The United States was founded on a cultural hegemony that
privileged and assigned control to the White patriarchy and relegated other racial,
cultural, and gender groups to a culture of silence. (1994, p. 44)
The development, or recognition, of a black canon would expose the fact that the
common culture assumed by the mainstream canon is not a common culture at all. It only
seems common to some because those excluded are not recognized as such. Their
invisibility is invisible to those who think the mainstream canon is universal. That is how
the mainstream canon can seem universal, and also, how the mainstream canon is
political, even as it claims and appears to be apolitical. Gates writes,
That people can maintain a straight face while they protest the eruption of politics
into something that has always been political from the beginning—well, it says
something about how remarkably successful official literary histories have been in
presenting themselves as natural and neutral objects, untainted by worldly
interests. (1992, p. 33)
What people may be objecting to is not the politicization of literature, but the
exposure of the politics of literature. Macedo writes,
What [Allan] Bloom and other conservative educators have failed to acknowledge
is how the traditional approach to education has primarily served the interests of
the elite classes, mostly White males. If they were to acknowledge the elitist,
antidemocratic, and discriminatory nature of traditional approaches to learning,
they would understand the perceived anger and demands from the members of
those groups who have been denied access to the bastions of knowledge and
power. In Bloom‘s view, education is the acquisition of predefined forms of
knowledge that are organized around the study of Latin and Greek and the
mastery of the great classical works. This traditional approach to education is
inherently alienating in nature. On the one hand, it ignores the life experience,
history, culture, and language practices of students. On the other, it
overemphasizes the mastery and understanding of classical literature and the use
of great books as the only venue that enables on the search for the ―Good and
True.‖ (1994, p. 63)
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This position presents politics as an exposure of inequalities. In other words, it
rejects the view that if inequalities are not exposed, then those inequalities are not
political, nor do they exist. If the inequalities are exposed in areas that have been seen by
the mainstream as apolitical, then this exposure is seen as politicizing something that was
not previously political. Like Macedo, Gates is revealing, not creating, the politics of
canon formation. Therefore, he is seen as politicizing when he is actually revealing what
is already political.
The perspectives of Gates and Macedo are the first coding, the black perspective
(and in this case, Macedo contributes the broader perspective of people of color). The
perspectives of Bloom and Bennett are the second coding, the white perspective. In
response to Bloom and Bennett‘s putatively depoliticizing perspectives, Gates offers
powerful examples of how double consciousness can be transformed from a harmful
assault on one‘s sense of self to a form of critical thinking and agency. Gates writes,
[T]o deny us the process of exploring and reclaiming our subjectivity before we
critique it is the critical version of the grandfather clause, the double privilege of
categories that happen to be preconstituted. Such a position leaves us nowhere,
invisible and voiceless in the republic of Western letters. Consider the irony:
precisely when we (and other Third World peoples) obtain the complex
wherewithal to define our black subjectivity in the republic of Western letters, our
theoretical colleagues declare that there ain‘t no subject, so why should we be
bothered with that? (1992, p. 35-36)
This concept of a ―double privilege of preconstituted position‖ means that both
objectivity and the subject can be rejected after the positions, privileges, exclusions, and
invisibilities created by those senses of objectivity and the subject have already been
established and naturalized. The ―double privilege‖ refers to mainstream society‘s
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position of dominance and exclusion, which is then dismissed after it has become the
standard, so ensconced that it is no longer noticed as the norm. Exposing this view is a
kind of double consciousness that breaks down and examines the broader social dynamics
and rationalizations that perpetuate invisibility and exclusion by denial and evasion.
Gates explores the illuminating debate between a kind of double consciousness that
speaks, through and of its own duality, to its counterpart of double privilege

Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man
Ralph Ellison‘s Invisible Man, originally published in 1947, is a novel about a
young African American man whose sense of himself develops as an internal identity that
is not recognized or accepted by other people. This young man can only be referred to as
―Invisible Man‖ because his real name is never revealed. It is as though he has no name.
Invisible Man is a student at an elite southern college who is expelled for driving
off campus with one of the founders, Mr. Norton (at Mr. Norton‘s request), and for the
fact that Mr. Norton is made to listen to an upsetting and shocking story of incest.
Curious to meet a member of the local community, Mr. Norton spontaneously asks
Invisible Man to stop so they can meet and talk with Jim Trueblood, a local black farmer
the see along the way. Mr. Norton is shocked when Trueblood reveals how he committed
incest with his own daughter. After his expulsion, Invisible Man travels north to find
work, and he is continually betrayed along the way. Everyone he meets has a prescribed
role for Invisible Man, but no one can recognize or accept Invisible Man for who he is, or
on his own terms.
283

The three codings of black perspective, white perspective, and black response can
be found after Invisible Man and Mr. Norton meet Jim Trueblood. Mr. Norton is quite
upset by Jim‘s story of incest, and as they are driving away, Invisible Man says,
Suddenly Mr. Norton touched me on the shoulder. ―I must have a little stimulant,
young man. A little whiskey.‖
―Yes, sir. Are you all right, sir?‖
―A little faint, but a stimulant . . .‖ (Ellison, 1989, p. 69)
Invisible Man takes Mr. Norton to the nearby Golden Day, a bar and brothel, so
Mr. Norton can have a drink and collect himself. However, instead of having a
comfortable and relaxing respite, Mr. Norton and Invisible Man meet up with a veteran
who is also visiting the Golden Day. ―The Vet‖ reveals all three codings at the same time:
―You see,‖ he said turning to Mr. Norton, ―he has eyes and ears and a good
distended African nose, but he fails to understand the simple facts of life.
Understand. Understand? It‘s worse than that. He registers with his sense but
short-circuits his brain. Nothing has meaning. He takes it in but he doesn‘t digest
it. Already he is—well, bless my soul! Behold! A walking zombie! Already he‘s
learned to repress not only his emotions but his humanity. He‘s invisible, a
waking personification of the Negative, the most perfect achievement of your
dreams, sir! The mechanical man! . . . Poor stumblers, neither of you can see the
other. To you he is a mark on the scorecard of your achievement, a thing and not a
man; a child or even less—a black amorphous thing. And you, for all your power,
are not even a man to him, but a God, a force.‖ (1989, pp. 94–95)
The Vet shows that Invisible Man has a black perspective of which he is not
aware. The Vet also shows that Mr. Norton has a white perspective of which he is not
aware. The Vet‘s own perspective—his critique of the first two perspectives—is double
consciousness.
The black perspective, that of Invisible Man as explained by the Vet, is one of
self-negation. Invisible Man is trying so hard to assimilate that he loses the distinction
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between his own identity and the role he is trying to fill for his school, and for Mr.
Norton. Who he is has become dependent on, and determined by, how well Invisible Man
can abnegate his own sense of self so that he can be shaped by the images others project
onto him.
The white perspective of Mr. Norton, also explained by the Vet, is the sense of
philanthropy Mr. Norton gets from seeing Invisible Man fit the image of assimilation that
is ascribed to him. Mr. Norton does not realize that the more he putatively helps Invisible
Man assimilate, the more he is actually alienating Invisible Man from himself. This
means that the relationship between Mr. Norton and Invisible Man becomes more
mutually estranged even as they think it becomes closer.
This is why the Vet says, ―Poor stumblers, neither of you can see the other.‖ It is
the Vet‘s double consciousness that enables him to see Invisible Man and Mr. Norton
from their shared perspective while also seeing their perspectives from his own. Mr.
Norton and Invisible Man are invisible to themselves and to each other. Only the Vet has
the double consciousness necessary to see their assumed familiarity, which is actually
alienation.
It takes a long time and a lot of anguish, but Invisible Man eventually develops
his own critical double consciousness. Near the end of the book, Invisible Man says,
It was a joke, an absurd joke. And now I looked around a corner of my mind and
saw Jack and Norton and Emerson merge into one single white figure. They were
very much the same, each attempting to force his picture of reality upon me and
neither giving a hoot in hell for how things looked to me. I was simply a material,
a natural resource to be used. I had switched from the arrogant absurdity of
Norton and Emerson to that of Jack and the Brotherhood, and it all came out the
same—except that now I recognized my invisibility. (1989, p. 508)
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Pattern Codings
Ellison and Gates show how critical awareness of one‘s own invisibility can be
empowering when it‘s used to counteract the psychological assault of that invisibility.
The first pattern coding is that subjugated people are often aware and critical of their
disadvantaged social position. By showing Invisible Man‘s futile and naive intention to
assimilate, Ellison, through the Vet, challenges and rejects Mr. Norton‘s patronizing
treatment. Gates and Macedo place the Vet‘s insights into a broader perspective. They
show that when the dominating and patronizing positions are seen as apolitical—as they
are in Invisible Man, for example—the awareness the Vet provides is inaccessible to
Invisible Man and Mr. Norton. In this way, the contrast between awareness and
unawareness of one‘s disadvantaged social position is captured by Ellison in a specific
way, while the contrast is captured by Gates and Macedo in a broader way.
In the second pattern coding, subjugated people are dehumanized, and they
struggle with their position and with the perspectives of the domineering population.
Gates, Macedo, and the Vet realize their dehumanization and try to help others
understand how they are in the same position. In so doing, they reveal that it is not only
African Americans or people of color in general who are subjugated and dehumanized.
Whites, including Mr. Norton, Allen Bloom, and William Bennett, are also shown to be
dehumanized by their inability to engage people of color outside their dominating and
supposedly depoliticized relations. This struggle with the domineering population, then,
is not just internal and defensive, but it is also the assertion of a perspective that can help
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transform mainstream society, enabling people to recognize how white privilege is
maintained at the cost of dehumanizing both the privileged and the subjugated.
The third pattern coding is that the struggle with domineering perspectives, the
struggle with double consciousness, is a survival tactic and form of resistance against
dehumanization. Gates, Macedo, and the Vet use their double consciousness as much
more than a survival tactic. In their cases, it can be seen as a powerful intervention and
form of resistance. They reveal that, for double consciousness to be oppressive, the
political has to be seen as apolitical, and the patronizing, dehumanizing relations between
the races have to be seen as fair and assimilative. A deeper look, though, as provided by
the Vet, reveals that there can be an epiphany or a gradual realization of double
consciousness itself. When that happens, double consciousness can be brought into
deliberate consciousness and watched and critiqued as it is functioning. In other words,
the clash of perspectives can be examined and explored instead of just being endured
without reflection. The Vet demonstrates such examination and exploration on a personal
level, while Gates and Macedo demonstrate how double consciousness can edify a
societal level of critical inquiry.
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CHAPTER 22
FINDINGS SECTION SEVEN:
IRONY, BROADENING AND SHARING OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

This final section of data analysis focuses on writers who help show how and why
double consciousness can be positive and constructive when it is shared across color,
language, ethnic, and cultural lines. When only one group has double consciousness—
when double consciousness is unilateral—then the entire burden of adaptation with
negation is ascribed to that group.
However, when double consciousness is shared—when it is multilateral—then all
groups can negotiate how they are seen by each other. This multilateral double
consciousness can eliminate the negation of double consciousness and replace it with
dialogue that equalizes the participants by sharing the development of identities and
positions through negotiation rather than through imposition. Several writers explicitly
suggest what this thesis calls multilateral double consciousness: David Mura (1998),
Carlos Fuentes (1992), Vernon Andrews (2003), and Langston Hughes (1967, 1969).
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Vernon Andrews, “Self-Reflection and the Reflected Self: African American Double
Consciousness and the Social (Psychological) Mirror”
In the personal narrative, ―Self-Reflection and the Reflected Self: African
American Double Consciousness and the Social (Psychological) Mirror,‖ Vernon
Andrews (2003, pp. 59–79) explores how, in current times, his own identity is negotiated,
recognized, or dismissed. To provide a framework, Andrews discusses a broad range of
social settings and locations, including professional athletics and popular music;
academic forums; and interracial interactions in the U.S., England, and New Zealand. A
theme within the situations is how blacks are forced to negotiate, interpret, and respond to
how they are viewed with suspicion by white people. Andrews also discusses how he has
expected suspicion from white people in certain situations, only to realize later that he
had been treated with respect and fairness.
Andrews (2003) says (first coding, black perspective),
In a mixed setting how do we continually shift and decide which group is the true
social mirror? The choice of audiences to reflect is a daily situational contestation
with professional African Americans who are always and constantly in crosscultural settings and interactions. Whose norms do you choose? Who is watching?
Whose imagination do you reflect? (2003, p. 73)
This question of choice between conflicting representations of oneself is unilateral
because the question is situated as pertaining to people of color within mainstream
American society, instead of pertaining to everyone within society in relation to each
other. It is a conflict and problem that involves the whole American community, but that
community views the conflict as one for people of color only. This unilateral double
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consciousness is one way whiteness is the self-denying norm. Andrews (2003) explains
(second coding, white perspective),
By the hyper-critique of past actions and white behaviors in interracial
environments, it might be easy for white students, professors and others to adapt a
―say nothing, do nothing‖ approach in ambivalent interaction scenarios. (2003, p.
77)
Whites might not want to face the discomfort of speaking or acting when their
own discomfort and uncertainty with white normalcy might be exposed and disrupted.
After all, if they do not know how to deal with themselves as others see them, then they
can do nothing but stay silent. This raises the question: What are whites uncomfortable
with? Is it a discomfort because they do not have the language and perspective to
consider whose norms to choose and whose imagination to engage? Or is it a discomfort
because, on the one hand, they are dependent on not having such language and
perspective, while also, on the other hand, needing to feel that they do not support the
system of white supremacy—a system that allows this very dependency, which directs
their consideration of whose norms to choose and whose imagination to engage?
Unilateral double consciousness for people of color may be the price they have to
pay for white dependence on a white supremacist system that allows whites to claim to
believe in equality only because they do not, or will not, see how that sense of equality is
enabled by redoubling the oppression of people of color. In other words, the more whites
pursue a false sense of equality through their denied dependence on white supremacy,
and through the absence of their own double consciousness, the more oppressive they
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become. Adaptation becomes more and more the burden of those oppressed by unequal
adaptation. Andrews (2003) suggests (third coding, black response),
[S]ay what you think in social settings with African Americans. But also think
about what you say, and if called upon to self-reflect, be willing to step outside
the norm of whiteness, white rules, white manners and white hegemony to be able
to take the imagined position of the social/racial/cultural/gendered other. Part and
parcel of the ability of African Americans to redefine interracial social spaces as
appropriate venues for the enactment of blackness might be the dual ability for
whites to exhibit double consciousness about multiple meanings of the social acts
of non-whites. (2003, p. 77)
Andrews is suggesting that whites learn how to see themselves as others. He is
suggesting that they develop their own double consciousness. He is suggesting that this
white (or multilateral) double consciousness could help whites learn more about people
of color. Also, by developing the ability to see oneself as the other, whites can learn more
about their own social positions and personal identities by helping to open up the topic of
double consciousness to interracial discussion. Then, instead of the invisibility of
unilateral double consciousness being a pillar of white supremacy, the sharing and
discussion of multilateral double consciousness could become a way to expose and
dismantle white supremacy as a structure of thought and as a structure of society.

Carlos Fuentes, “The Mirror of the Other”
In ―The Mirror of the Other,‖ Carlos Fuentes (1992) discusses how the long
history of Hispanic people throughout North America is remembered through art, even
though this history and art is not appreciated as indigenous by the mainstream. This
perspective raises the question of what it means for everyone, people of color and whites,
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to be Americans. Is the mainstream really a melting pot or some kind of salad, where
everyone can live together on their own terms? Or are these metaphors merely a form of
forced assimilation that erroneously, and deceptively, claims to be equalizing? Fuentes
asks (first coding, black perspective),
So the cultural dilemma of the American of Mexican, Cuban or Puerto Rican
descent is suddenly universalized: to integrate or not? To maintain a personality
and add to the diversity of North American society, or to fade away into
anonymity in the name of the after-all nonexistent ―melting pot?‖ (1992, p. 3)
The choice to Fuentes is between maintaining cultural and personal integrity by
contributing to diversifying the U.S., or becoming anonymous through the illusion of
surrendering to the melting-pot metaphor. Fuentes is posing the problem as more than
just opposing the oppression of anonymous integration. He is situating people of color as
having contributing roles in helping the U.S. become more democratic through diversity.
Diversifying the U.S., then, is a gift to the country as well as a demand that the country
must answer. This perspective, however, contradicts the way freedom is defined by and
for the mainstream. Fuentes explains (second coding, white perspective),
When it achieved independence, the Mexican republic inherited these best,
underpopulated territories, but lost them in 1848 to the expanding North
American republic and its ideology of Manifest Destiny: the U.S.A., from sea to
shining sea. (1992, p. 1)
There is no place in the mainstream for the gift and demand that people of color
maintain their cultural and personal integrity by helping to diversify the U.S. on their own
terms. This type of freedom prevents equality, and must hide that prevention of equality
from itself so the freedom can seem legitimate to the mainstream. However, there is a
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way out of this conflict between freedom and equality. Fuentes explains (third coding,
response from people of color),
[W]hen we embrace the Other, we not only meet ourselves, we embrace the
marginal images that the modern world, optimistic and progressive as it has been,
has shunned and has then paid a price for forgetting. (1992, p. 3)
It is through seeing other people on their own terms that we can learn about who
we are. Fuentes illuminates that people are not only how they see themselves. They are
also how they are seen by others. However, Fuentes reveals that the modern world,
mainstream white society, has overemphasized its own view of itself and others to the
point of forgetting how to see itself from the perspectives of others. Switching from such
forgetting to remembering can involve white, or multilateral, double consciousness as a
route toward whites learning how they may have roles and identities in the broad
multicultural communities of which they are members, but of which they are not aware.
In this sense, the mainstream society‘s principal freedom is freedom from awareness, or
the freedom to be ignorant of itself and other people. This is freedom from learning how
to be part of the human community. Multilateral double consciousness would help
illuminate this problem so that it could be identified and discussed within and across all
multicultural communities. This would make it a freedom from ignorance rather than a
freedom from awareness.
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David Mura, “Strangers in the Village”
David Mura‘s ―Strangers in the Village,‖ published in The Graywolf Annual Five:
Multicultural Literacy (1988) is an essay that covers a wide range of topics to show how
white Americans can, but usually don‘t, learn to see themselves as they are seen by
people of color. Mura discusses how white parents hire black nannies, which leaves the
black women‘s children to fend for themselves while their mothers are taking care of
other people‘s children. He writes about how homes of Japanese Americans were sold to
white Americans for very low prices when Japanese Americans were interned or
imprisoned during World War II. Mura also discusses racial stereotypes in films and
debates that occur between actors of color over whether or not they should play such
roles. Mura discusses how Frantz Fanon helped him understand the psychological costs
of oppression, and how Stanley Crouch helped him critique some writings by James
Baldwin as binary and lacking the subtlety and nuance of Baldwin‘s other writings.
Within this wide range of topics, Mura implicitly shows that double
consciousness can and should be shared by people of all cultures as a route toward selfunderstanding, integration, and equality. Mura writes (first coding, black perspective),
Blacks, and other colored minorities, must generally know two cultures to
survive—the culture of middle-class whites and their own minority culture. (1988,
p. 137)
This insight shows that this first coding is not only a black perspective. It is
shared by other people of color who are also burdened with adjusting to two cultures,
even though this adjustment is not shared by whites, into whose communities the people
of color must adjust. This, in other words, is unilateral integration, and a form of
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inequality within the putatively equalizing strategy of integration. The goal of integration
is subverted by the method of unilateral integration.
This self-subversion of unilateral integration is clarified by Mura‘s writing
(second coding, white perspective), ―Middle-class whites need only to know one culture‖
(1988, p. 137). He elaborates on the kinds of confusion and alienation that can result from
such monoculturalism by writing,
As I talk [with white friends about images of Asians in American society] I often
sense their confusion, the limits of their understanding of the world. They become
angry, defensive. ―We all have experiences others can‘t relate to,‖ they reply and
equate issues of race with prejudice against women or Italians or rich people.
Such generalizations can sometimes be used to express sympathy with victims of
prejudice, but as used by many whites, it generally attempts to shut down racial
anger by denying the distinct causes of that anger, thereby rendering it
meaningless. Another form of this tactic is the reply, ―I think of you just as a
white person,‖ or, a bit less chauvinistically, ―I think of you as an individual.‖
While, at one time in my life, I would have taken this for a compliment, my reply
now is, ―I don‘t want to be a white person. Why can‘t I be who I am? Why can‘t
you think of me as a Japanese-American and as an individual?‖
Mura raises the vital question of whether whites, who only have to know their
own culture, are sympathetic or evasive when they assert, or impose, their own views of
the challenges people of color face. Mura also shows how whites may be sympathetic to
or evasive of his own identity as a Japanese American and an individual. Mura views the
predominant white discourse as one that attempts to shut down racial anger in people of
color. This white perspective reinforces unilateral integration by foisting the whole
problem onto people of color and exonerating whites through the self-serving and
negating language of ―colorblindness.‖ The message from whites is for people of color to
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accept white perspectives and the accompanying negation so they can assimilate,
presenting this as the only option.
As an alternative, Mura not only reveals his own double consciousness, but he
also implies that whites can integrate equally by learning how to see themselves as whites
from the perspectives of people of color. Mura writes (third coding, people of color
response),
[A] balance can only be achieved if the speaker who has dominated speaks less
and listens more . . . [O]nly when whites in America begin to listen to the voices
of the colored minorities and the Third World will they come to understand not
just those voices but also themselves and their world. Reality is not simply
knowing who we think we are, but also what others think of us. (1988, p. 152)
Part of this self-understanding and world-understanding involves white awareness
of how what might seem fair to them, and fair to assert to people of color, is really a form
of domination. Whites not seeing color and only seeing individuals, and whites missing
the unique causes of oppression of people of color, may not seem oppressive from
perspectives of good-intentioned but evasive whites. These issues of what is and what is
not an oppressive perspective (for example, a perspective lacking double consciousness)
can be illuminated and explored across racial lines. Such exploration can help make those
racial lines less impenetrable by helping people engage with each other as equals, as
individuals, and as racialized subjects in the exploration.
Langston Hughes shows his understandings of racial lines in two of his poems.
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First, showing the negation he experiences from whites in ―Impasse,‖ he writes,
I could tell you,
If I wanted to,
What makes me
What I am.
But I don‘t
Really want to—
And you don‘t
Give a damn. (1989, p. 85)
However, Hughes has a more positive message that can help whites engage him
as an equal and on his own terms. In, ―Down Where I Am,‖ Hughes writes,
Too many years
Beatin‘ at the door—
I done beat my
Both fists sore.
Too many years
Tryin‘ to get up there—
Done broke my ankles down,
Got nowhere.
Too many years
Climbin‘ that hill,
‘Bout out of breath.
I got my fill.
I‘m gonna plant my feet
On solid ground.
If you want to see me,
Come down. 1989, p. 50)
In response to a paper written about Langston Hughes, Calvin Hernton, a college
professor (personal communication, 1990) wrote on the paper, ―Why don‘t whites come
down? What stops them? Perhaps to come down is to get down, to be truly human, which
is the greatest risk anyone can take.‖
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Pattern Codings

The first pattern coding is that subjugated people are often aware and critical of
their disadvantaged social position. However, in these writings, the focus is on how
people in the dominating and imposing positions can benefit themselves and others by
developing their own double consciousness. Only then can they begin a dialogue about
themselves, others, and double consciousness itself.
In the second pattern coding, subjugated people are dehumanized, and they
struggle with their position and with the perspectives of the domineering population.
However, in this section, the focus is redirected from the dehumanization of people with
double consciousness; in fact, it becomes the people without double consciousness who
are seen as culturally deprived—as victims of their own privileges. They cannot function
outside their dominant and accommodated positions, so they are trapped in a sheltered
outlook that depends on the accommodation and tolerance of those whom the sheltered
oppress. With critical double consciousness, or to those with such awareness, it is the
oppressors who are also oppressed by their own oppression.
The third pattern coding is that the struggle with domineering perspectives, the
struggle with double consciousness, is a survival tactic and form of resistance against
dehumanization. In this section, however, critical double consciousness becomes a form
of liberation. When subjugated people are aware of their own double consciousness, and
when they can view their oppression through the critique of their double consciousness,
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then their position and perspective can expose and penetrate their own invisibility and the
invisibility of others. Perhaps it is this combination of illuminating the invisibility of
oneself and others that is the true liberation of double consciousness.

299

CHAPTER 23
CONCLUSION OF FINDINGS: UNILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DOUBLE
CONSCIOUSNESS

The seven typologies of double consciousness show that double consciousness
can be harmful, but it can also be empowering when it helps people become more critical
of their subjugated positions. For example, Bigger, in Wright‘s Native Son, and Bob
Jones, in Himes‘s If He Hollers Let Him Go, see themselves from the perspectives of
white others to the point of losing their own senses of themselves from their own
perspectives. Conversely, Pemberton, in The Hottest Water in Chicago, and Ralph
Ellison, in Invisible Man and Shadow and Act, show how they can use their combination
of self-defined and imposed identities to critique and understand their inferior position.
This insight turns their double consciousness from dehumanizing negation to
empowering insight. In these ways, double consciousness can be either submersion in
white supremacy or opposition to white supremacy.
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The issue of double consciousness as submersion in white supremacy or
opposition to white supremacy, so far, pertains to double consciousness as it relates only
to African Americans and people of color within their own selves and within their own
relationships with other people of color and with whites. In this way, double
consciousness is considered in its unilateral dimension. Double consciousness is
unilateral in that it is considered and experienced only as it relates to subjugated people.
However, there is a broader context for double consciousness, and that is
multilateral double consciousness. In this framework, the focus changes from how
subjugated people deal with self-defined and imposed positions as submersion or
opposition in relation to a distant and unaccountable broader structure of white
supremacy. Instead, with multilateral double consciousness, whites see themselves from
their own perspectives, while also viewing themselves as whites from the perspectives of
people of color. In this way, all parties have an equality of perspectives, identities, and
positions. That equality can be part of equalizing and revealing negotiations between the
dominating and subjugated communities, or whites and people of color.
This negotiation involves whites learning how they too are seen by and as others.
It is not only people of color who are seen as others. Whites are others too, but their
dominant position allows them to disregard, or be completely unaware of and
unconcerned with, how they are seen by and as others. That position of dominance can be
illuminated and brought under investigation with equal input by all parties when
everyone involved explores their positions together, through relationships that include
mutual double consciousness.
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When whites learn to develop their own double consciousness, then double
consciousness can be an ability and a burden that is equally shared across color (and
other) lines. No longer is imposed identity a hidden struggle against, or a one-sided
analysis of, dehumanization, as it is with unilateral double consciousness. Instead,
multilateral double consciousness brings all participants into equal debate, because all
participants have their own senses of themselves, the senses others have of them, and the
senses they have of other people. It is this new relationship of equality within inequality
that, for example, Gates and Macedo suggest by exposing the politics of positions and
relationships that may not seem political. This new relationship is also suggested by
Andrews, Mura, and Hughes as they call on whites to learn to see themselves as they are
seen by and as others.
The shift from unilateral to multilateral double consciousness could have a
significant effect on how equality is pursued in American classrooms and within debates
about education. The negotiations between teachers and between teachers and students
would become more equal. The preexisting negotiations would be revealed as less equal
and less equalizing than previously realized. To help conceptualize these changes, two
related areas of scholarship will be related to, and combined with, multilateral double
consciousness in the concluding section of this thesis: 1) Paulo Freire‘s concepts of
dialogue, unfinishedness and critical consciousness; and 2) Lilia Bartolomé‘s and
Donaldo Macedo‘s insights into teacher education.
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PART IV
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
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CHAPTER 24
DISCUSSION: FROM CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS TO MULTILATERAL
DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN TEACHER PREPARATION

A transition from unilateral double consciousness (UDC) to multilateral double
consciousness (MDC) means white people, or those in dominant positions, learn to see
themselves as white or dominant from the perspectives of people of color, or subjugated
people. This shift would share the problems revealed in the seven typologies of double
consciousness that are shown in the Findings section of this thesis. Instead of black
double consciousness being unilateral, it would be part of an equal negotiation where all
parties share, explore, critique, and develop their views of themselves and others. This
would mean that the imposition of identities would be replaced by the awareness and
practice of mutual construction of identities. Double consciousness would change from a
form of oppression of some to a form of dialogue and negotiation for all. Absence of
double consciousness would change from a privilege for the dominant to a form of
insight and shared inquiry into social formation of identities, on equal terms and with
mutual dependency between all parties.
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This empowerment of MDC can occur first through dialogue. Paulo Freire (1992,
2001, 2005) and Donaldo Macedo and Lilia Bartolomé (1999) present the kind, or
meaning, of dialogue to which MDC can contribute. Although not writing explicitly of
double consciousness, Freire captures the meaning of the concept and condition by
writing about dialogue:
[T]he task of the humanists is to see that the oppressed become aware of the fact
that as dual beings, ―housing‖ the oppressors within themselves, they cannot be
truly human.
This task implies that revolutionary leaders do not go to the people in
order to bring them a message of ―salvation,‖ but in order to come to know
through dialogue with them both their objective situation and their awareness of
that situation—the various levels of perception of themselves and of the world in
which and with which they exist. One cannot expect positive results from an
educational or political action program which fails to respect the particular view
of the world held by the people. Such a program constitutes cultural invasion,
good intentions notwithstanding. (1992, p. 84)
Dialogue can be more than equality between positions and perspectives. It can
also help create that equality. Toward creating equality, dialogue includes the
development of equal valuing and respecting between people of different worldviews.
When these forms of equality between worldviews are shared between people of unequal
racial positions, then the dialogue can transform cultural invasion of the dominant to
mutual sharing and negotiation between the subjugated and the dominant.
Then, the equal dialogue can lead to equal discussion of unequal conditions,
including how the oppressed are dehumanized by ―housing‖ the oppressors within
themselves. And this ―housing‖ can include the UDC of African Americans and other
minorities being forced to see themselves through the perspectives of white others, while
maintaining their own self-definitions. Dialogue can lead to interracial discussion of
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perspectives that develop from racial positions without those discussions becoming
repetitions and reinforcements of the inequalities (e.g. the silencing of the oppressed for
the impositions of the dominant). When all groups share awareness of how their own
dialogue with each other can be corrupted, then the corruption can be the focus of the
dialogue instead of the corruption being the framework and rule of the interaction. In
these ways, dialogue and MDC can be intimately connected. This connection can become
clearer when another Freirean concept is introduced and included.
Freire‘s concept of critical consciousness can help link dialogue with MDC.
Freire explains critical consciousness development in three stages. First, in the state of
―semi-intransitive consciousness‖ (Freire, 2005, p. 13), people are aware of their
biological needs and issues of survival. They are not aware of the political dynamics that
affect them. In this condition, people attend to effects they face without being aware of
the causes. UDC on the part of people of color, and absence of dialogue about that UDC,
can help limit both the oppressed and the oppressors to semi-intransitive consciousness.
When double consciousness is not discussed in dialogue, and when that dialogue does not
lead toward MDC, then how people see themselves and how they are seen by others—as
well as all of the political relationships and dynamics of imposition and
accommodation—remain out of reach and outside the realm of awareness. The dominant
population can also become mired in semi-intransitive consciousness, although they may
not notice its limitations. This is because the ignorance inherent in this type of
consciousness can seem like equality when all of the accommodation and adaptation is
relegated to people of color.
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As people emerge from this first stage of consciousness, they can enter the second
stage, but still not apprehend the whole complexity of their condition. In this second
stage, naive transitivity, as people become more aware of their position as political
subjects and agents, they realize that they can apprehend and act on the causes of their
conditions and positions. However, Freire writes that this stage of naive transitivity is
characterized by an over-simplification of problems; by a nostalgia for the past;
by underestimation of the common man; by a strong tendency to gregariousness;
by a lack of interest in investigation, accompanied by an accentuated taste for
fanciful explanations; by fragility of argument; by a strongly emotional style; by
the practice of polemics rather than dialogue; by magical explanations. (Freire,
2005, p. 14)
At this stage, problems are oversimplified, people are underestimated, and
arguments are frail and highly emotional. The problems are not completely invisible, but
they are not critically evaluated. Perhaps this is the stage at which color blindness
develops and discussion of race is considered racist. Then, there is no dialogue about
perspectives, or about how both oppressors and oppressed people have identities and
views of each other that can be explored as routes to mutual understanding, dependency,
and shared empowerment and cooperation. This level of critical consciousness does not
apprehend MDC.
Finally, critical transitivity (Freire, 2005, p. 15), or critical awareness (Freire,
2005, p. 15), or critical consciousness, is
[c]haracterized by depth in the interpretation of problems by the substitution of
causal principles for magical explanations; by the testing of one‘s ―findings‖ and
by openness to revision; by the attempt to avoid distortion when perceiving
problems and to avoid preconceived notions when analyzing them; by refusing to
transfer responsibility; by rejecting passive positions; by soundness of argument;
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by the practice of dialogue rather than polemics; by receptivity to the new . . .
(Freire, 2005, p. 14)
This process of critical consciousness includes powerful transitions. In earlier
stages, people simply respond to whatever conditions are imposed on them. Then they
develop simple-minded awareness of their being within political positions that they
cannot identify. With such awareness, people learn that they can act on those conditions
and positions, but their views and actions can be uncritical. Freire explains:
However, the further, crucial step from naive transitivity to critical transitivity
would not occur automatically. Achieving this step would thus require an active,
dialogical education program concerned with social and political responsibility . .
. (2005, p. 15)
Dialogue and critical consciousness develop together. It is through dialogue that
people can pursue a deeper interpretation of problems. This relationship between
dialogue and critical consciousness does not suggest what the interpretations of problems
will reveal. Rather, Freire shows that a sharing of perspectives on equal terms can lead all
parties toward insight into the dynamics and conditions of which they can have only
partial awareness if they view the dynamics and conditions in isolation and without
dialogue.
MDC can require and contribute to this process of dialogue and critical
consciousness. MDC opens views of oneself and others to negotiation. No longer, as with
UDC, are views imposed by whites onto people of color, who then have to try to
reconcile the contradictions even as the whites can ignore or dismiss such struggles of
reconciliation. Rather, with MDC, all parties develop their senses of themselves and
others through equal negotiation of multiple perspectives. No longer is identity a private
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matter. MDC situates an individual identity as a product of a political position that can be
exposed, explored, and developed through dialogue and critical consciousness.
There is an interdependency, then, between identities that critically conscious
people can recognize. And this interdependency can be part of the liberation and
humanization of both whites and people of color. Freire explains an ―unfinishedness‖ that
helps clarify the interdependency that can be found when MDC is pursued through
dialogue and critical consciousness. Freire explains,
I like to be human because in my unfinishedness I know that I am conditioned.
Yet conscious of such conditioning, I know that I can go beyond it, which is the
essential difference between conditioned and determined existence . . . Far from
being alien to our human condition, conscientization [critical consciousness] is
natural to ―unfinishedness‖ humanity that is aware of its unfinishedness. (2001,
pp. 54–55)
Critical consciousness can help reveal how people are unknowingly conditioned.
With such understanding, conditionings can be identified and surmounted. Being
―unfinished‖ means being aware that there is always more to learn about how people are
conditioned, and there is always more to do to understand how these conditionings affect
the ways people think and believe. Unfinishedness can be recognized and achieved with
MDC because, Freire writes,
Ideally, educators, students, and prospective teachers should together be
conversant with other forms of knowledge that are seldom part of the curriculum .
. . [S]ubjects in dialogue learn and grow by confronting their differences. (2001,
p. 58)
Other forms of knowledge, including equal and mutual knowledge of how people
see each other can enable awareness of unfinishedness. This awareness can help open a
dialogue between whites and people of color, to explore how their identities, positions,
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and perspectives are dependent on each other, even if they do not seem related outside of
an understanding of unfinishedness. This new understanding of unfinishedness includes
perspectives of oneself and others that are mutually constitutive (as in the ways blackness
and whiteness construct each other), and that are not ordinarily part of mainstream
academic curriculums.
Exploring this kind of mutual construction involves appreciating how
understanding and acting on people‘s own unfinishedness depends on their abilities to
dialogue with each other to expose and explore their views together. This process can
involve MDC, because confronting differences can include explorations of how whites
and all people—not just blacks, people of color, or subjugated people—can see
themselves from their own perspectives while also seeing themselves from other people‘s
perspectives. This universal unfinishedness, apprehended through critical consciousness
and dialogue, can open up these perspectives to shared inquiry. In this way, no single
group is burdened with another group‘s impositions of identities. Rather, the imposition
itself can become a topic of exploration through shared and mutually developed critical
consciousness and dialogue.
This relationship of shared inquiry through MDC can contribute to the kinds of
changes in education that are presented by Lilia Bartolomé in ―Beyond the Methods
Fetish‖ (Macedo and Bartolomé, 1999). This writing was originally published as a
journal article in The Harvard Educational Review (Bartolomé, 1994). It was later
expanded to become a chapter of the book Dancing with Bigotry (Macedo and
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Bartolomé, 1999). This expanded and elaborated chapter version of ―Beyond the
Methods Fetish‖ is discussed in this thesis.
In this chapter, Bartolomé discusses how many white teachers mistakenly
attribute academic difficulties of linguistic, racial, and cultural minority students to the
teacher‘s senses of the students‘ learning and cultural deficits. The teachers often believe
that the way to help minority students to overcome their supposed deficits is through new
techniques and methods of teaching. This kind of thinking attributes the problems of
minority education to the minority students themselves, and prevents attention to ways
the teachers‘ views of the students (and the broader political relations between dominant
and subjugated groups) affect teaching and learning (Macedo and Bartolomé, 1999, pp.
120–121). Instead of this deficit model of minority students and this fetish over methods,
Bartolomé reveals how teachers can improve their own performance, and be better
teachers for their students, by developing their awareness and their students‘ awareness
of how they and their students are situated within an under-addressed political dynamic
of assimilation that undermines the good intentions of the teachers. Bartolomé writes,
We believe that by taking a sociohistorical view of present-day conditions and
concerns that inform the lived experiences of socially perceived minority
students, prospective teachers are better able to comprehend the quasi-colonial
nature of minority children . . . By conducting a critical analysis of the
sociocultural realities in which subordinated students find themselves at school,
the implicit and explicit antagonistic relations between students and teachers (and
other school representatives) take on focal importance. (Macedo and Bartolome,
1999, pp. 122–123)
How are teachers, however well meaning they might be, complicit with forms of
domination, silencing, and assimilation that impede the academic performance of
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minority students? This question is quite hard to answer when teachers are not aware of
their complicity with these forms of domination, or when they are resistant to being
exposed to them. Teachers, especially white ones, need their own multilateral double
consciousness in order to help expose, explore and discuss how their own good intentions
may seem helpful to the teachers, but not to their students and colleagues of color.
Bartolomé‘s concept of political clarity helps expose and surmount some of the
ways teachers can unknowingly reproduce positions and relationships of dominance and
subjugation with their students of color and linguistic minority students. Such exposure
can empower teachers to overcome the limitations and oppression of their own
perspectives and practices. Bartolomé explains,
Political clarity refers to the process by which individuals achieve a deepening
awareness of the sociopolitical and economic realities that shape their lives and
their capacity to recreate them. In addition, it refers to the process by which
individuals come to better understand possible linkages between macro-level
political, economic, and social variables and subordinated groups‘ academic
performance at the micro-level classroom. Thus, it invariably requires linkages
between sociocultural structures and schooling. (Bartolomé, 1994, p. 178)
Political clarity can expand with MDC as a form of dialogue that can lead to
mutual development of critical consciousness between students of color and white
teachers. When white teachers learn how they are seen from the perspectives of students
of color, then both students and teachers can explore how their interactions, views, and
relationships may reflect broader sociocultural inequalities. This shared inquiry can
reveal how schooling can be political in ways that had not previously been identified.
Linking education to the development of political clarity for both students and
teachers, Bartolomé writes,
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A teacher‘s political clarity will not necessarily compensate for structural
inequalities that students face outside the classroom; however, teachers can, to the
best of their ability, help their students deal with injustices encountered inside and
outside the classroom. A number of possibilities exist for preparing students to
deal with the greater society‘s unfairness and inequality that range from engaging
in explicit discussions with students about their experiences to more indirect ways
(that nevertheless require a teacher who is politically clear), such as creating
democratic learning environments where students become accustomed to being
treated as competent and able individuals. (Macedo and Bartolomé, 1999, p. 126)
One of these possibilities can be coursework from the perspectives of MDC. Such
perspectives can enable dialogue that will lead students of color and teachers toward new
ways of interacting that will treat the students as competent and able to share their own
views, so that the whole class can explore how the students‘ views of whiteness are
important parts of dialogue. Also, such dialogue can expose how the exclusion of
students‘ views of whiteness reproduces forms of inequality within classrooms that
teachers and students may think are politically neutral. These are democratic learning
environments that can contribute to critical consciousness that develops through new and
negotiated appreciations of students‘ and teachers‘ unfinishedness.
Bartolomé helps lead teachers toward this new combination of political clarity,
dialogue, critical consciousness, unfinishedness, and MDC. She writes,
[T]eachers must confront and challenge their own social biases so as to honestly
begin to perceive their students as capable learners. Furthermore, they must
remain open to the fact that they will also learn from their students . . .
Acknowledging and using existing student language and knowledge makes good
pedagogical sense, and it also constitutes a humanizing experience for students
traditionally dehumanized and disempowered in the schools. (Macedo and
Bartolomé, 1999, p. 131)
Learning together about their social biases through their shared MDC
development with the students is a way white teachers can learn with their students and
313

create a humanizing and democratic educational experience for everyone. Teachers could
learn more about how they are seen as white, and how the exclusion of this perspective
had previously influenced class dynamics that may have appeared apolitical, since the
perspective on their whiteness was excluded. It is through exploring perspectives on
whiteness held by students of color that existing student knowledge can be used to create
dialogue, reveal unfinishedness, and lead toward critical consciousness for teachers and
students.
Schools of education, and all departments that produce teachers and professors,
can help prepare prospective teachers by helping them to develop MDC as a form of
political clarity before they begin teaching. For example, students could begin by reading
DuBois‘ discussion of double consciousness in Souls of Black Folk for an overview of the
concept. Then they could explore how Wright, through Bigger Thomas in Native Son and
Richard in Black Boy, enables white readers to first identify with the black protagonists
and then begin to share their outlooks.
Then, white prospective teachers could engage in a shift. Perhaps this could be
part of the vast revolution in their lives suggested by Wright in Black Boy. The shift or
revolution could occur when white readers, already identifying with the black characters
in the books, encounter the white characters, including Jan and Mary in Native Son and
the white waitresses in Black Boy. These encounters with whites can become encounters
with ―whites as others‖ from the black perspective, which the white reader has
internalized already from reading the books. Whiteness in the books can be otherness to
white readers. With the texts as a foundation, prospective teachers can explore how they
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may be able to identify with some of the whites in the texts who do not notice how they
are seen as whites by people of color.
This position can enable white readers to switch between seeing whiteness as
otherness and seeing themselves as the whites who are the others. This is the beginning of
white double consciousness. It is an abstract double consciousness because it is located
within literary texts. However, with this conceptual appreciation for seeing self from
outside self, white readers and white prospective teachers can use their abstract model of
double consciousness to develop multiple perspectives of self in real life, with real
people, instead of only having these new perspectives in the readings. This is when
dialogue, unfinishedness, political clarity, and critical consciousness can truly join with
the precepts of MDC.
This type of preparation reveals to white prospective teachers how whites are seen
as whites by people of color. With such understanding, white teachers can learn to
become more comfortable with being seen as white, so that they can engage their
students without defensive or evasive postures. Also, the preparation can lead white
prospective teachers to notice some ways their own MDC deficits can force students of
color to unilaterally accommodate racial tensions with whites. With that awareness,
prospective teachers can better prepare themselves to create safe and democratic venues
for discussing (instead of unknowingly reproducing) these tensions. What will the
teachers do after providing a safe place for their students to discuss the tensions? Is there
a next step between teachers and students? These are questions, or kinds of questions,
that can be developed between teacher education professors and the prospective teachers
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in their university classes. Also, these types of questions can be explored by teachers,
school administrators and parents in primary and secondary schools. The goal of this
thesis is not to answer these questions, but to help illuminate and open the questions to
shared and equal dialogue and debate.
The facets of dialogue, unfinishedness, political clarity, critical consciousness,
and MDC, then, can begin to develop between professors and the prospective teachers
they teach. In fact, there can be a reciprocal relationship between the teaching of MDC
and dialogue, unfinishedness, political clarity, and critical consciousness. Not only do the
later skills, or states of awareness, help develop MDC, but MDC can also help
prospective teachers acquire the states of awareness comprised of dialogue,
unfinishedness, and critical consciousness.
MDC, dialogue, unfinishedness, political clarity, and critical consciousness are
internal (or psychological) states of awareness, as well as social practices. More
precisely, they are all concurrent psychological states of awareness and social practices.
They can only occur simultaneously. This means that the psychological realm is
inseparable from the social realm. There is no distinction between personal development
of MDC and dialogue with others about MDC development. The sense of self that sees
itself as separate from the outside world and other people is seen, with MDC, as an
illusion. Ultimately, with MDC, there is no sense of separate self, because the sense of
self is comprised not of its own ideas of itself, but of the broader social environment of
which it is a product. In this way, people can transition through MDC from a sense of
isolated individuality to a sense of interconnectedness, where not only the racial, cultural,
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and linguistic barriers, but also the individual separateness, of people is recognized as
unreal. This state of awareness can lead toward compassion that develops from a sense of
interdependence. The illusion is that we are merely our senses of ourselves. The actuality
is that we are much more each other.
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CHAPTER 25
THESIS CONCLUSION: RACE AND ―COLORBLINDNESS‖ AS HIDDEN
IDEOLOGY

Toward the actuality that we are more each other than our senses of individuality,
a more concrete ―big picture‖ can be seen and explored. This picture is of race as a
hidden ideology. Exposing race as hidden ideology through multilateral double
consciousness development and dialogue can help all Americans notice and critically
evaluate how our identities, senses of justice, strategies, methodologies, ideals,
perspectives and narratives are informed, or even determined, by the social environment.
Exposing race as hidden ideology can begin with a return to Loury‘s definition of
race. The social categories of race, Loury explains, ―are among the structures in our
social environment to which meanings about the identity, capability, and worthiness of
their bearers have been imputed‖ (2002, p. 58). Also, social categories of race are
structures by which positions of inferiority or superiority are ascribed. The negation and
ascription of black inferiority, this thesis has argued, can conflict with self defined
identities of African American people and lead to what DuBois calls, ―Double
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consciousness.‖ If this black burden is happening while whites are privileged to be free
from double consciousness at the expense of unilateral black double consciousness, then
that is a form of inequality and white supremacy. If that oppression is not noticed, then
the lives lived within and through that oppression can be limited to the systems of
thought (the hidden social structure of black burden and white privilege) that are
accessible with the system of thought. That system, the hidden privileges and burdens of
race, and the hidden social structure of black burden and white privilege, is a hidden
ideology. It is a way we think from, but not about. It is what we use to think and study,
but it is not the target of thought and study. Claude Levi-Strauss says,
From birth and…probably even before, the things and beings in our environment
establish in each one of us an array of complex references forming a systemconduct, motivations, implicit judgments, which education then confirms by
means of its reflexive view of the historical development of our civilization. We
literally move along with this reference system, and the cultural systems
established outside it are perceptible to us only through the distortions imprinted
upon them by our system. Indeed, it may even make us incapable of seeing those
other systems. (1992, p. 11)
People live in social environments that impart references that form systems of
conduct, motivations and implicit judgments. Other systems of thought are unclear or
inaccessible because people can only see them through the distortions of their own
reference systems. Race is one such reference through which we are shaped by history.
Loury explains,
―Race‖ is all about embodied social significance… [Bodily markings are] signs
from which cues of identities are drawn, and upon which indices of belongingness
are inscribed. As we encounter one another in social space, we perceive the
physical markings on one another‘s bodies and go on to play our respective parts,
enacting scripts written long before we were born… Here we enter the territory of
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racial stigma, of dishonorable meanings socially inscribed on arbitrary bodily
markings, of ―spoiled collective identities.‖ (2002, pp. 58-9)
These scripts are often more subtle than overt or deliberate racism. They can be as
aversive as superseding class over race when class and race are actually symbiotic. That
position of class salience over race evades the whole problem of racial stigma while
claiming to be anti-racist. The covert white supremacy of dismissing racial stigma is
hidden, and made inaccessible, by the ideology itself. Donaldo Macedo et.al. say,
[I]f the results that are presented as facts were originally determined by a
particular ideology, these facts cannot themselves illuminate issues that lie outside
the ideological construction of these facts to begin with. (2003, p. 72).
It is hard to look at an orientation or a reference system because it is the reference
system that does the looking. Ideology is hidden because it cannot see itself, but it is the
only perspective from which its host can see. When there is a population, a nation, within
an ideology of unilateral black double consciousness, then all members are living in a
system of deception. There is an intrinsic inequality within unilateral double
consciousness that persists as who we are regardless of our positions, identities, beliefs,
work or deeds. Vaclav Havel explains,
Ideology is a specious way of relating to the world. It offers human beings the
illusion of an identity, of dignity, and of morality while making it easier for them
to part with them. As the repository of something suprapersonal and objective, it
enables people to deceive their conscience and conceal their true position and
their inglorious modus vivendi, both from the world and from themselves. It is
very pragmatic but, at the same time, an apparently dignified way of legitimizing
what is above, below, and on either side. (1991, p. 133)
The invisibility of ideology in unilateral double consciousness enables illusions of
fair and equal identity, dignity and morality to develop. When unilateral black double
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consciousness is not identified as a form of covert white supremacy, then people can have
a shared insidious sense of their own identities, dignity and morality that remains
collectively validated because no one sees or admits the deception or delusion. Then,
without knowing of their positions, the inequality they do not see can seem just. It seems
just because it just is. This is how covert white supremacy, as revealed by DuBoisian
double consciousness, is a hidden ideology.
A question then arises of how to surmount hidden ideology. Ideology has to be
exposed and explored dialogically. Karl Mannheim says,
Once we recognize that all historical knowledge is relational knowledge, and can
only be formulated with reference to the position of the observer, we are faced,
once more, with the task of discriminating between what is true and what is false
in such knowledge. The question then arises: which social standpoint vis-à-vis of
history offers the best chance for reaching an optimum of truth? In any case, at
this stage the vain hope of discovering truth in a form which is independent of an
historically and socially determined set of meanings will have to be given
up…Thus the ideological element in human thought, viewed at this level, is
always bound up with the existing life-situation of the thinker. (1936 pp. 79-80)
This is a difficult, but not complicated, problem. It is very difficult to persuade a
person to minimize a whole sense of reality when that reality is confirmed by tremendous
emotional and identity investment and when that reality is confirmed by a whole
historical standpoint that gives the person a secure and recognized position among other
people. It is a simple, problem, though, because the solution is nothing more than a new,
alternative, orientation from which the ideology can be considered and regulated from
outside. The way out of a hidden ideology is through a different ideology.
There may be no need to bother wondering if people can be free from ideology. It
does not matter. What matters is that people do not have to be trapped within a single
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ideology. When a person can move between ideologies, no one ideology can control a
person‘s thinking. As soon as one system becomes too domineering, another system can
assert itself and demand restraint of the other system. Such mobility can reveal that any
ideology is limited and limiting, thereby discouraging too much investment in any one
system of thought. Mannheim says,
It seems inherent in the historical process itself that the narrowness and the
limitations which restrict one point of view tend to be corrected by clashing with
the opposite points of view. The task of a study of ideology, which tries to be free
from value-judgments, is to understand the narrowness of each individual point of
view and the interplay between these distinctive attitudes in the total social
process (1936, p.81).
When opposing views clash between different people, they can lead to each party
hunkering-down within conflicting positions. If, however, opposing views can clash
within the same person, the person can emerge from both views with a sense of the
limitations of each view. More important, the person can notice that all positions are
limited and limiting. This insight does not mean a person cannot invest and believe in
anything. Rather, it just means that beliefs, or believing, should not be allowed too define
us. Identity may be necessary to function with other people in life, but we do not have to
be trapped by or as our identities. Instead of having only one pattern of thought to adhere
to, live within and believe in with increasingly limited flexibility and increasingly
limiting certainty, the interplay between the views, and between all views, can be
appreciated and negotiated within oneself and with other people. Lilia Bartolome says,
The juxtaposing of ideologies should help teachers to better understand if, when,
and how their belief systems uncritically reflect those of the dominant society and
thus maintain unequal and what should be unacceptable conditions that so many
students experience on a daily basis. (2004 p. 98)
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Multilateral double consciousness can help people identify and then juxtapose
ideologies and become familiar with mobility between ideologies. Juxtaposition and
mobility between ideologies is both a personal process and a social interaction. It happens
within one‘s own thinking, but it comes from talking with people from other communities
and especially across color lines.
Such exposure of race as hidden ideology through multilateral double
consciousness development involves openly facing and addressing views and experiences
that are extremely sensitive for most people in the US. Race became too touchy to
mention because of the rise of ―colorblindness‖ as the dominant ideology since the
1990‘s. ―Colorblindness,‖ along with unilateral double consciousness, became part of
both a known and hidden ideology of race. Its sensitivity to race, in and of itself, is an
ideological justification for ―colorblindness‖ to avoid addressing the continuing social
significance of race and ongoing racism.
As ―colorblindness‖ was developing, since the 1980‘s, black incarceration has
increased (Tonry, 1995); segregation and mutual suspicion continues (Kotlowitz, 1998);
institutionalized racism is perpetuated (Brown, 2003); and racism is denied through
―colorblindness‖ as it mutates internationally in the globalizing economy (Macedo &
Gounari, 2006). Meanwhile, also since the 1980‘s, and with accusations of racism from
the colorblind, African American scholars have been writing, for example, about the
deepest roots of white supremacy as shown through American Literature (Morrison,
1993); the double standards of ―colorblindness‖ (Gates, 1992); and the privileging of
323

white people‘s sensitivity to race over that of blacks (Williams, 1991). Despite the
reproductions of racism and the research into exposing the hidden realms of that racism,
―colorblindness‖ became the dominant strategy ―against‖ racism. In fact,
―colorblindness‖ became so politically correct that any mention of race could be
considered racist just because it drew attention to the censored subject. Questioning that
censorship, and identifying it as hidden ideology, was not made part of critical thinking.
One of the strongest arguments of ―colorblindness‖ is called, ―Anti-essentialism.‖
Anti-essentialism means that each individual is so unique that he/she, or who he/she is,
cannot be reduced to any common racial trait, especially since there is no biological
significance or essence of race anyway. That sounds reasonable at first. However, antiessentialism seems reasonable at first because white supremacy, as hidden ideology in the
forms of hierarchical ascriptions and ―colorblindness,‖ runs through and shapes meanings
and understandings of race, individuality, choice and agency. The vaunted individual
uniqueness of anti-essentialism is not so pristine as one might like to insist. Americans
are unique individuals within a social system of white supremacy. Blacks and whites are
differently and unequally situated as unique individuals within white supremacy as an
overarching structure and a hidden ideology.
When anti-essentialism goes so far from the biological into the social as to claim
that there is no role of white supremacy in the unique individualities of racially
differentiated people, then ―colorblindness‖ prevents awareness of ways common racial
burdens and privileges malleate the unique individualities of black and white Americans
as well as all people in the U.S. and perhaps in other countries as well. This is a way
324

―colorblindness‖ is a known ideology against racism, but as a hidden ideology it
maintains the unilateral burden of black double consciousness.
In other words, there is no biological essence of race and no unanimous meaning
of what race means to individually defined identities. However, evaluation of race as part
of U.S. white supremacy is exploration of how white supremacy essentializes race as a
social hierarchy even if it the essentializing is not noticed. This thesis endeavors to
evaluate and explore how unique individuality within white supremacy might be
allocated or rationed according to racial designations. If this is socially essentializing
race, then that is asserted to be anti-racist rather than racist.
To explain another way, it is easy to say race has no meaning because it has been
a lie all along, so why keep lying? In a way, yes, it is true and right to see race as a lie, as
not existing, as a known ideology contrived to create unnatural differences in meanings
of humanity, social position and interpersonal dynamics. That is nothing new, though. It
has always been right and true to see race as such a known ideology and as a fallacy.
However, although race has always been false, it has always been, or had, an actual
existence too since it was first developed during the Seventeenth Century colonization of
the New World. The falsity of race never prevented it from becoming socially and
psychologically real; part of the nation; and part of who Americans are. Although it is not
biological, we do not have to believe in race for it to be real. We, from before birth, are
already ideologically shaped by the black stigma and white pedestal of race regardless of
what we decide to think and believe and regardless of how we feel deep inside.
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Colorblind people, of all sorts of social groups, have insisted that it is racist to
discuss race because that maintains, instead of forsaking, the existence of race, which
only exists because we maintain it in our thinking, interactions and choices (personal
communications, 1989- present). Consider, though, what this meaning of anti-racism
does. It leads us to dismiss and censor race as a known ideology instead of looking
exquisitely into how all Americans are shaped and influenced by race as a hidden
ideology, no matter how false and contrived a lie it is. Then, we ignore the most visible
and concrete meanings of race (as a known ideology) in order to ignore the deeper and
more obscured meanings of race (as a hidden ideology), all in the name of anti-racism.lxiii
In this way, anti-essentialism actually maintains the racism it claims to oppose.lxiv
Instead of seeking the depths of race as hidden ideology, the biological fallacy of
race is sublimated by ―colorblindness‖ into rejection of race as socially significant. This
subterfuge is accomplished by conflating racial stereotypes with racial essences, as if
believing in stereotypes is social essentializing. (For example, many African Americans
may be conservative and even racist. Not all tall African Americans play basketball. Not
all black youth like hip-hop.) Anti-essentialism and ―colorblindness‖ might say that,
since none of the racial stereotypes can be generalized and since there is no biological
significance, there is no evidence of race as a natural or nurtured reality. Then,
perseverating on all those social and biological fictions can seem to do nothing
lxiii

lxiv

This limiting of range of inquiry may be similar to Herbert Marcuse‘s meaning of, ―Closure of
meaning,‖ in, One Dimensional Man.
This conflation of maintenance with opposition may be similar to Marcuse‘s meaning of, ―Unification
of opposites,‖ in, One Dimensional Man.

326

productive, but only keep them active and functioning in thought and society. This might
be why ―colorblindness‖ argues that it is racist to talk about race.
It is not the stereotypes, however, that are the possible social essences of race.
Focusing only on stereotypes directs attention away from the ascriptions of white
superiority and black inferiority. Those positive and negative ascriptions could be the
essences of race that do exist socially and that are missed when looking at race closely is
considered racist. Seeing, really seeing, racism would no longer be turned around and
considered to be racism itself.
The social significance of race is dismissed on the grounds of stereotypes, but
those are not sufficient grounds. There is more to the social significance of race than
stereotypes. Generalizing the dismissal of stereotypes to mean that all social significance
of race can be dismissed is a way the remaining social significances (including
ascriptions, positions and dynamics racial superiority and inferiority) can remain a hidden
ideology, hidden behind a façade of anti-racism. These remaining social significances
(the hidden ascriptions, positions of racial superiority and inferiority) are very covert,
subtle, nuanced, emotionally sensitive and psychologically guarded. These could be the
social essences of race that derive from U.S. white supremacy and maintain an unexposed
black burden of unilateral double consciousness. If so, illuminating the essences, or at
least the significances, of race could help expose the broader system of white supremacy.
When social ascription of white supremacy is seen as a social essence of race,
then anti-essentialism can be caught out as evading, denying and reproducing the
unilateral black double consciousness that multilateral double consciousness can expose.
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Then, we can see and address the contradictions of our carrying the ascriptions we also
reject. Multilateral double consciousness could help introduce people to each other, to
themselves and to their hidden ideologies and unexposed conditionings across color lines.
Meeting the other, meeting one‘s self and exposing hidden ideology and conditionings
can happen together when people share the burdens and gifts of seeing themselves as
racial from views across the color lines. That would be a practice of critical thinking.
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APPENDIX A
BLACK DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS DATA

9.
Shadow
and Act
(Ellison,
1994)

10.
Playing in
the Dark
(Morrison,
1992)

Black Perspective
26: ―[T]he American
himself has not been
finally defined . . . this
struggle between
Americans as to what
American is to be is
part of that democratic
process . . . the ideal
American character . .
. is slowly being
born.‖

47: ―American means
white, and Africanist
people struggle to
make the term
applicable to
themselves with
ethnicity and hyphen
after hyphen after
hyphen.‖

White Perspective
28–9: ―[The] Negro . . . is
also a key figure in a
magic rite by which the
white American seeks to
resolve the dilemma
arising between his
democratic beliefs and
certain antidemocratic
practices . . . The Negro
was placed outside the
democratic master plan, a
human ‗natural‘ resource .
. . so that white men could
become more human.‖
47: ―For the settlers and
for American writers
generally, this Africanist
other became the means of
thinking about body,
mind, chaos, kindness and
love; provided the
occasion for the exercises
in the absence of restraint,
the presence of restraint,
the contemplation of
freedom and aggression . .
.‖
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Black Response
28: ―I propose we
view the whole of
American life as a
drama acted out
upon the body of a
Negro giant.‖

50: ―[T]he
consequence was a
master narrative
that spoke for
Africans and their
descendants, or of
them. The
legislator‘s
narrative could not
coexist with a
response from the
Africanist
persona.‖
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